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Abstract 
The thesis discusses the question of how unfamiliar computing systems, particularly 
those with graphical user interfaces, are learned and used. In particular, the approach 
of basing the design and behaviour of on-screen objects in the system's model world 
on a coherent theme and employing a metaphor is explored. The drawbacks, as well 
as the advantages, of this approach are reviewed and presented. The use of 
metaphors is also contrasted with other forms of users' mental models of interactive 
systems, and the need to provide a system image from which useful mental models 
can be developed is presented. 
Metaphors are placed in the context of users' understanding of interactive systems 
and novel application is made of the Qualitative Process Theory (QPT) qualitative 
reasoning model to reason about the behaviour of on-screen objects, the underlying 
system functionality, and the relationship between the two. This analysis supports re-
evaluation of the domains between which user interface metaphors are said to form 
mappings. A novel user interface design, entitled Medusa, that adopts guidelines for 
the design of metaphor-based systems, and for helping the user develop successful 
mental models, based on the QPT analysis and an empirical study of a popular 
metaphor-based system, is described. The first Medusa design is critiqued using 
well-founded usability inspection method. 
Employing the Lakoff/lohnson theory, a revised verSIOn of the Medusa user 
interface is described that derives its application semantics and dialogue structures 
from the entailments of the knowledge structures that ground understanding of the 
interface metaphor and that capture notions of embodiment in interaction with 
computing devices that QPT descriptions cannot. Design guidelines from influential 
existing work, and new methods of reasoning about metaphor-based designs, are 
presented with a number of novel graphical user interface designs intended to 
overcome the failings of existing systems and design approaches. 
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"Technical texts are generally understood to report work that their authors have 
done; they are focused on machinery in a broad sense, be it hardware, software, or 
mathematics. They open by making claims - 'Our machinery can do such and such 
and others' cannot' - and they confine themselves to demonstrating these claims in a 
way that others can replicate. They close by sketching further work - more problems, 
more solutions. Critical texts, by contrast, are the work that their authors have done. 
Their textuality is in the foreground, and they are focused on theoretical categories. 
-
They open by situating a problematic in an intellectual tradition, and they proceed by 
narrating their materials in a way that exhibits the adequacy of certain categories and 
the inadequacy of others. They close with a statement of moral purpose." 
- P. E. Agre (1997) Computation and Human Experience, Cambridge University 
Press: xiii. 
"This is the time, and this is the record of the time. 11 
- Laurie Anderson (1979) United States live I-W, Warner Brothers Records. 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
1.1 The Problem 1 
1.2 A Solution - Metaphor Recommended 3 
1.3 A Solution? Metaphor Also Considered Harmful 4 
1.4 A Solution - Ne\v Metaphors and Approaches to Metaphor 5 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 6 
Chapter 2: Existing Approaches to the Use of Metaphor and 13 
Analogy in User Interface Design 
2.1 Introduction 13 
2.1.1 WIMP Systems 14 
2.2 The Desktop 17 
2.3 Rooms 18 
2.4 The Al ternate Reali ty Ki t 24 
2.5 Metaphor and non-visual representation 29 
2.5.1 Auditory Icons 30 
2.5.2 SonicFinder 32 
2.5.3 SharedARK 33 
2.6 The "Reality" Metaphor and New Interaction Styles 34 
2.6.1 Optical Metaphors 36 
2.7 Conclusions 39 
Chapter 3: An Empirical Study of First-time Macintosh Users 41 
3.1 Overview of the study 43 
3.1.1 The Subjects 43 
3.1.2 Methodology 43 
3.1.3 Tasks Performed by Subjects 44 
3.1.4 Caveats 45 
3.2 Observations 46 
3.2.1 Using the Manual 46 
3.2.2 Using the On-line Help Facility 47 
3.2.3 Interpreting the Desktop Metaphor 48 
3.2.4 Basic User Interaction 52 
3.3 Conclusions 56 
Chapter 4: Drawbacks to Employing Metaphors and 58 
Analogies in Interactive User Interfaces 
4.1 Introduction 58 
4.2 Operational Metaphors 59 
4.3 Structural A pproaches to Metaphor 63 
4.4 Structural Approaches to Metaphor and Learning of Computer- 68 
Based Systems 
4.5 The Pragmatics of Metaphor 72 
4.5.1 WIMP Systems 73 
4.5.2 Instruction 73 
ii 
4.5.3 Basic user interaction 74 
4.5.4 The Desktop 75 
4.6 Discussion - Metaphor and System Learning and Use 76 
4.7 Types and Theories of Metaphor 82 
4.7.1 Interaction Theories 83 
4.7.2 Metaphor and Analogy 85 
4.8 Is Metaphorical Understanding of User Interfaces 88 
Possible? 
4.9 Cognitive Semantics of User Interface Metaphors 93 
4.9.1 Image Schemata and Metaphorical Projection for 94 
Understanding 
4.9.2 The Lakoffllohnson Theory in HCI 98 
4.10 Conclusions 101 
Chapter 5: Users' Models of Interactive Systems 102 
5.1 Introduction 102 
5.2 Types of Users' Models of Systems 105 
5.2.1 Networks 108 
5.2.2 Glass Box Models 109 
5.2.3 Surrogates 110 
5.2.4 Task-action Mappings 115 
5.2.5 Qualitative Models as Mental Models 116 
5.3 The Role of the Display as Source of Information in System 123 
Learning and Use 
5.4 Using the Lakoffllohnson Model for Analysis and 125 
Design of User Interfaces 
5.4.1 Case Study I:An Immersive Environment 126 
5.4.2 Case Study 2:Snap-Dragging 129 
5.4.3 Case Study 3:The Apple Macintosh Trashcan 131 
5. 5 Conclusions 134 
Chapter 6: The Medusa System 136 
6.1 Introduction 136 
6.2 Basic Criteria that the Medusa System Should Satisfy 137 
6.3 General Layout of the Medusa Display 138 
6.4 Performing Basic Tasks in Medusa 139 
6.4.1 Using the Toolbar 140 
6.4.2 Collections of Objects 142 
6.4.3 Moving Files between Containers 146 
6.4.4 Deleting Files 147 
6.4.5 Interacting with the Root Window 149 
. 6.5 Breakdowns ISO 
6.5.1 Hardware Breakdowns 150 
6.5.2 Buffers 151 
6.5.3 Predicting Breakdown 152 
6.6 Conclusions 154 
11l 
Chapter 7: The Medusa System Design Rationale 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 The Medusa System -Version One 
7.2.1 The Workbench 
7.2.2 Objects in the Model World 
7.2.3 What Are Files? 
7.2.4 An Ontology of Invisible Objects? 
7.2.5 Numbers of Objects -Directories and Containers 
7.2.6 The Computer-Computer Metaphor 
7.2.7 Penonning Tasks in Medusa 
7.2.8 Groups of Objects 
7.2.9 System Feedback 
7.2.10 Help 
7.2.11 The File Manager 
7.3 Implementing Medusa 
7.3.1 Use of the Agent Notation and Language 
7.3.2 System Architecture 
7.3.3 The Application 
7.3.4 A Partial Implementation 
7.4 Conclusions 
Chapter 8: A Critique of the Medusa System Design 
8.1 Introduction 
8.2 The Cognitive Walkthrough Method 
8.2.1 Interaction and The Cognitive Walkthrough 
8.2.2 Conducting the Walkthrough Method 
8.3 A Cognitive Walkthrough of the Medusa System 
8.3.1 Preparation 
8.3.2 Perfonning the Cognitive Walkthrough 
8.3.3 Task 1 - Running an Application 
8.3.4 Task 2 - Moving a File 
8.3.5 Task 3 - Adding a Method to the Toolbar 
8.4 Design Haws in the Medusa System Version One 
8.4.1 Basic Interaction 
8.4.2 Understanding the Computer-Computer Metaphor 
8.4.3 Directly ManipUlating the Intangible 
8.5 Conclusions 
8.5.1 Is The Computer Metaphor Better Than Others? 
Chapter 9: Revised Versions of the Medusa System 
9.1 The Medusa System - Version Two 
9.1.1 Direct Manipulation 
9.1.2 The Workbench 
9.1.3 Objects in the Model World 
9.1.4 File Management - Piles of Objects 
9.1.5 Perfonning Tasks in Medusa Version Two 
9.1.6 Other File Organisation Solutions 
iv 
155 
155 
156 
156 
157 
170 
172 
172 
175 
177 
182 
183 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
193 
194 
196 
197 
198 
199 
199 
201 
203 
203 
204 
205 
207 
209 
212 
212 
215 
215 
218 
219 
221 
222 
222 
224 
225 
227 
234 
247 
9.2 Medusa-1: - A System Addressing Temporal Problems 259 
9.2.1 Implementing Medusa-1: 263 
9.3 Conclusions 263 
Chapter 10: Conclusions and Further Work 265 
10.1 Summary of the Thesis 265 
10.2 Contributions of the Thesis 267 
10.2.1 Medusa in a Cognitivist Framework 267 
10.2.2 Medusa in a Cognitive Semantics Framework 269 
10.3 Does the Work Address Key Issues in HCI? 270 
10.3.1 Interaction Styles - What is Natural? 270 
10.3.2 Input Techniques - Putting Intention into Action 272 
10.3.3 Output Organisation 273 
10.3.4 Response Time 274 
10.3.5 Error Handling - Preventing User Errors 274 
10.3.6 Individual Differences 275 
10.3.7 Explanatory and Predictive Theories 276 
10.4 Suggestions for Further Work 277 
10.4.1 Full Implementation of the Medusa Systems 277 
10.4.2 Implementing Agents 278 
10.5 The Future of Metaphors and Direct Manipulation 279 
10.5.1 Classes of Metaphor and Understanding Directness 279 
10.5.2 Metaphors for Future Computing Systems 282 
10.5.3 Metaphor-based Design 283 
References 286 
Appendix A: Qualitative Process Theory Notation and 309 
Models of Generic Processes 
A.l Qualitative Process Theory Notation Employed in the Thesis 310 
A.2 QPT Models of Generic Commands 311 
A.2.1 Moving a file 311 
A.2.2 Copying (or duplicating) a file 312 
A.2.3 Deleting a file 313 
A.2.4 Printing a file 314 
Appendix B: Forms used to Conduct Cognitive Walkthroughs 315 
RI Forms Completed During a Walkthrough 315 
B.1.1 Section One of Phase Two of a Walkthrough 316 
B.1.2 Section Two of Phase Two of a Walkthrough 317 
B .1.3 Section 3 of Phase Two of a Walkthrough 318 
Appendix C: Metaphors We Stack By 319 
C.l Introduction 319 
C.2 Users' Construction and Use of Piles 320 
C.2.1 A Neat Office 320 
C.2.2. A Messy Office 321 
C.3 A Logic of Piling 323 
v 
List of Figures 
Fi gure 2.1 A Desktop 17 
Figure 2.2 Relationships between tasks,engaged tools,Rooms and windows 21 
Figure 2.3 Mail,a Room for reading electronic mail 22 
Figure 2.4 An ARK simulation of bodies moving under mutual gravitational 25 
attraction 
Figure 2.5 The ARK \varehouse 26 
Figure 2.6 ARK buttons 26 
Figure 2.7 ARK representatives 27 
Figure 2.8 An ARK interactor 27 
Figure 2.9 The ARK hand 28 
Figure 2.10 The metaDESK concept 37 
Figure 2.11 MetaDESK 37 
Figure 3.1 An on-line help speech balloon 48 
Figure 3.2 Icon denoting a file produced by SuperPaint 51 
Figure 3.3 An application program 51 
Figure 3.4 Close window button 53 
Figure 3.5 Finder menu icon 54 
Figure 4.1 Domain model of the solar system 66 
Figure 4.2 Domain model of the structure of the atom 66 
Figure 4.3 Highlighted text placed on a saw-tooth sheet 69 
Figure 4.4 Building blocks of slipnets 80 
Figure 4.5 Part of a slipnet representing the alphabet 80 
Figure 4.6 GEdit,a paper-like interface 82 
Figure 4.7 The our 1 schema 96 
Figure 4.8 The ourl schema 96 
Figure 4.9 The our3 schema 96 
Figure 4.10 Some pervasive image schemata 98 
Figure 5.1 QPT notation attributes and on-screen objects 118 
Figure 5.2 A QPT model of a moving object in an ARK simulation 120 
Figure 5.3 A QPT model of motion 121 
Figure 5.4 A QPT model of moving a file within the underlying system 122 
functionality 
Figure 5.5 A vie\v inside Osmose 126 
Figure 5.6 The Structure of the Osmose model world 127 
Figure 5.7 The COUNTERFORCE schema 128 
Figure 5.8 The ATTRACTION schema 130 
Figure 6.1 General layout of the Medusa display 140 
Figure 6.2 Invoking the tool bar for an on-screen object 142 
Figure 6.3 Collections of objects - containers 143 
Figure 6.4 A Toolbar for a Group 145 
Figure 6.5 Placing a data file into a container 147 
Figure 6.6 Visualising the Medusa keyboard buffer 152 
vi 
Figure 7.1 The categories of Medusa system version one on-screen objects 158 
Figure 7.2 Typical text file icons 161 
Figure 7.3 A Hypercard stack 168 
Figure 7.4 A multidimensional icon denoting a C language file 170 
Figure 7.5 The potential capacity of a directory 173 
Figure 7.6 The first design of device description in Medusa 176 
Figure 7.7 The second design of device description in Medusa 177 
Figure 7.8 Get-value sub-task 179 
Figure 7.9 An unloaded multifunction cursor for a 3-button mouse 181 
Figure 7.10A sample tool bar 182 
Figure 7.11 SSOU feedback states 186 
Figure 7.12 An agent 190 
Figure 7.13 The UMA user interface architecture 192 
Figure 8.1 Norman's Seven-Stage Model of Interaction 199 
Figure 8.2 Moving the pointer over an icon 205 
Figure 8.3 Revealing the toolbar for a file 206 
Figure 8.4 Moving the pointer over the "Run Application"toolbar option 206 
Figure 8.5 Selecting the "Move to"toolbar option 208 
Figure 8.6 Indicating the destination container when moving a file 208 
Figure 8.7 Moving the pointer over the meta-toolbar 210 
Figure 8.8 Selecting the "Add Command"toolbar option 211 
Figure 8.9 Selecting the "Edit using Text Tool" hierarchical toolbar option 211 
Figure 9.1 Spreading out a pile's contents by a horizontal gesture 231 
Figure 9.2 Gestures to browse the contents of piles 232 
Figure 9.3 Reality, alternate reality, and meta-reality 233 
Figure 9.4 Starting a new pile 236 
Figure 9.5 Adding a file to an existing pile 237 
Figure 9.6 Spreading out a pile in a revised version of Medusa 238 
Figure 9.7 An account of file copying (Dourish and Button, 1998:423) 242 
Figure 9.8 The COMPULSION schema 246 
Figure 9.9 Toolbar options for a conduit 247 
Figure 9.10 A Lifestream 251 
Figure 9.11 Data Mountain for web page favourites 256 
Figure 10.1 The collaborative manipulation metaphor 281 
Figure C.l A containment schema 324 
vu 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Physical Instantiation of GUI Elements in a TUI 38 
Table 5.1 An action-effect rule describing partial behaviour 103 
of the Macintosh Finder interface. 
Table 7.1 Basic interaction tasks and virtual devices 179 
Table 7.2 Dra\vbacks of user interface services and reasons for adopting a 191 
user interface architecture. 
Table 8.1 Goal structure for first walkthrough task 207 
Table 8.2 Goal structure for second walkthrough task 209 
Table 8.3 Goal structure for third walkthrough task. 212 
Table 9.1 Units of desk organization 228 
Table 9.2 Mappings for the Time Orientation metaphor 253 
Table 9.3 Mappings for the Composite Moving Time metaphor 253 
Table 10.1 Part of an OSM table for a drawing package 269 
viii 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"So then I got down to the writing. and it was awful. I don't know why I'd ever 
romanticised it. I don't know why anyone would want to do it. It stinks. It's like a 
disease. It's an illness. writing. It steals your body from you. There's no audience. 
You're alone." 
- Spalding Gray, from the 'Monster in a Box' monologue. 
1.1 The Problem 
Card, Moran, and Newell (1983: vii) claim that: 
"Designing interactive computer systems to be efficient and easy to 
use is important so that people in our society may realise the potential 
benefits of computer-based tools." 
The vast majority of user interface designers and researchers of human-computer 
interaction (HC!) will agree with this view. What is not agreed upon, however. is 
how interactive systems should be designed; or how efficiency and ease of use may 
be designed for and how a completed system can be judged to possess them; or how 
one recognises a member of a society who can be expected to understand and make 
use of a computing system; or how systems should be designed so that they are 
comprehensible and usable in a particular culture or society; or indeed whether 
computing systems, in fact, deliver any benefits to those who use them (Landauer, 
1995). For Herbert Simon (1981), design, like all activity, is a matter of making 
choices from options and actions in a problem space. Confronted by numerous 
options, people engage in a process termed satisjicing - making choices that are 
satisfactory, not necessarily those that are optimal - if they are to not be stuck in a 
state of paralysis, unable to decide between a number of equally valid choices. In 
some sense, we are more fortunate if constrained by time and the limited availability 
of resources. For the user interface designer, there exist many tens of design lifecycle 
models, interaction styles, input and output devices, programming languages, user 
interface toolkits, and usability evaluation techniques which can be combined in 
many \vays during a design task. This multiplicity of choice arises because of what is 
claimed to be a theory gap in HCI (Landauer, 1989; Long and Dowell, 1989). There 
is no theory of user interface design that allows us to construct the best interface 
given a set of requirements and constraints, neither are there sufficient bodies of 
knowledge or of experimental data provided by cognitive psychology which can be 
employed to constrain design choices. If we are to discuss user interface design, we 
are required to constrain the types of system we examine. 
The interfaces we consider are those where, in contrast to command-based interfaces 
where the user converses with an unseen agent in a natural or artificial language 
about an unseen but assumed task domain (the conversation paradigm of 
interaction), the task domain is depicted on-screen and its state may be directly 
altered. These systems are said to be based on the model world paradigm (Hutchins, 
Hollan, and Norman, 1986). Such systems are a subset of those systems termed 
direct manipulation (Shneiderman, 1982, 1983). Direct manipUlation systems are 
characterised by: 
• Continuous representation of the object of interest; 
• Physical actions or labelled button presses instead of complex syntax; 
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• Rapid incremental reversible operations whose impact on the object of interest is 
immediately visible. 
1.2 A Solution - Metaphor Recommended 
Even when the types of systems we consider in this research are restricted to those 
that support the model world paradigm of interaction, many design methodologies 
exist that can be considered and employed in a design task. The approach we 
-
consider in this research is one that is recommended by many influential and best-
selling texts (Hix and Hartson, 1993; Neilsen, 1993; Thimbleby, 1990), which is to 
use a metaphor or analogy in the depiction and programming of the behaviour of on-
screen objects. Analogy is recommended as a means of understanding new concepts 
and problem solving in many domains, it is, for example famously advocated by 
P6lya (1945) as a method for mathematical problem solving. The motivation 
underlying user interface metaphors is that users can make use of their existing 
knowledge structures with little modification, making the unfamiliar interactive 
system easier to use and learn than if users need to be acquire new knowledge 
structures (Carroll and Thomas, 1982). An example of how the use of user interface 
metaphors is recommended to students of computer science students is given by 
Evanson and Holland (1996): 
"To make users feel comfortable, successful software surrounds them 
with pictures or icons of familiar objects. Because such environments 
are meant to resemble the everyday world, designers say they're using 
a metaphor. 
Good software uses metaphor, which allows people to draw on their 
mental models of how the world works. All screen objects should fit 
the metaphor and act in sympathy with the user's expectations." 
3 
1.3 A Solution? Metaphor Also Considered Harmful 
While employing metaphors and analogies in the design of on-screen model worlds 
is often recommended, the metaphor-based user interface design process has not 
been described in detail by researchers. Anderson, Smyth, Knott, Bergan, Bergan, 
and Alty (1994) are exceptions and do provide some details as to how metaphors 
could be employed and how the best metaphor could be chosen from a set of 
alternatives. While metaphor-based design is ill-defined, there is some question as to 
whether metaphors do, in fact, offer the best solution to providing users with systems 
that are easily learned, used, and understood. As detailed in Chapter 4, previous uses 
of metaphor in user interfaces show that the metaphors employed give rise to serious 
usability problems while solving others. Criticisms of the use of metaphor in user 
interface design are long standing. Halasz and Moran (1982) describe the problem 
most often encountered with metaphors, that they break down. There often, if not 
always, exist aspects of the analogical source domain that ,viII not carry over into the 
target domain, or some functionality supported by the target domain of the 
computing system cannot be accounted for by the user interface metaphor. In all 
accounts of the cognitive mechanisms underlying metaphor understanding that have 
been proposed as valuable in user interface design, and in all existing approaches to 
employing metaphors, we see that metaphors are subject to these sorts of failures and 
breakdowns. That metaphors are implemented on computer hardware presents 
additional difficulties, the behaviour of model worlds, system image or system 
illusion, is dictated to an unpredictable degree by the behaviour of the operating 
system and by the hardware on which it, and the user interface process, executes. 
In addition to pragmatic difficulties, and the possibly inherent problem of 
breakdowns and limitations of scope in metaphors, there exist other difficulties with 
the use of metaphor in user interface design. The most serious arise from philosophy 
4 
and formal semantics, recent work in which fields (for example Putnam, 1981; 
Lakoff, 1987), in addition to a shift from long standing views of mind and cognitive 
science, points to a view that suggests that metaphor plays no role in understanding. 
This work suggests that user interfaces cannot be understood through metaphor, as 
metaphor is currently widely understood in user interface design. 
1.4 A Solution - New Metaphors and New Approaches to 
Metaphor 
Current trends in user interface design show a shift away from the metaphors 
currently widely used in desktop computing systems, toward immersive 
environments and desktop virtual realities, augmented realities, and visual 
formalisms. Also of growing importance are spatial metaphors, where the location 
of objects in the model world is more important for understanding and recognition 
than classification, action, and existing knowledge structures of a real world domain. 
Seeking to avoid the explicit use of metaphors in model worlds that are intended to 
account for much of the target system ignores the major part metaphor plays in 
understanding the real world, and by extension, in understanding model worlds. 
As with many aspects of cognition, metaphor has proved to be far more complex to 
understand than tasks that people themselves consider difficult. With user interface 
metaphors though a poor design can seem as difficult for users to understand and 
interact with as the mental mechanisms of metaphor understanding are to the 
researcher. Human-computer interaction has responded to the problem of metaphor 
and analogy in a number of ways. As mentioned above, current trends are shifting 
away from designs in which the problem of addressing metaphor must be faced. As 
with consciousness, problems can be divided into those that are easy and those that 
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are hardl • The easy problems of explaining cognitive functions are easy because they 
only require the specification of a mechanism that can perfonn the function. The 
hard problem is that even after all functionality has been explained, the further 
question of why functions are accompanied by experience may remain. Much of the 
previous work on analogy and metaphor surveyed belo\v addresses the easy 
problems. While some avoid either type of problem and regard metaphor in HC! as 
an area in which all problems have been solved or are unworthy of consideration, if 
user interface design is to understand the user experience, the hard problem of 
experience in general \vill eventually have to be addressed. 
The solutions adopted in this research are, firstly, to develop new metaphors to the 
functionality and services provided by systems which existing metaphors seek to 
explain. Secondly, other new metaphors are based on methods of thinking about the 
analysis of systems and metaphors that have previously not been applied to user 
interface metaphors and human-computer interaction, or that have not previously 
been explored in the depth that they are in this research. These methods of thinking 
have a focus on human experience built in and so allo\v some progress on the hard 
problem to be made. Case studies examining existing interface design solutions, and 
also novel interface designs, are undertaken to illustrate the approach adopted. 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 
We present the motivation for a novel user interface to facilities supported by a 
computer's operating system. We also present details of its design and a critique of 
the design based on the results of applying a usability inspection method. This 
I lbis distinction is attributed to, and is frequently discussed in the writing of, the philosopher David 
Chalrners, for example "Facing up to Consciousness" in Rita Carter's (2002) Conrciousnesst 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson: 50-55. 
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interface, rather than employing a single real world metaphor, attempts to make 
mechanisms that would otherwise be implicit and would have to be inferred by 
users, explicit. The interface is designed with the intention that users are more able 
to construct a realistic mental model of the system. Important in this part of the 
thesis is the realisation that the difficulties presented by existing theories of 
metaphor understanding, and their application in design tasks, must be addressed. In 
addressing these difficulties, a contemporary theory of metaphor, not usually applied 
to user interface design, is introduced and its usefulness is explored by undertaking a 
number of small case studies. In these studies, aspects of novel -user interfaces that 
prove difficult to describe and account for are examined. This theory is then 
employed as a predictive tool to help design a revised version of the novel user 
interface design presented earlier. In the revised design, the difficulties of metaphors 
are appreciated, but the pervasive nature of metaphor in understanding is not 
ignored. 
Chapter Two reviews a number of existing, historically important, systems which 
employ metaphors and analogies in providing a user interface to the facilities offered 
by the operating system of a complex computing device. Those systems that had a 
profound impact on future commercially available systems, or on human-computer 
interaction research, are focused on. In particular, systems that have helped to define 
what is commonly understood by the use of metaphor in user interface design, or 
that have employed metaphors when considering interaction using novel or 
unfamiliar modalities, are surveyed. 
Chapter Three presents the results of an empirical study of first-time users of the 
Apple Macintosh computer. This study was undertaken to examine the robustness of 
a previous similar study which explored the usability of another desktop metaphor-
based user interface, and to examine the pragmatics of user interface metaphors in 
use in order to question the claim that interfaces based on metaphors have superior 
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usability. Results of the study are also used to constrain the design of the novel user 
interface design presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter Four examines the role of metaphors and analogies in learning to use 
unfamiliar computing systems. Analogy plays an important role in learning and 
problem solving. Users \viIl often make use of existing skills and knowledge and 
may make spontaneous analogous connections when they are confronted \vith a new 
system. The use of analogies and metaphors is not without difficulties however. In 
this chapter the drawbacks of specific metaphors; the difficulties that aiise when 
specific theories of metaphor are applied in an attempt to understand what role 
metaphor plays in HCI; and the difficulties of attempting to evaluate chosen user 
interface metaphors, are surveyed. This chapter surveys the theories of metaphor that 
have previously been, or which can be, employed to design, criticise, or reason about 
the usability of, user interfaces. Realising the drawbacks of existing theories of 
metaphor comprehension and the limitations of other forms of mental model 
description, recent work undertaken by George Lakoff and his colleagues, including 
Mark Johnson, on metaphor comprehension is also considered in this chapter. 
Application of Lakoff and Johnson's \vork as a candidate approach to user interface 
metapho~ is then presented. 
Chapter Five places metaphors in the context of other forms of mental models that 
users may possess and employ \vhen interacting with computing systems. It is found 
that many approaches to aiding users by providing them with an account of how 
computing systems work also rely on metaphors. This chapter also seeks to stress the 
importance of users having useful knowledge of how a computing system works. In 
addition to knowing how their tasks should be performed, knowing how the device 
works is useful if interaction with a system is to be successful; if methods for 
performing new tasks are to be generated; if unexpected system behaviour is to be 
explicable and, where needed, correcting tasks must be performed. Using a 
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qualitative reasomng model and notation developed in the field of artificial 
intelligence, a novel attempt to model the behaviour of objects in model worlds, and 
to analyse the relationship between objects in the model world and their 
implementation as functionality in the underlying software, is presented. This 
method of analysis supports a revised view of the domains between which analogical 
mappings should be thought of as being made between when graphical user 
interfaces are required to be understood. This model also reveals and captures the 
mismatches between user interfaces based on a physical world metaphor and the 
actual behaviour exhibited by these systems based on a physical world metaphor. It 
also suggests, as with other means of capturing mental models, that knowledge of 
the underlying functionality, and its actual, and temporal, behaviour is required if 
user interfaces are to be understood fully. Sections of this chapter have been 
previously published as (Treglown, 1994). The ability of the Lakoffllohnson theory 
of metaphor understanding to provide accounts of how problematic features of 
existing user interfaces can be understood, or shown to be inherently difficult to use, 
is demonstrated in a number of case studies presented in this chapter. Sections of this 
chapter have been previously published as (Treglown, 1999; 2000; 2001). 
Chapters Six and Seven present the design of the Medusa system, the motivation for 
which arises from, in particular, the design guidelines discussed in Chapter Five. The 
system architecture and details of a proposed implementation are presented along 
with relevant aspects of the system's specification. Medusa provides a graphical user 
interface to the application programmer interface of the operating system of a 
complex computing device. Medusa also provides a representation of the computer's 
file space and supports file organisation and retrieval tasks. Medusa adopts three 
principles that are applied consistently to every relevant instance of the classes of on-
screen objects. These principles are, firstly, the idea of self-representation in icon 
design, where the final form in which a data file is presented is used to generate a 
rich icon design for the file. User interface design is not the only discipline in which 
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metaphors have been commonly used to account for the concepts that make up the 
domain of interest. In cognitive science, particularly in naive psychology, for 
example, metaphors have frequently been used to explain mental states and 
behaviour. Rumelhart (1989: 298) claims that "... the serial processing Von 
Neumann computer has become the dominant approach to the understanding of 
higher mental processes over the past 25 years or so." Rumclhart complains that 
while the metaphor has a great deal of merit, and improved upon many 
conceptualisations of the mind that preceded it, the conceptual baggage carried by 
-
the computer metaphor for the brain has limited, or must inevitably limit, further 
progress in understanding. Rumelhart suggests that more brain-like metaphors must 
replace computer-like metaphors to account for the brain. Rumelhart (1989: 299), in 
short, \vants to " ... replace the computer metaphor with the brain metaphor". In the 
design of Medusa , therefore, we seek for users to have greater understanding of the 
system by replacing traditional user interlace metaphors with a computer metaphor 
to explain a computing system .. This involves providing sufficient description and 
depiction on-screen of the device components, their interconnections, and their 
dynamic behaviour to permit users to easily alter accessible system parameters. In 
addition, unexpected system behaviour should be noticeable and explained in a ,\'ay 
that refers to the state of the hardware and operating system, but which does not 
require breaking the model world's metaphor. The third principle is consistency of 
task sequences, the same interaction style is adopted to permit interaction \vith every 
instance and class of on-screen object. 
Chapter Eight presents a critique of the Medusa system design described in Chapters 
Six and Seven. As no complete working prototype of the Medusa system exists, low-
cost usability inspection methods are employed to examine the usability of the 
system design. The usability inspection method chosen is the cognitive walkthrough 
method. This technique is termed an inspection method rather than an evaluation 
method because no user studies are conducted, it is, though, a technique proven to be 
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able to deteInline the usability of a system when users attempt to perfOITI1 tasks that 
the system is designed to support. A number of cognitive walkthroughs are reported 
which consider realistic interaction tasks and which demonstrate the general 
usability of the Medusa system. The walkthroughs, however, also reveal some minor 
usability difficulties and the omission of any interface features that support recovery, 
being able to reach a desired system state after perfoInling an erroneous action. 
Possible design solutions to support recovery are discussed in Chapter 10. Design 
solutions addressing other failings of the Medusa system are presented in Chapter 9, 
the means of analysis used to justify these solutions are presented- in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
Chapter Nine presents details of the design of a second, revised, version of Medusa 
which is based upon employing the account of metaphor understanding presented in 
Chapter Eight as a predictive and critical tool. Motivation for another revised version 
of Medusa, entitled Medusa-'t, is presented. Medusa-'t is closely related to the 
Medusa system, it retains much of the Medusa system's design, but additional 
requirements are considered. These are intended to address the breakdowns in 
system behaviour and understanding that occur due to the uncertain temporal 
behaviour of computing hardware and its user interface. Two approaches to 
addressing the problems of breakdown in interface behaviour can be proposed, one 
can give the user an explanatory account of the source of the breakdown, or one can 
attempt to prevent, through appropriate hardware and software technology, the 
breakdown from occuning. Medusa-'t employs on-going work in fOInlal 
specification of user interface software, software architectures, and the choice, and 
possible development, of appropriate programming languages to prevent temporal 
breakdowns in the behaviour of on-screen objects where possible. This on-going 
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work is described. Sections of this chapter \\'ere accepted for publication2 but are to 
date unpublished. 
Chapter Ten concludes and summarises the thesis. The contributions of the \\'ork arc 
described and suggestions for further work are presented. 
2 At the International Workshop on Physicality and Tangibility in Interaction, (Sienna, Italy, 20-22 
October 19(9). 
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Chapter 2 
Existing Approaches to the Use of Metaphor and 
Analogy in User Interface Design 
"We didn't have metaphors when I was young. We didn't beat about the bush." 
- Fred Trueman. 
2.1 Introduction 
Learning to use an unfamiliar computer system can take a considerable time as users 
acquire the knowledge required to use the system successfully. Carroll and Thomas 
(1982) state that the relevant knowledge structures cannot, by definition, be accessed 
at first, instead related knowledge is accessed and forms a metaphor for the 
knowledge being acquired. Users are often found to devise and employ metaphors 
when learning a previously unfamiliar computer system (Payne, 1991a), but systems 
designers can often aid users by making the metaphor to suitable related knowledge 
explicit in the model world represented on-screen. Metaphors employed in user 
interfaces tend to be copula, directive, instructional, statements of the form "X is 
(like) aY". According to these assertions, an unfamiliar domain, X, can be explained 
by making its similarities to a familiar domain, Y, explicit. 
Metaphors employed in user interfaces may be employed to describe some small 
aspect of the system, or a single application. The lightbox metaphor (Uidtke and 
Nackunstz, 1987), for example, has been employed to present X-ray data, and the 
note card metaphor (Halasz et aI., 1987) has been employed in hypertext systems. 
Metaphors may also be employed to represent many aspects of a computer system, 
for example, the Notebook metaphor (Fox and Gonzalez, 1989) is offered as an 
extension of the sorts of window manager systems discussed in more detail below. 
The metaphors of interest in this thesis are those that attempt to represent the 
facilities offered by a computer's operating system to support tasks such as file 
management. These interfaces are of interest as every user of the computer will 
employ them at some point, and they attempt to represent an artificial domain, that 
of the computer's storage facilities and operating system, \vith which most users will 
not be familiar beforehand. 
2.1.1 WIMP Systems 
Many of the systems discussed in this chapter, and considered in the rest of this 
thesis, are collectively termed WIMP systems. They are characterised by the use of 
Windo\vs, Icons, Menus and a Pointing device (or Windows, Icons, Mice, and Pull-
down menus, according to some interpretations of the acronym). An early discussion 
of the concept of windows may be found in Kay (1969), although many of the 
concepts and problems raised by windows date back through systems such as 
Sutherland's (1963) Sketchpad to early research in computer graphics. A window 
provides a view onto data or a data structure. Windows allow a portion of the data to 
be seen where the data is too large to be comfortably displayed on-screen in its 
entirety. Large graphics images and multi-page documents are examples of such 
data. Douglas Engelbart's rejection of the windows paradigm, as implemented in 
WIMP systems, and much of the discussion about post-WIMP interface design (for 
example, Van Dam, 1997) is due to the idea that " ... WIMP interfaces are still 
'marking interfaces' that in effect use 'digital ink' to make marks on digital 'paper' on 
a digital 'desktop'" (Bardini, 2000: 225). The complaint offered by critics is that 
windows are tied to these limiting metaphors. The power of, and the advance made 
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by, windows as proposed by Alan Kay was" ... in part to eliminate the modality of 
applications. He also wanted to eliminate the distinction between operating system 
and applications but succeeded primarily in making the functioning of of the 
operating system visible in the form of the desktop." (Raskin, 2000: 141). The 
fundamental metaphors that critics argue underlie the window concept are not, 
however, faithfully implemented in real systems. Kohler (1987) observes that with 
many systems, notably text editors, the space in which data is displayed, which is 
viewed through the window, may itself depend on quite complex metaphors which 
must be recognised and interpreted by users. Only a portion of the entire display is 
visible within a window. In order to view the remaining portions of the large display 
scrollbars are often attached to windows. The scrollbar determines and represents the 
portion of the view currently visible in the window. The scroll bar can also give an 
idea of the size of the extract visible in relation to the size of the document as a 
whole, and the approximate position of the visible extract within the document. 
Smith (1987) discusses the notion of features which are literal to the metaphor 
employed by the system, or which are considered magical, in that they lie outside the 
metaphor yet increase the ease with which functions may be performed. Windows 
are powerful user interface features based on a metaphor, scroll bars have no 
analogue in the real world and are therefore magical, yet are demonstrably useful 
interaction objects. A more complex fundamental metaphor is discussed in detail in 
Section 4.4. 
Smith (1977: 71) describes icons as "two-dimensional, visual, analogical, concrete 
descriptions of concepts." In the Xerox Star, icons simply denoted a closed window, 
whether this window provides a view onto the files in a directory in the file store, or 
it is a window employed by a currently active program. Icons are increasingly 
fundamental objects in user interfaces, they are usually visually atomic in that they 
have no internal structure, and hence may be employed as lexemes in human-
computer dialogues. Unlike command-based user interfaces, the result of a command 
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may not merely be a description of the result of carrying out the conlmand, but may 
provide objects which may be used direclly in the user's subsequent task. 
Menus are often implemented as a form of window, but with simplified mechanisms 
for scrolling through their contents. The menu, like its restaurant namesake, presents 
the user with a list of items from which a selection may be made. In user interfaces 
they are employed to present the user with a list of actions acceptable at the current 
point in the user's dialogue \vith the system. Users select and interact with the objects 
displayed on-screen using some form of pointing device. Light pens and dataglovcs 
are examples of such devices, the most commonly used are mice and trackballs, 
however, which convert the motion of the mouse, or the rotation of the suspended 
trackball, into changes in the position of an on-screen cursor. Input from buttons 
attached to the pointing device is used to select on-screen objects or cause operations 
on objects to be performed. A requirement of any pointing device is that a sense of 
spatiomimesis (Hutchins, Hollan, and Norman, 1986), immediate and appropriate 
feedback in the position of the on-screen pointer in response to movement of the 
pointing device, be perceived by the user. The importance of such system behaviour 
will be considered further below. 
In the design of user interfaces which employ icons as a major component of the 
system, it has been noted (Gittins, 1986) that the model world of the system may be 
represented in terms of a useful metaphor by designing the icons according to a 
collective theme. A well-known metaphor employed in user interfaces, in which this 
is demonstrated, is the desktop metaphor. The desktop metaphor \vas devised for the 
user interfaces of the Xerox Alto and Star computer systems (Johnson et al., 1989) 
and was subsequently adopted by the Apple Lisa and Macintosh computers. Unlike 
some WIMP user interfaces, the desktop metaphor consistently employs icons 
designed according to the collective theme of an office environment. 
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2.2 The Desktop 
The desktop builds on the ideas presented in the discussion of user interfaces which 
employ windows, icons, menus and some form of pointing device in employing a 
consistent metaphor in the design of the user interface. The path of development of 
the desktop metaphor has been a subject of much historical, and legal, argument. 
Johnson et al. (1989), Kay (1993), and Levy (1994) all provide details of the 
principal influences on the desktop's development. The desktop metaphor arose from 
-
work by the Xerox corporation into the design of systems to support the 
development of the electronic office. Smith et al. (1982a; 1982b) identified the 
option available to designers of employing metaphors in the design of user interfaces 
resulting in on-screen objects familiar to potential users from their everyday working 
environment. An example of an electronic desktop can be seen in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 A Desktop 
Smith and his colleagues, the designers of the Xerox 'Alto' and 8010 'Star' systems, 
the first commercially available systems to employ the desktop metaphor, recognised 
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that familiar analogies and metaphors may be used to introduce new concepts and 
functions to a potential user. The approach chosen by Smith and his colleagues \vas 
to create electronic counterparts of objects in the physical office with which the 
intended user population were familiar. In this \vay, the icons denoting text files are 
analogous to, and resemble, paper documents, directories on disks are analogous to 
folders, and electronic mail facilities are analogous to in and out trays. The design of 
the icons used in the Xerox 8010 Star's model world were the result of considerable 
design and testing effort (Bewley et al., 1983). Operations performed on objects are 
also analogous to operations that would be performed in the real world: filing a 
document requires moving it to the picture of a folder, whereas in the real world it 
would be carried to the physical folder itself. 
Even in the design of the earliest desktop metaphor system, the Xerox Star, the 
system's designers appreciated the distinction between literal and magical features. 
The file storage system of the Star does not completely resemble real-world filing 
cabinets in that it adds a search mechanism which allows files or folders required by 
the user to be located without him or her having to browse the file structure tree. In 
the empirical study reported in Chapter 3 of first-time Macintosh users, such search 
facilities were used in preference to having to browse the file space. Search facilities 
are magical features, however, knowledge of a typical file organisation relics on the 
memory of a filing clerk, or on some some external catalogue. Certainly a request for 
the whereabouts for a file will tend not to produce the file ready for use, as is 
possible in direct manipulation user interfaces. 
2.3 Rooms 
The Rooms metaphor extends the notion of the WIMP user interface. It provides 
display structures that collect together related on-screen windows and addresses the 
particular issue of supporting task switching as a part of working practice and 
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computer use. Analysis of users' command histories (Bannon, Cypher, Greenspan, 
and Monty, 1983) has shown that users spend periods of time performing a certain 
task, but will interleave the commands employed in performing that task with the 
commands used to perform other tasks. Users this way spend periods of time on 
tasks punctuated by transitions and time spent performing other tasks. 
In basie WIMP systems, the software tools employed in order to perform some task 
will each require one or more windows to be open on-screen. However, as users 
switch their attention from one sub-task to another, they are forced to switch their 
attention from one set of windows to another. The arrangement of windows on-
screen has a great effect on the time it takes to switch attention from one window to 
another. The amount of real estate on-screen is often limited, and the number of 
windows visible at one time, or the size of the visible windows will be limited as a 
result (Billingsley, 1988). To overcome this space contention problem windows may 
be either tiled, or may overlap (Bly and Rosenberg, 1986). In a tiled window system, 
no window is obscured by any other window, however tiled windows may be very 
small. If a window is enlarged by the user in order to make its contents legible, then 
the other windows must be resized in order to remain visible on the screen. The 
recently developed elastic windows (Kandogan and Shneiderman, 1997) model is a 
space-filling tiled window, but one in which hierarchies of windows may be 
constructed to suit user roles and tasks, and in which operations, such as closing, 
may be performed on an entire hierarchy, not just a single window. Overlapping 
windows are more complex in that, in addition to having to be resized, windows not 
relevant to the current sub-task may have to be closed, or hidden behind windows 
that the user is interested in. 
This problem of switching between windows has been likened by Card et al. (1985) 
to the use of virtual memory within a computer's operating system. Virtual memory 
allows a computer system to run programs which require larger amounts of physical 
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memory than the computer has available. This is achieved by storing the contents of 
memory locations that have not recently been accessed onto a secondar), storage 
device and retrieving them into main memory when these data are required. Card 
and Henderson (1987a) employ terminology analogous to that of virtual memory in 
their discussion of the Rooms metaphor. They describe the requirement of having to 
ready an engaged tool, a software application used in performing some task, by 
manipulating its window, or by running the required application, as being initiated 
by a tool fault. If data located in secondary storage is needed in main memory, the 
terminology of virtual memory describes this as a page fault. Every time a user is 
forced to switch between \vindows on a computer screen, there is a delay as the user 
makes the required windo\v visible. The Rooms metaphor attempts to minimise this 
overhead. The need to switch rapidly between tasks was noted by the Xerox Star's 
designers (Johnson et al., 1989) and led to tiled windows being employed in that 
system's user interface. As the number of tools required to perform the major task 
increases, the time spent s\vitching between tools increases. In extreme cases, as with 
computer operating systems, the phenomenon of thrashing can occur; where users 
spend more time switching between tasks than they spend actually performing their 
tasks. 
The design of the Rooms user interface is influenced by the observation that work 
conducted using a computing system is made up of phases of activity spent on 
particular sub-tasks using software tools punctuated by transitions to other sub-tasks 
performed using other software tools. The need to minimise transitions between sub-
tasks and the software on \vhich they are performed and hence reduce the time taken 
to complete the user's larger tasks is a particular issue addressed by Rooms. Central 
to the Rooms metaphor is the notion that all of the software tools engaged to 
accomplish a major task, such as reading electronic mail, are placed within one 
"room", or screen-sized work space. Tasks, however, may not be independent, an 
engaged tool may be used when performing two or more tasks. Also, it may be 
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desirable to have some tools, such as a clock, visible at all times in all rooms. An 
engaged tool may have a different role in one task to the role it has in another task, it 
should therefore be possible to adapt a tool to match the task. Figure 2.2 shows the 
relationships between tasks and engaged tools and Rooms and windows. 
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Figure 2.2 Relationships between tasks, engaged tools, Rooms and windows 
(Henderson and Card, 1986: 380). 
A Room is a named screen-sized work space; in each room are the windows opened 
by the programs used to perform a major task. A Room containing a number of tools 
for reading and sending electronic mail, taken from Henderson and Card (1986: 
224), can be seen in Figure 2.3. Each room also contains a number of icons 
resembling doors, these doors symbolise paths from one Room to another. To switch 
between tasks, the user clicks on the door to the Room that contains the engaged 
tools for the other major task. 
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Figure 2.3 Mail, a Room for reading electronic mail 
In case the user wishes to return to the Room that they entered the current Room 
from, Back Doors are provided. These special doors overcome the difficulty raised 
by most doors in the Rooms system that only permit one-way travel between Rooms, 
and help the user who may not remember the name of the Room they have just left. 
Card and Henderson (1987a) state that as the number of Rooms increases, the 
complexity of the interconnections between Rooms can create an electronic maze, 
for this reason t\VO other mechanisms to aid the user navigate a network of Rooms 
are provided. 
The first user navigation aid is a pop-up menu listing the names of all the Rooms in 
the net\vork, from which the desired destination Room may be selected. The second 
solution is the Overview. The Overview displays a grid of pictograms of all of the 
Rooms currently in use arranged by the rooms' names in alphabetical order. To help 
the user find a particular window, window pictographs may be expanded to allow the 
user to browse through the windows in the entire set of Rooms.The paths between 
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doors and the Rooms they connect onto may, in addition, be superimposed on the 
Overview to show the web of interconnections between Rooms. These features, 
while improving the Rooms system, lie outside the basic Rooms metaphor, although 
the menu (as was mentioned in Section 2.1.1), and the use of a plan view of the 
network of Rooms in the Overview both rely on analogies and metaphors. 
Other features that support users employ analogies that are closer to the central 
theme of moving between a number of inter-connected rooms. Users may wish to 
have an engaged tool, and the data associated with that tool, for example a text file 
and the editor used to prepare the file, accompany them as they move from one 
Room into another. The concept of baggage permits this. Baggage is simply the 
identification of tools that should travel with the user as they move into the next 
Room. If a number of tools are to travel with the user at all times, they are said to be 
placed in the user's pocket and appear in a Room within every Room the user visits. 
The notion of Room inclusion, having a Room contained within the current Room is 
the solution provided to the problem of defining the location and position attributes 
of tools that must remain constant across workspaces. If a change is made to any of 
the engaged tools in the collection, the change is propagated throughout the entire 
network of Rooms. 
The Rooms metaphor provides a user interface which allows users to switch quickly 
between tasks without being delayed by the overhead of having to resize windows or 
to search for data files; the Rooms themselves, however, require a great deal of time 
to configure. In order to overcome this problem, Card and Henderson (l987b) 
devised the mail-order catalogue metaphor. The mail-order catalogue metaphor 
allows users to install and configure Rooms far more quickly than would otherwise 
be possible. Users may configure a network of Rooms by simply ordering pre-
defined Rooms, Suites (small, pre-defined networks of Rooms) and engaged tools 
from the catalogue. By employing the catalogue, the user can define a network of 
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Rooms which will be available instantly when the user starts the machine, users can 
also use a previously unused software application with far less difficulty than if they 
were using the basic Rooms system. 
2.4 The Alternate Reality Kit 
The Alternate Reality Kit (henceforth ARK) was developed by Randall Smith 
(Smith, 1986). ARK shares many of the features of the systems, and is influenced 
-
by, the same systems that influenced the development ?f the systems mentioned 
discussed above. Its name, for example, follows from David Canfield Smith's 
(Smith, 1977) Pygmalion system's provision of an alternate reality for supporting 
creative thinking in its users. ARK's principal influence is the Small talk 
programming language and the principal aim of the Small talk environment to be a 
system for developing microworlds, interactive simulated environments.Motivation 
for ARK followed from Smith's observation that students of physics demonstrate 
difficulties in understanding the abstractions encountered in physics. Studies 
conducted using ARK, which shall not be discussed further, have shown that ARK is 
helpful in overcoming students' difficulties in understanding Newtonian and 
relativistic physics. An example of an ARK simulation, taken from (Smith, 1987: 
62) can be seen in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 An ARK simulation of bodies moving under mutual gravitational 
attraction 
ARK simulations are constructed by providing access to object-oriented 
programming in Smalltalk-80 for non-expert programmers. ARK provides a number 
of pre-defined objects from which simulations may be constructed, prototypes of 
these objects are all held in the warehouse (shown in Figure 2.5) from where the 
instances of objects required for a particular simulation may be retrieved. ARK 
provides other on-screen objects that are used to alter variables encapsulated within a 
simulation object. Slider switches are used to specify numbers, they allow values of 
properties associated with an object to be easily altered. Buttons (shown in Figure 
2.6) are the means by which users communicate directly with objects. Buttons 
contain a simple command to be applied to an object and are invoked by being 
picked up using the hand pointer and dropped onto the object. If the user wishes to 
remove an object from a simulation, the user drops the "vaporize" message onto that 
object, the object will then disappear. Message passing is the mechanism by which 
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objects communicate with each other, message passing can also be thought of as the 
means by which users interact \vith on-screen objects as suggested by Card, Moran, 
and Newell (1983). This concept will become important when human-computer 
dialogues in a ne\v user interface design are considered in Chapter 6. 
Figure 2.5 The ARK warehouse (Smith, 1987: 65). 
Figure 2.6 ARK buttons (Smith, 1987: 65). 
Message boxes provide a general message passing facility, a message box consists of 
the name of the message it sends and a plug that connects to the object which is to 
receive the message. If the object is to return a value as the result of being sent a 
message, the message box will contain a region in which the result is displayed, for 
example, an object might be "asked" for its mass and this value would be displayed 
within the message box. Representatives (shown in Figure 2.7) often appear as an 
object that contains text describing the object being represented. Representatives 
allow instances of any Smalltalk-80 class to be represented and used within an ARK 
simulation. Interactors (shown in Figure 2.8) allow users to manipulate physical laws 
within a simulation. Interactors define an object's behaviour, or define constraints 
that apply between a number of objects, for example Newton's inverse square law of 
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gravitational attraction, and they also maintain a list of the objects within a 
simulation subject to that constraint The power of an interactor lies in users being 
able to adjust its attributes in the same way that they can adjust the attributes of other 
objects. The user could, for example, reduce the gravitational constant, or switch it 
off entirely. 
Figure 2.7 ARK representatives (Smith, 1987: 65). 
Figure 2.8 An ARK interactor (Smith, 1987: 65). 
Users interact with all ARK simulations using the hand. The hand, like other on-
screen pointers, is used to select and manipulate the on-screen objects. ARK permits 
several alternate reality simulations to run at the same time, each within its own 
window. A number of simulations could, for example, show the same set of objects 
interacting with different sets of physical constants as a way of comparing how 
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changing the value of one constant affects the simulation. The hand (shown in Figure 
2.9) is not a part of any of these realities, it exists in a meta-reality. ARK complicates 
the simple physical \vorld metaphor with the concept of a reality structure. The 
alternate reality simulations are self-contained, but all lie on onc plane of reality. The 
hand exists in a meta-reality where it is free to move \vithout being subject to any 
influences from the alternate realities, and from where it casts a shadow in the reality 
belo\v. Any object picked up by the hand is taken into the meta-reality and the 
objects left behind behave as if the object were no longer there. Buttons attached to 
objects also cast a slight shado\v signifying that they intrude into the meia-reality. 
An object's position in the reality structure is meant to aid novice programmers by 
eliminating the confusion between editing and execution, the object's appearance 
denoting its current role. 
Figure 2.9 The ARK hand (Smith, 1987: 65). 
Although the ARK is based on a physical-world metaphor, some features of the 
ARK's interface, such as attaching buttons to objects, would be very difficult to 
achieve if they were activities literal to the metaphor. Actions such as attaching 
buttons to an object by simply dropping the button onto the object lie outside the 
physical-world metaphor and are considered magical in Smith's (1987) distinction. 
The use of magical features that lie outside the metaphor has implications when 
users are learning to use the ARK. Smith (1987: 62-63) says: 
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" one of the lessons of ARK is that the literal aspects of the 
interface are often obvious while magical capabilities are harder to 
learn. In ARK, the time to explain the basics is actually measured in 
seconds. Every piece of added magic is relatively 'expensive' because 
it requires its own explanation: it does not 'come for free' as it does 
when the user realizes there is a physical metaphor." 
2.5 Metaphor and Non-visual Representations 
In the sections above the use of metaphor in visual forms of representing software 
objects in a small number of computing systems was considered. These systems all 
rely on the visual modality to communicate the system state and in the depiction of 
the metaphor employed. In all of the systems discussed above, sound is either absent 
or limited to a few simple indications that an event of some sort has occurred. And 
while the mouse, or some equivalent device, is used to point to and select objects 
and operations on objects, these systems cannot be said to employ the haptic channel 
to communicate system feedback, or to communicate the user's intentions to any 
great extent. In Section 2.6, we consider the role metaphor plays in systems that 
employ the haptic channel to a greater extent than in the systems described above. In 
this section, we consider the role of metaphor in systems that employ other 
modalities to a larger extent than in what are typically deemed metaphor-based 
systems. 
We are unaware of the olfactory channel, the user's sense of smell, being currently 
employed to communicate information about the state of an interactive system 
(except in the case of some severe hardware failures). While Morton Heilig's 
Sensorama arcade rides, which are cited as early immersive reality systems 
(Rheingold, 1991), would, in one ride, blow the smells of combustion fumes at the 
rider of a virtual motorcycle, the rides themselves were not interactive. The user was 
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simply a passenger on a ride filmed earlier and projected onto eyepieces giving a 3D 
display. In Smith's (1996: 231) terms, however, as the user can "sce through" the 
projection to the actual events and objects it presents, the display does not stand in 
metaphorical relation to other events and objects and so this system does not require 
further consideration in this thesis. Sound, however, as a means of communicating 
infonnation about the current state of a computing system, is \vorth some discussion. 
2.5.1 Auditory Icons 
It is claimed that other than its use in computer games, sound still tends to be 
neglected as a means of conveying information in computer systems. Where sound is 
used, if at all, in most systems, it is restricted to "beeps" and other simple warning 
sounds. Gaver (1986) noticed this neglected modality and outlined an approach that 
uses sound to convey a great deal of information about a computer system to the 
user. This approach, tenned auditory icons, uses caricatures of naturally occurring 
sounds to represent both conceptual objects and dimensional data within the 
computer system to the user. Auditory icons are mentioned as they can evoke 
metaphors in the way that they communicate information. The auditory icon 
approach is not concerned with the proximal stimulus, meaning the dimensions of 
sound such as pitch, loudness and duration that describe the variations of air pressure 
near the ear, but rather is concerned with the diBtal stimulus, \vith the physics of the 
source of the sound. 
Gaver (1986: 168) described the infonnation that might be conveyed by an auditory 
icon saying: 
"One can imagine how a single sound could be used to give 
infonnation about a file arriving in a message system. The file hits the 
mailbox, causing it to emit a characteristic sound. Because it is a large 
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message, it makes a rather weighty sound. The crackle of paper 
indicates a text file - if it had been compiled program, it would have 
clanged like metal. The sound comes from the left and is muffled: 
The mail box must be in the window behind the one that is currently 
on the left side of the screen. And the echoes sound like a large empty 
room, so the load on the system must be fairly low." 
If a sound is to be used to represent a source of information, the mapping between 
the information and the representation, the relationship between the source and the 
sound, must be considered. Gaver (1986) identifies three mappings between source 
and sound; nomic, termed iconic in (Gaver, 1989); metaphorical; and symbolic. 
Symbolic mappings have an arbitrary mapping between the information and its 
representation, they rely on social convention for meaning, examples of symbolic 
mappings include sirens and telephone bells. Earcons, "which are short, rhythmic 
sequences of pitches with variable intensity, timbre and register" (Brewster, Wright, 
and Edwards, 1993: 222), another form of auditory feedback that have received 
some attention, have only a symbolic mapping to the object, location, operation, or 
interaction that they denote. Nomic, or iconic, mappings in auditory icons depend on 
the physics of the source of a sound to convey meaning, an example is the auditory 
icon described above representing a file being placed in a mailbox. 
Metaphorical mappmgs rely on similarities between the represented and the 
representing systems to convey meaning. A metaphorical mapping may either be a 
structural mapping where similarities between the structure of two symbols or 
objects are exploited, or it may be a metonymic mapping, where a feature of the 
object is used to represent the whole object. Gaver (1986) gives the example of a 
hiss being used to represent a snake as an example of a metonymic mapping. Other 
metaphorical mappings rely on the notion of temporal progression of sound and the 
events the sounds stand for, or on the notion of a dimensional metaphor, " ... in which 
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one ordered dimension is used to represent another" (Gavcr, 1986: 171). An example 
Gaver (1986) gives of the use of a dimensional metaphor is of the change in pitch of 
an object at different heights. 
The mappings bet\\'een the represented object and the representation are not distinct 
descriptions, it is possible for an auditory icon to employ a mapping that lies 
between two of the classes of mappings described. If a metaphor is weak, or is 
poorly understood, then the mapping becomes increasingly symbolic. Also, nomic 
mappings depend on models of the source events for understanding, as models 
become more approximate, the result becomes more like a metaphor. Nomically 
mapped auditory icons also depend in some sense on metaphors, the icon's mapping 
will, Gaver (1986: 172) claims, " ... be nomic to some event in the model world 
presented to the user, not to underlying events in the computer itself." Auditory icons 
have, to date, been implemented within two important systems, the SonicFinder 
(Gaver, 1989) and SharedARK (Gaver, Smith, and O'Shea, 1991), these are briefly 
discussed below. 
2.5.2 SonicFinder 
The SonicFinder (Gaver, 1989) augmented the desktop metaphor of the Apple 
Macintosh Finder user interface with auditory icons. The auditory icons were added 
to the Finder system to provide auditory information whenever the user interacted 
with an object on the model desktop. For example', if the user clicked on the visual 
icon representing a file and dragged the icon across the screen, the user heard the 
sound of the object being hit (clicked on) and a scraping sound as the object was 
dragged. Further sounds were added to typical actions that can be performed within 
Finder; the actions of opening windows and scrolling the contents of a window, for 
example, had auditory icons associated with them. 
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Gaver (1989) realised that this use of auditory infonnation is redundant, the Apple 
Macintosh had been used successfully for some time without sound being employed 
to the extent it was in the SonicFinder. His claim, however, was that learning and 
remembering the system is aided by this redundant infonnation, by these 
confirmatory sounds (Gaver and Smith, 1990), and that users' perceived senses of 
direct engagement with on-screen objects should be enhanced - although no studies 
exist to substantiate these claims. 
2.5.3 SharedARK 
SharedARK is a multiuser version of the Alternate Reality Kit (described in Section 
2.4). In ARKola, a simulation implemented in SharedARK, auditory icons were used 
to convey infonnation about hidden processes in a soft-drinks bouling plant (Gaver, 
Smith, and O'Shea, 1991). The ARKola bottling plant is made up of a number of 
interconnected component machines, but only a few machines can be seen on a 
user's workstation at anyone time so much of the operation of the plant will be 
invisible. Auditory icons were used to convey infonnation about these invisible 
machines. 
The use of auditory icons in such an application is likened to the way in which some 
people, especially trained and experienced mechanics, can detennine the status of a 
machine with which they are familiar depending on the noise that the machine is 
making. If there is a fault within a machine, it is assumed to cause a characteristic 
noise which can aid diagnosis of the fault. Within the ARKola factory, users are able 
to tell if the factory as a whole is running well from the noises made by the separate 
component machines. If there is a fault in the running of the factory, users are able to 
tell which machine to examine from the characteristic noise made by the faulty 
machine, for example if the bottle storage area is being overfilled, the sound of 
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breaking bottles can be heard. Studies of collaborating users undertaken using 
ARKola (Gaver, 1991; Gaver and Smith, 1990; Gaver, Smith and O'Shea, 1991) 
demonstrated that for some states of the system the use of audito!)' icons assisted 
users in determining which tasks they should attend to next. Some sounds were less 
effective than others, the absence of critical sounds \vas in particular not regarded 
\vith the urgency it should have been. The results, however, lead Gaver and his 
colleagues to claim that auditory icons are useful for communicating semantic 
information, rather than just for event notification or communicating simple status or 
mode information, which are the typical uses of sound in interactive systems. 
2.6 The "Reality" Metaphor and New Interaction Styles 
The systems described above are landmarks in metaphor-based user interfaces. All 
of these systems are confined to the (physical) desktop and to running on a 
conventional workstation (\ve shall ignore personal digital assistants for now). The 
"reality" metaphor is a term coined by the researchers working on the Wearable 
Computers project at the MIT Media Laboratory. The "reality" metaphor describes 
the presence of both real physical objects and computer-generated artefacts in the 
user's visual field. A growing movement in computer science is the design of 
systems that are mobile, ubiquitous, or a natural part of the environment. \Ve are 
required to consider such systems, not just because of their growing importance, but 
also because of the role metaphor plays in the design and understanding of them. We 
shall not revie\v all the systems that can be termed as applying the "reality" 
metaphor, but shall briefly discuss illustrative examples of the different interaction 
styles that fall under this heading. We discuss in greater detail the fundamental 
metaphors claimed to be the foundation for many systems designed according to the 
"reality" metaphor. 
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Ubiquitous computing, as the term suggests, is concerned with making computing 
systems a part of the everyday environment. This can be achieved by introducing 
computing machinery into artefacts that have previously not contained computing 
systems, such as LEGDI bricks (Resnick et al., 1996) or office whiteboards 
(Stafford-Fraser and Robinson, 1996), or by making computing systems smaller and 
mobile, as in the form of PDA's (personal digital assistants). Whereas in ubiquitous 
computing systems, the computing system and the physical artefact occupy the same 
object, be it a LEGO brick, doorknob, running shoe, and so on, in augmented reality 
systems the external world provides implicit input into a computing system. In 
augmented reality the user interacts with a real world augmented by computer-
generated information. Examples of such systems include repair assistants (Sass et 
al., 1997) where instructions can be displayed over the image of the actual object 
being repaired. A CCTV camera mounted in the computing device, or head-up 
display provides an input source to the device and possibly relays the image of what 
it is looked at to the user. Devices with such an arrangement of camera and display 
are described as employing a magnifying glass metaphor (Rekimoto and Nagao, 
1995). This term is a true metaphor (the "information is detail" metaphor) in that it 
describes a system, but not one where the image of the world seen by the camera is 
magnified In the display and more detail can be seen. Instead" the image is 
magnified 10 terms of the information available, additional information being 
supplied by the computing device, not the world itself. 
Some systems employ the reality metaphor to support the task domains supported by 
the workstation-bound user interface metaphors discussed above. The desktop 
metaphor is typically used to support tasks that are performed in an office setting, 
the desktop metaphor, however, mirrors the environment into which it is introduced, 
it is not fully a part of it. Documents must be printed if they are to be stored in 
1 LEGO is a trademark of LEGO Systems, Inc. 
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physical filing cabinets, but a printed document is unavailable for manipulation in 
the electronic domain. The DigitalDesk (Wellner, 1991), for example, overcomes 
these problems, by use of image projectors, cameras linked to image processing 
software, and a touch- and gesture-sensitive physical desk surface. In the 
DigitalDesk, electronic and physical documents have equal status within the system, 
images of electronic documents may be projected onto the desk's surface and real 
documents may be scanned and an electronic version of them created. Systems 
developed as part of the Tangible Media project at the MIT Media Laboratory (Ishii 
and Ullmer, 1997; Ullmer and Ishii, 1997) demonstrate a similar equality of physical 
and electronic objects within the representation and embodiment of the task domain .. 
2.6.1 Optical Metaphors 
The tangible user interfaces developed by Ishii and his colleagues are based on 
metaphors of light, shadow, and optics, which are claimed to be "particularly 
compelling for interfaces spanning virtual and physical space." (Ishii and UlImer, 
1997: 240). The activeLENS system, an arm-mounted flat-panel display is described 
as being modelled in both its form and function as a jeweller's magnifying lens, the 
same notion drove the design of the passiveLENS, a simpler transparent glass 
surface onto which the metaDESK display projects information. The metaDESK 
greatly extends the use of optical metaphors. 
The metaDESK concept, depicted in Figure 2.10 (MetaDESK itself is shown in 
Figure 2.11), is an effort to integrate both computer and physical worlds. Via the 
desktop metaphor, aspects of the physical world are emulated in the 2D model world 
implemented by a PC. The metaDESK concept simultaneously attempts to 
physically instantiate windows, icons, menus, handles, and control metaphors back 
into the real world (denoted A in Figure 2.10), as well as expoiting affordanccs of 
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real world instrument and artifacts made obsolete 1n the development of the 
personal computer (denoted B in Figure 2.10). 
desktop 
metaphor 
Figure 2.10 The metaDESK concept (Ullmer and Ishii, 1997: 224). 
Figure 2.11 MetaDESK (taken from Dourish (2001: 45) 
The metaDESK concept is illustrated by the prototype application Tangible 
Geospace. In this system, small physical replicas (collectively termed phicons) of 
landmarks found on the MIT campus can be placed on the surface of a desk onto 
37 
which a map of the MIT campus rotated and translated appropriately to match the 
orientation and location of the phicons is back-projected. Viewing the desk through 
the activeLENS \vill cause an appropriate 2D projection of the 3D scene that could 
be 'seen' from the comparable location of the lens in the real world to be displayed in 
the lens' panel. Placing a second phi con on the desk causes the map to be scaled, 
\varped, and rotated so that the phi con lies on the appropriate location in the map. 
Moving the relative positions on the ph icons causes the projected map to be adjusted 
accordingly. Table 2.1 lists the tangible user interface counterparts of common 
graphical user interface components. 
G VI: Graphical Vser Interface TUI: Tangible User Interface 
Windo\v Lens 
Icon Phicon 
Menu Tray_ 
Handle Phandle 
Widget Instrument 
Table 2.1 Physical Instantiation of GUI Elements in a TUI 
In terms of optical metaphors, phicons are linked with the notion of "digital 
shado\vs". As illuminated objects cast shadows, so phi cons cast digital shadows that 
project information as to their virtual contents. Thus Ishii and Ullmer suggest that a 
suitably modified torch (flashlight) can be used to project different wavelengths of 
virtual, or semantic, light onto the desk. One fonn of light might render physically 
constrained shadows of the physical building, while another might cause funding for 
the faculty to be rendered. 
The ambientROOM system provides information not only to 'foreground' perception, 
as with the metaDESK, but also to peripheral perception through ambient media, 
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light, shadow, sound, air and water flow. Where ambient information needs to 
brought into the foreground for closer attention, the ambientROOM provides 
phicons that act as sources of the ambient information, which may be moved into the 
proximity of an information sink, such as a loudspeaker where the information can 
be suitably rendered. The use of optical metaphors in all of these systems is justified 
by Ishii and Ullmer's (1997: 240) claim that: 
"Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the optical metaphor is its 
seamless consistency with the physics of real space. By not only 
invoking but also obeying the optical constraints metaphorically 
imposed on our physical interface prototypes, we are able to 
maximize the legibility of interface in our creations. People know 
what to expect of a flashlight, know what to expect of lenses. By 
satisfying these expectations, we can truly realize truly seamless 
'invisible' integration of our technologies with the physical 
environment. " 
We shall consider these claims further in Chapters 6 and 9. 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter served to review a number of existing user interface designs which 
employ metaphors in order to attempt to represent a large part of the underlying 
computer system. While the systems described above revolutionised, and continue to 
revolutionise, the usability of computing systems and make them accessible to a far 
larger number of users, the use of metaphors in the designs of their model worlds is 
not a perfect solution to the problem of improving system usability. In the following 
chapter we examine user interface metaphor in general, and the problem of 
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understanding and interacting with computing systems in terms of metaphors and 
analogies. In particular, we survey the difficulties that user interface metaphors pose 
for the user. 
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Chapter 3 
An Empirical Study of First-time Macintosh Users 
"/ feel/am beyond metaphorical assistance. " 
- 'Cher' in "Clueless", the television series. 
In the previous chapter a number of important and influential computing systems and 
user interface designs that implement user interface metaphors or which rely on 
metaphor comprehension in order to be understood and used successfully were 
reviewed. These systems helped to make the personal computer the pervasive 
technology that it is in many parts of the world. They also helped make the computer 
accessible to a wider range of users than other visions of personal computing might 
have seen come about. The design principles of these systems can be contrasted, for 
example, with Douglas Engelbart's "bootstrapping" concept and NLS technology 
(Bardini, 2(00), which was intended for use by knowledge workers who were 
expected to invest tens of hours in the initial training period. Many of the systems 
described in the previous chapter have not been subjected to usability testing that 
would make the case for their usability and usefulness compelling. Alternatively, 
usability testing might have been undertaken, but the results of such testing might 
have been withheld for commercial reasons. The study reported below, for example, 
seeks to copy one whose results were withheld for some time at the behest of the 
company that sponsored the original work (John M. Carroll, personal 
communication). 
The systems described in the previous chapter all use or rely on metaphor for their 
understanding and use. A survey of the HeI literature, however, finds that metaphor 
is also a source of users' difficulties. In this chapter we report on a small study of 
first-time users of the Apple Macintosh to test the notion that metaphor is always 
advantageous in interface designs. This study also seeks to examine the findings of 
Carroll and Mazur (1986) who undertook an empirical study of the Apple' Lisa (the 
forerunner of the Macintosh) and found a number of usability faults that wcre not 
resolved by the use of the desk top metaphor. Indeed they found (their study is 
described in more detail in the following chapter) that the use of metaphor can be a 
source of users' difficulties. 
In Carroll and Mazur's (1986) study, a small number of subjects from thc staff of 
IBM were recruited \vho used an Apple Lisa for weekly sessions lasting between two 
and three hours to undertake a medium-scale project and report. Due to constraints 
imposed on the study reported below, our study examines a much shorter period of 
initial use of the DESKTOP metaphor. Like Carroll and Mazur, though, we also 
found that the DESKTOP metaphor used in the user interface, while it is an 
improvement over command-based interfaces, was a source of users' difficulties. 
These difficulties, among others, that are due to the use of metaphor arc explored 
further in the next chapter. 
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3.1 Overview of the study 
3.1.1 The Subjects 
Seven subjects. recruited from the staff of the Open University. participated in the 
study. The subjects were selected on the basis of availability. and were all paid a 
nominal fee. All of the subjects were familiar with IBM PC compatible computers • 
. and. over the group. were familiar with spreadsheets. database ·software, terminal 
emulators, C language compilers and word processing packages. All of the subjects 
were users of the Microsoft Windows graphical user interface to MS-DOS. As 
subjects were only available during their lunch break, sessions were planned so 
significant progress could be make in no longer than an hour. 
3.1.2 Methodology 
Subjects were supplied with a copy of the Apple Macintosh manual (Apple, 1990) 
and a blank, pre-formatted floppy disk. Subjects were also given a list of short 
exercises to perform (shown below). These exercises were designed to be similar to 
the sorts of tasks that users of the Apple Macintosh would perform every day, and 
were designed to force those subjects who attempted them into using particular parts 
of the system. The subjects were not obliged to perform the exercises, although they 
all attempted them. The subjects were then free to begin to investigate the Macintosh 
system. Subjects were asked to "think aloud" as they worked, otherwise they were 
free to work as they wished. No advice was offered as the subjects worked. When 
they could see no solution to their problems, the session was considered to be at an 
end and advice was given. Notes were taken and the subjects' screen activity was 
videotaped and their speech recorded. The time subjects spent working ranged 
between forty minutes and an hour and ten minutes. 
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3.1.3 Tasks Performed by Subjects 
Participants \vere provided \vith the list of tasks below, as mentioned they "'ere 
under no obligation to attempt them, although all participants did, with mixed 
success. Participants were told before attempting the first exercise: 
Try to do as many of the exercises as you can. Don't worry if you 
cannot complete an exercise or if you haven't completed an exerCise 
ber ore time runs out. 
The instructions for the tasks were as follows: 
Exercise 1 
Write down the names of the files in the folder Experiment 1 
Exercise 2 
Delete all of the picture files from the folder Experinlent 1 
Exercise 3 
Copy the application program in the folder Experinlent 1 to the 
floppy disk provided. 
Exercise 4 
Find the file Mary's lamb, open it, and add the line the lamb was 
sure to go to it. Save the file and make a duplicate copy of it. Place 
the duplicate copy of the file on the floppy disk. 
44 
Exercise 5 
Eject the floppy disk from the computer. 
3.1.4 Caveats 
Although Carroll and Mazur's (1986) study was taken as the starting point for this 
study, this study differs in a number of respects. Firstly the machine used was not an 
Apple Lisa, instead an Apple Macintosh SEl30 running the System 7 revision of the 
operating system was used. This machine was chosen as one of the particular aims of 
the study was to investigate users' understanding of the mechanism which allows the 
computer to have a number of programs active at one time and which allows the user 
to switch between these programs. 
The internal floppy disk drive of the machine used was faulty, and an external floppy 
disk drive had to be used instead. The Apple Macintosh supports three methods of 
ejecting floppy disks from machine. The "proper" way is to drag the icon of the disk 
to be ejected to the trashcan, the automatic mechanism within the disk drive will then 
eject the disk. The second method, which is commonly used when copying files from 
one floppy disk to another, is to select the Eject Disk option from the SpeCial 
menu or to use the XE shortcut. Again the automatic mechanism will eject the disk, 
but a greyed out image of the disk's icon will remain visible on the desktop. At some 
point in the future the system will request that the disk be replaced so that any 
outstanding or final operations on it may be performed. The third method, which is 
only recommended should the machine crash and there is no other way of retrieving 
the disk, is to push a rod (such as a straightened paper clip) into the hole to the right 
of the disk drive, this action will manually eject the disk. The external drive, unlike 
internal Macintosh disk drives, had an eject button, which acted in the same way as 
the HE key combination. Whilst this study used an atypical hardware configuration, 
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many flaws in the subjects' understanding of the computer system were brought to 
light as a result. 
The principle differences between this study and Carroll and Mazur's are the time 
students used the system for, and the tasks they were asked to perfonn during that 
time. Subjects could only give up an hour of their time, so many aspects of the 
Macintosh user interface could not be encountered by them. The exercises that the 
subjects were set (see above) were considered reasonable for the length of the 
session, although those subjects that completed the exercises did so in less than the 
time available. The subjects in Carroll and Mazur's study were available for two 
three-hour sessions, hence were able to perform a much more complex task using the 
Lisa, and many more aspects of the Lisa's interface were encountered by their 
subjects. 
3.2 Observations 
3.2.1 Using the Manual 
The subjects were all provided with a copy of the user manual supplied with the 
Macintosh computer (Apple, 1990), none of the subjects, ho\\'ever, found it to be of 
much use. Subjects 2 and 7 were the only participants to attempt to make much use 
of the manual, the other subjects who used the manual did so only as a last resort 
(three of the subjects did not refer to the manual at all). 
One problem that arose \\'as the layout of the manual; subjects would find the page 
number of a topic they were interested in, but would find that the contents of that 
page addressed a different topic. Because of the method of instruction used by the 
manual, subjects had difficulty searching from the page containing information that 
they did not want to the information that they did require. Subjects would be 
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presented with the sequence of steps to be followed to perform some specific task, 
but they were unable to apply this action sequence in the particular context of the 
task they wanted to perform. 
Using the manual to search for information on a specific topic was complicated by 
some subjects re-phrasing the terminology of the desktop metaphor into terminology 
with which they were familiar. this re-phrasing was also evident when users 
attempted to perform certain other tasks. This meant that subjects would re-phrase a 
problem in the list of exercises into terminology they knew, and then search the 
index for the familiar term rather than the correct term. The subjects would then be 
unable to obtain the correct information, if they were able to obtain any useful 
information at all. 
3.2.2 Using the On-line Help Facility 
The computer system used for this study was equipped with an on-line help facility 
called Balloons. When the user runs this program, a small speech balloon appears 
next to an object that the user points to using the mouse. The balloon contains a 
small piece of text that describes the object and its possible uses. A typical speech 
balloon can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
Subject 2 made particular use of these balloons, usmg them initially to gain 
information about all of the on-screen objects, then, as the session progressed. she 
used them to gain information about single objects that she had not encountered 
before. On-line help such as this proved initially very helpful. As the session 
progressed, however. some shortcomings became apparent. Firstly, speech balloons 
had only been defined for a limited number of objects, and had not been defined for 
objects used by a number of application programs. Thus there was no information 
about objects that were new to the subject. Secondly, Subject 2 in particular became 
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frustrated by the text that appears in the speech balloon being a constant piece of 
"canned text", the infotmation does not change according to the particular state of 
the machine or in relation to the task the user is trying to perform. 
This is an application-a program 
",Hh which you can perform a 
task or create a document. 
Applications includE' word 
procE'ssors I graphics programs J 
database programs I games I and 
spreadshE'E'ts. 
Figure 3.1 An on-line help speech balloon 
3.2.3 Interpreting the Desktop Metaphor 
The subjects were all familiar with the Microsoft Windows user interface. so they 
already possessed many of the basic skills needed to use the Macintosh. Some of the 
subjects' existing skills, however, \vere particular to the Windows environment and 
interfered with their attempts to learn the Macintosh. The aspect of the Macintosh 
that caused most problems when subjects attempted to apply their existing 
knowledge is not one which is covered by the desktop metaphor, hence discussion of 
this will be delayed until Section 3.2.4. Some problems with the desktop metaphor 
did, however arise. 
Most of the problems observed by Carroll and Mazur were caused by the 
terminology used to describe the system, this also caused problems in this study. The 
notion of an application file caused problems for some subjects, they simply were 
not sure what was meant by this term. Even when they had double-clicked on an 
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application's icon and could see the program running, some subjects (especially 
Subject 6) could not associate an application with a runnable program. The concept 
of a folder caused some confusion, most of the subjects at some point remarked that 
they assumed by the new term "folder" that the more familiar term "directory" was 
meant. Folders caused a problem for Subject 7. He did not relate the icons that 
appeared in the window that opened when he double-clicked on a folder's icon to the 
files contained within that folder, he assumed them to be more folders, even though 
none of the files had a folder-shaped icon attached to them. 
The terminology used to describe the Macintosh and its user interface created more 
serious problems when users tried to perform certain tasks. The exercises listed in 
Section 3.1.3 were all phrased in the terminology used in the system documentation, 
but as users attempted to perform these exercises, especially in the case of Subject 3, 
the terms used were translated into more familiar terms. However, in reformulating 
the description of the task it was sometimes then impossible to perform the task. 
When, for example, Subject 3 came to delete a file on the hard disk, she saw the task 
as one of "erasing" a file. She was then forced to use a number of elaborate strategies 
in order to perform the act of "erasing" when she could find no information on 
"erasing" files in the manual. For example, she carried out a lengthy search of the 
options listed on the pull-down menus and even opened the file in the hope that she 
would find an option within the application that would be capable of erasing the file. 
The trashcan was also found to create problems for the subjects. Users seemed not to 
notice that a desktop metaphor was being used as far as the trashcan was concerned. 
Only Subject 1 knew that files could be deleted by dragging them to the trashcan, 
and she admitted that she had been told about this before the session. The other 
subjects tried to apply their knowledge of Microsoft Windows and went on, often 
lengthy, searches for a delete option on a menu. Most subjects resorted to the manual 
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after this searching proved fruitless. It occurred to Subject 4 that dragging files into 
the trashcan might delete them, which he then tried. This provoked him to remark: 
"It's that easy is it? ... I suppose if I'd taken the time to read the 
manual I'd have found that out." 
Once subjects had learned to delete objects, some still did not infer some other tasks 
that could be perfonned using the trashcan, Subject 2, for example, asked: 
"Ho\v do I retrieve things from the wastebasket?" 
Only one subject discovered that disks can be ejected from the disk drive by 
dragging their icon to the trashcan, but she discovered this infonnation by stumbling 
across it in the manual. All of the subjects initially used the eject button on the drive. 
This, as was mentioned in Section 3.1.4, causes the user to be frequently prompted 
by the system to re-insert the disk. These frequent requests prompted only one user 
to ask if there \\'as another way to eject disks, the others were seemingly content, and 
did not notice that the system had not completed any outstanding operations on the 
disk before ejecting it. 
The design and use of icons on the Macintosh were not as successful as might have 
been assumed. For example, only one subject was able, from looking at the icon 
alone, to deduce that the icon shown in Figure 3.2 represented a picture created using 
a graphics soft\vare package. The remaining subjects used combinations of t\\'O 
strategies to detennine the contents of the file. Onc method used was to simply 
double click on the icon of every file installed on the system's hard disk that they 
were interested in discovering the contents of. This had the effect of running the 
application used to create the file, or ran the application itself, and the subjecl~ 
would then decide the nature of the file from what appeared on the screen. The other 
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method was to use the Get I nfo option on the Finder's File menu. This has the 
effect of displaying information such as the size, creation date, and the nature of a 
file, whether it is a document or application and so on. 
m 
~ 
Figure 3.2 Icon denoting a file produced by SuperPaint1. 
Again, similar strategies were adopted to determine which was the application file to 
which the exercises referred, (the shape that all application icons should have, shown 
in Figure 3.3, is described on the very first page of the Macintosh manual, but went 
undiscovered). This is surprising as all of the subjects had experience of a graphical 
user interface, it suggests that an association is learned between the icon shape and 
the file and the software package used to create that file. Subjects were unable to 
decide which icon denoted a picture because they had not learned the association, 
but it had been assumed before the study began that subjects would be able to infer 
the nature of the file from the design of the icon. 
Figure 3.3 An application program 
1 SuperPaint is a trademark of Silicon Beach Software, Inc. 
51 
3.2.4 Basic User Interaction 
All of the subjects were familiar with the Microsoft Windo\\'s user interface, hence 
they already possessed much of the knowledge required to use the Apple ~1acintosh 
system. This knowledge, however, also interfered with their attenlpL~ to learn the 
new system. An example of this was the subjects' use of the mouse button. To pull 
down a menu within the Microsoft Windows system, for example, the user has only 
to press and release a mouse button. On the Macintosh, however, thc mc·nu remains 
visible only while the mouse button is presscd, if the uscr releases the button \\'hile 
an option on the menu is highlighted, thcn that option is selected. Thc subjccts all 
required several attempts at pulling down a menu beforc they learned that they 
needed to keep the mouse button prcsscd, once they had learned this, most of them 
had no further problem using menus. 
Problems that seemed to bother all of the subjects, but which posed particular 
problems for Subject 5, were the inconsistent results of sclecting options on mcnus 
and the results of pressing buttons on windows. Mostly, operators are o\'erloaded, 
that is, the same operator is ablc to pcrfonn the same function on a number of 
different objects. These are the generic operations, such as ope 11 , close, and print 
that are discussed by Rosenberg and Moran (1985) and which werc invoked by keys 
on the Xerox Star keyboard labelled with the operator's namcs. Somc opcr~tors are, 
by contrast polymorphic, operators with the same namc havc different semantics 
depending on which object they are applied to. On the Macintosh system used in this 
study, the same operator name, or button on a window, provided a number of 
different operations but no information was provided by the display to tell users 
which operation would occur. The close window button (shown in Figure 3.4) is an 
example of this, sometimes clicking on this button causes a window to close, but the 
application continues to run, sometimes the application is closed down. Without 
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checking the list of active programs on the Finder menu, it is often difficult to tell 
which operation has occurred. 
§D-
- -
- -
Figure 3.4 Close window button 
The Open ... operator on the File menu caused particular problems for Subject 5, 
again due to inconsistent assignment of operators to names and buttons. The version 
of Microsoft Word installed on the machine used in the study had the behaviour that 
if the user pulled down the File menu and dragged the pointer to the Open ... 
option - but not release the mouse button - a sub-menu listing readable files in the 
current directory would appear. Subject 5 tried to apply this knowledge at the 
desktop level of the Macintosh's interface. This caused her to be unable to perform a 
seemingly simple task. Exercise 4 asks the subject to find a file that contains a few 
lines of text and to add a further line of text. Most subjects, possibly because of the 
way in which they use Microsoft Windows, did not browse the hierarchy of files on 
the hard disk, rather they used the Find option on the File menu. Subject 5, again 
rather than search for the file, remained at the root folder of the file space tree and 
attempted to discover the contents of each of the sub-folders. She did so by selecting 
the folder of interest, highlighting it, and choosing the Open option from the File 
menu. Rather than release the mouse button she waited for the sub-menu to appear, 
when it did not, she falsely concluded that the highlighted folder was empty. A 
possible explanation for this is the subject perceiving the keyboard shortcut HO on 
the menu as #0, meaning that the number of items in the folder is zero, that the folder 
is empty. 
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Making the underlying state of a computer system visible, or easy to infer, has been 
stressed as important when considering what makes a systenl usable and when 
considering how successful mental models are formed. A large number of problems 
that arose \vere due to information about the system's state not being made as explicit 
as it should have been. The System 7 revision of the Finder user interface allo\\'s a 
number of programs to be resident in memory at one time, if there is sufficient main 
memory, and the user can then switch between these programs. If the user clicks on 
the Finder menu icon (see Figure 3.5) a menu listing the programs currently resident 
in memory \vill appear, the user may then make one of these programs active by 
selecting it from the menu. 
Figure 3.5 Finder menu icon 
We described above ho\v the close window button was thought by Subject 5 in 
particular (although this problem was encountered by all subjects to some extent) to 
close down an application rather than simply close the window. This effect was 
compounded by the occasional use of the close window button actually shutting 
down the application. This result is interesting as the system is still said to be 
predictable (Dix, 1991). After the user closes a window, the menu bar at the top of 
the screen states that the system will behave as if it is still running Microsoft Word, 
say, because the system is still running Microsoft Word. This on-screen information 
was ignored, however, by users who believed instead that they had achieved their 
goal of closing down the application program. Roast and Harrison (1994) discuss 
templates, areas of the display that contain information about the state of the system 
relevant to the user's goals when performing tasks. In this situation it seems that the 
desktop appearing from beneath the closed window confirms the user's hypothesis 
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that the application has been closed down, and that the information contained in the 
menu bar (a far smaller section of the screen) is ignored. A further source of 
information that would inform users that the application was still active, the list of 
resident applications, is hidden in the Finder menu and by the time subjects 
discovered this menu, they were unable to relate the list of programs to their 
command history. They did not know that the list of applications presented by the 
Finder menu was a list of applications that they had previously run and which had 
not been closed down. Subjects seemed to persist in the belief that they had closed 
down applications even when problems arose when they attempted to run other 
additional applications. One subject was informed by the system that there was 
insufficient RAM to run the application that she wished to, but it did not occur to her 
that other programs were idle and taking up space in main memory that could be 
otherwise used by shutting down some unused programs. 
The problems that arise due to subjects not being aware of programs still being 
resident in the computer's memory are compounded by the hiding of information 
about the state of the underlying machine, but one can understand why. For users to 
successfully use this version of the Finder user interface, called MultiFinder, they 
need to be aware of the program switching mechanism and need to be aware of some 
mechanism which can focus its attention on a single program and run it. Users need 
to be aware of a (however vague) notion of a hidden processor, but this lies outside 
the scope of the DESKTOP metaphor. In providing this mechanism for allowing 
uses to switch between a number of programs, the advantage to the user of 
employing a metaphor, making the underlying computer system invisible, has been 
lost. Also, in trying to reconcile the program switching mechanism and the 
DESKTOP metaphor, information in the display needed to make the system usable 
has been hidden. 
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3.3 Conclusions 
The results of this study concur with those of Carroll and ~1azurs study (which is 
described in more detail in the next chapter). Subjects were found to ha\'e problems 
\vith basic user interaction with the system as well as in conlprehending the desktop 
metaphor. Many of the problems with the basic aspects of the systenl appeared to be 
a result of subjects' prior knowledge of a different graphical user interface being 
applied to the new system. A number of these problems, however, were compounded 
by the design of the Macintosh user interface itself, and by infonnation that would 
have helped subjects learn a correct model of the system being hidden. 
The documentation supplied with the Apple Macintosh appears to rely on rote 
learning of the skills needed to use the system successfully. This contrasts with the 
active learning approach adopted by the subjects, who would tl)' any seemingly 
useful approach to achieving some goal before "resorting" to the manual. Indeed. 
three subjects announced that they were totally confused and left the session early 
after trying to perform comparatively simple exercises, when the information they 
required was easily obtainable from the manual, and should have been deducible 
from the desktop metaphor. 
Subject 3 gave some hint as to how learning this sort of interactive system could be 
made more successful. She remarked that the method adopted by the study where 
subjects worked alone without human advice was not her preferred \vay of learning, 
she preferred to have an adviser on hand should she need someone to answer her 
questions. Certainly a facility, human (such as a work colleague or helpdesk advisor) 
or otherwise (such as an intelligent help system or agent), able to offer some fonn of 
context sensitive advice would have been useful to the subjects and help, if offered at 
the right time would probably have prevented the subjects who left early from doing 
so. Context sensitivity was something lacking from the balloon on-line help, the 
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subject who made great use of the balloons bemoaned the use of canned text in them 
and would have preferred more specific help. 
The introduction to this thesis hinted that while metaphor is a widespread and useful 
technique in user interface design, it can also be a source of users' difficulties and 
usability problems. In the next chapter drawbacks and usability problems arising 
from the use of metaphor-based user interfaces will be described in more depth. A 
number of these drawbacks were observed during the small empirical study that was 
reported in this chapter. In order to go on to present new user interface designs based 
upon a fuller account of metaphor as it applies in HeI, we must examine the 
difficulties that metaphors can give rise to. This is the task of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Drawbacks to Employing Metaphors and Analogies 
in Interactive User Interfaces 
"So the question is, willlhey see the metaphor? 11 
- Arthur Miller. 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 a number of computer systems which exploit metaphors in order to 
support file management, support object-oriented programming, provide a user 
interface for application programs, and provide mechanisms for switching between 
application programs \\'ere discussed. Although metaphors and analogies are 
suggested as a partial solution to the problem of designing usable software, 
metaphors often cannot account for aspects of a software system, and sometimes the 
use of a metaphor can create new usability problems while solving others. In this 
chapter some of the dra\vbacks of employing metaphors in user interface design are 
presented. 
Carroll, Mack, and Kellogg (1988) identify three strands in research in the use of 
metaphor in human-computer interaction. They make a distinction bet\\'een 
operational and structural approaches to metaphor, and the praglnalics of metaphors 
in use. This distinction is adopted in the consideration below of some of the 
drawbacks in adopting metaphors in user interface design. In the following 
discussion, the seeming convention of considering analogy and metaphor to be 
synonymous in user interface design is adopted, but this will be challenged later. 
4.2 Operational Metaphors 
Operational metaphors are applied in an educational context in order to make the 
process of teaching some concept simpler. Metaphors are provided by the teacher or 
instructional material and their value is judged by the learning gain that results over 
circumstances where no explicit metaphor is employed. Operational approaches to 
metaphor, according to Carroll et al. (1988), therefore attempt to provide examples 
of "good" and" bad" metaphors for certain concepts. 
The work of Richard Mayer is often cited as an example of employing operational 
metaphors to teach and explain computing systems. Mayer demonstrated the value of 
teaching programming in the BASIC programming language with relation to a 
concrete analogical model of the underlying system. The model taught to some of 
Mayer's subjects is described in Mayer (1976). Input to the system is said to pass 
through a physical window in the form of cards with some data written on them. 
Output from the system resulting from the execution of WRITE commands, is 
written on the topmost available line on a pad of paper. The flow of execution 
through a program is monitored by the commands making up the program being 
listed on a card, and the current command being pointed to by an arrow. The current 
values of the program variables is written into boxes on a chalkboard, each box is 
labelled with the name of the corresponding program variable. As the variable's 
value is altered, the learner erases the current value from the relevant box on the 
chalkboard and writes in the new value. This model of program variables has been 
shown by Burstein (1986) to be insufficient to prevent some learner errors arising, 
however. 
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Mayer (1981), as well as considering the teaching of programming languages, also 
provides a concrete model for a computer's file storage system and file management 
command language. This again is presented in the form of concrete analogies, a 
\vriting pad is used for output from the system, and a chalkboard is used for 
representing the list of variables used by the program. Program instructions are listed 
on a pad and a pointer is used to indicate the current instruction, as in the case of the 
set of analogies used to teach BASIC programming. The file management system 
differs from BASIC alone in having a filing cabinet used as an analogy for the 
storage of a set of files. Each file exists in a separate drawer in the cabinet, and is 
said to be made up of a number of records on cards. Files are read by removing the 
cards from the filing cabinet drawer and placing them in an IN tray on a desk. As the 
file is processed, some record cards might be discarded, these cards are placed in a 
DISCARD tray. Cards that are altered and are to be saved are placed in a SA VE tray, 
from where they are returned to the appropriate drawer in the filing cabinet. 
Mayer's studies of employing such analogies showed demonstrable positive effects 
on learning if learners \vere given such models of the system before reading 
conventional user manuals. Mayer suggested that the analogies provide a framework 
into which the new information contained in the manuals may be assimilated. As 
will be discussed further in Section 4.5, properties associated with the metaphorical, 
or analogical, explanation may not match properties associated with the system to be 
explained. In the case of the explanation provided for the file management system, 
Mayer is forced to tell learners that only one drawer of the filing cabinet may be 
open at a time. The reason for this is that only one file in the computer's storage 
system may be accessed and altered at a time for reasons that are well known in the 
design of database and operating systems. Learners may be aware that more than one 
file of a typical real-world filing cabinet may be opened, hence the filing cabinet 
analogy does not provide a perfect match for the storage of computer files. The 
learner may demand some reason for the mismatch, which will have to be given in 
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terms of the actual properties of the file management system. Real filing cabinets 
may indeed only permit one drawer to be open at a time, but it is difficult to explain 
the prevention of file corruption through mutual exclusion of file updates in terms of 
the weight of open filing cabinet drawers causing the cabinet to topple over. While 
Mayer reports positive outcomes from providing students with a concrete analogy 
for the BASIC language, the evidence for the usefulness of such advance organisers 
is mixed. A similar study conducted by Foss et al. (1982), in which learners of a new 
system were given a model very similar to that given by Mayer in order to explain 
the file save facility of a text editor demonstrated a far less· clear advantage. 
Experiments conducted by Payne (1988), by contrast, show advantages in learning 
device semantics and command abbreviations when metaphorical instruction is 
provided. 
Rumelhart and Norman (1981) present a model of learning in which new knowledge 
structures in the form of schemata (Bobrow and Norman, 1975), are developed 
initially by applying existing schemata which may be employed analogously to the 
problem at hand. The example they give is of drawing a pentagon in the Turtle 
graphics system of the LOGO programming language, which is described as an 
analogous procedure to drawing a square. In this example, the structure of the 
schemata which is employed in the operation of constructing the command to draw a 
square stays the same, but the loop parameter used to specify the number of sides is 
altered, and the internal angle between sides of the intended polygon is adjusted. 
Rumelhart and Norman go on to examine their model of analogical use of schemata 
in the context of the result of a study of users learning to use the UNIX text editor 
Ed. They suggest instances of the system's commands which can be employed using 
schemata analogous to schemata representing understood commands, and they 
suggest that evidence from protocols taken during the study support the view that 
learners do employ such mechanisms in learning. Problems arose, however, when 
learners reasoned analogously from the known results of some known commands to 
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the expected effect of other unknown commands. The result of issuing a command to 
print a line, for example, is for the contents of that line of the document to appear on 
the display. Learners reasoned that the result of deleting a line would cause that line 
to disappear from the display, which it did not. Rumelhart and Norman's suggestion 
is that the mental models that learners bring to the learning of the system play roles 
in the analogies they apply when using the system. The role of mental models in 
system learning will be discussed in Chapter 5. In order to overcome the problems 
raised by the system not behaving as the learners' analogical reasoning predicted, 
Rumelhart and Norman were forced to give the learners further information about Ed 
more appropriate to its use than the analogical predictions made. Rather than give 
information about the system inappropriate to the learners who had little knowledge 
of computers, a solution similar to Mayer's operational accounts of BASIC \\'as 
adopted, and the system \vas described in terms of a 'secretary' model, a 'tape 
recorder' model, and a 'card file' model. The secretary model is used to account for 
the mixing of commands and text supplied to Ed by the learncr. It is oflcn found, 
however, that when a system displays some intelligent behaviour, users often bestow 
more intelligence upon the system than it actually possesses. Describing Ed in tcrms 
of an intelligent system, a secretary, led to users behaving as if the system should be 
able to recognise typed input that should be interpreted as commands when in Ed 
was in the append mode (where typed input is merely appended to the text file). The 
tape recorder model overcomes this problem, termed the append-lnode trap, by 
providing the model of a system which records everything faithfully until explicitly 
ordered to stop recording. This model, however, cannot account for delete functions 
that Rumelhart and Norman described using the card file modcl. Each line of tcxt is 
thought of as being typed onto a record card. Dcletion commands removc relevant 
cards from the stack that makes up the entire document. Such difficulties are not the 
only ones encountered when using text editors, as will be discussed in the next 
section. The operational metaphors given by Rumelhart and Norman in their study, it 
may be noted, impose on learners the need to recognise which metaphor is to be 
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employed to help describe the system and their current task where metaphors overlap 
to describe the same aspect of the system. 
4.3 Structural Approaches to Metaphor 
Hall (1989: 43), from a survey of existing work, identifies the following components 
of a process model of analogical reasoning: 
1. Recognition of an analogical source. 
2. Elaboration of an analogical mapping between source and target. 
3. Evaluation of the elaborated analogy. 
4. Consolidation of information generated while using an analogy. 
The operational metaphors discussed in the previous section address the recognition 
component of Hall's analysis where, given a target domain and a set of source 
domains, the problem is to find a promising set of candidate sources. This set may be 
then employed in a tutorial context or further refined to produce the most suitable 
. candidate with which to solve problems (Carbonell, 1983). The elaboration and the 
evaluation components address the problems of finding a mapping, the analogical 
inferences, and mapping preferences between a source and target domain, and 
evaluation of a mapping given a source and target domain and analogical inferences, 
respectively. These components are the consideration of structural approaches to 
metaphor and analogy. 
Hall (1989) describes the elaboration component of analogical reasoning as the 
problem of finding a mapping and a set of analogical inferences given the target and 
source domains and mapping preferences. Existing accounts of finding mappings 
between the metaphorical base, or source. domain and the previously unfamiliar 
target domain mostly rely on knowing the structure of both domains. 
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A number of approaches to the representation of analogical source domains and a 
destination target domain, the method of determining a mapping between source and 
target, and the evaluation of the mapping have been proposed. Rumelhart and 
Abrahamson (1973) model similarity between domains as a distance metric between 
points (which denote concepts) in a multi-dimensional space. Such models cannot, 
ho\vever, account for asymmetric similarities considered central to understanding 
metaphors. An example of asymmetry cited by Tversky (1977: 328) is that people 
say that "an ellipse is like a circle" not that "a circle is like an cllipse". In Tvcrsky's 
model similarity matching is made according to the function: 
s(A,B) = F(AnB, A - B, B - A) 
meaning that the similarity of A to B is expressed as a function, Ft of three 
arguments; AnB, the features that are common to both A and B; A - B, the features 
that belong to A but not to B; and B - A, the features that belong to B but not to A. 
Tversky's theory is extended to address non-similar domains, or metaphors, by 
Ortony (1979), but Ortony's model is unable to make judgements as to the quality of 
a metaphorical mapping. 
Mac Cormac (1985) proposes a model of metaphor in which concepts arc members 
of fuzzy sets. This model is employed in the study of linguistics in an attempt to 
understand metaphors in natural language scntences. Scntences are thus regarded as 
metaphorical; non-metaphorical (literally truthful); or epiphors, which "01. involvc 
outreach and extension of meaning through comparison"!; and diaphors, where" ... 
1 P. E. Wheelwright (1962) Aletaphor and Reality, Indiana University Press, Rloomin~ .. on, Indiana: 
72. Quote reproduced from Indwthya (1992: 77). 
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similarity need not be obvious and comparison explicit"2. Mac Cormac's model 
allows a once metaphorical utterance to become a 'dead' metaphor, and a part of 
ordinary language over time by its membership of non-metaphorical fuzzy sets 
increasing and its membership of the fuzzy sets which denote forms of metaphor 
decreasing. Mac Cormac also provides a useful means by which analogy and 
metaphor may be discriminated between and also reconciled with his model. 
Metaphors, being statements which are not literally true, but which are stated as true, 
create an emotional tension in the reader which forces him or her to search for 
attributes of the metaphorical source which may be applied to the target domain. 
Much of the study of analogy and metaphor has been concentrated in linguistics and 
natural language communication. The study of analogy in reasoning, problem 
solving and planning is a growing field and has given rise to a number of models and 
representations of source and target domains, a number of these being developed 
from work in artificial intelligence. The most often employed model of analogy in 
human-computer interaction and the learning of computer-based domains is 
Gentner's structure-mapping model (Gentner, 1983). In the structure-mapping 
model, the source and target domains are both represented as a number of objects, 
every object has a number of attributes associated with it, each denoted as a single 
argument predicate taking the object's name as the argument. Relations are also said 
to apply between objects, these are represented as predicates taking more than one 
object as arguments. Second- and higher-order relations may also be defined which 
take first- and higher-order relations as predicates. Domains described in terms of 
objects, attributes and relations may also be represented graphically in a graph 
structure. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the domain structures which the analogy "the 
atom is like the solar system" can be made between. 
2 P. E. Wheelwright (1962) Metaplwr and Reality. Indiana University Press. B1oomington. Indiana: 
74. Quote reproduced from Indurkbya (1992: 77). 
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planet 
Figure 4.1 Domain model of the solar system (Gentncr, 1983: 160). 
electron 
Figure 4.2 Domain model of the structure of the atom (Gentner, 1983: 160). 
Provided with suitably represented source and target domains, the structure-mapping 
model provides a method for mapping from the source to the target and evaluating 
the mapping. The mapping is achieved by first discarding the attributes of objects in 
the base and target domains, and by attempting to preserve and match the relations 
bety-'een objects in both domains. Deciding which relations are preserved is achieved 
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by the systematicity principle, according to which a predicate that is part of a " ... 
mappable system of mutually interconnecting relationships is more likely to be 
imported into the target than is an isolated predicate" (Gentner, 1983: 163). 
Interconnected predicates may be identified from higher-order relations in the 
domain description. The types and numbers of predicates mapped from the base 
(source) to the target give an indication of the success of the metaphor being 
employed, and place the relationship between the base and target domains on a 
continuum from literal similarities to analogies. Within the structure-mapping model 
metaphors are treated in a similar way to the approach describeCl by Mac Cormac 
(1985). Suitable attributes, objects (some of which may not be the initial domain 
representation of the problem or utterance), and relations between objects, need to be 
identified and considered in the mapping process. This process may be seen in 
Winston (1980) where facts about a domain may be increased or generalised to aid 
the analogical mapping process. 
Where the structure-mapping model performs the mapping from source domain to 
target domain based on syntactic structures, and exact similarity of higher-order 
relations in the representation, in the ACME model (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989) 
semantic components in the two domains are matched. In addition, mapping between 
the two domains in ACME can be less precise than in the structure-mapping model. 
A judgement as to the best mapping between domains is made by comparing the 
level of an excitation function produced by each of a set of computational elements 
which each evaluate a potential mapping. Several plausible mappings may be 
generated, the best mapping is chosen according to the element that achieves the 
highest excitation level. A similar approach is realised in the Copycat system 
(Mitchell and Hofstadter, 1990). Keane's lAM model (Keane, Ledgeway, and Duff, 
1994) also generates and evaluates potential mappings in parallel, but imposes 
realistic constraints on time and memory limits so as to better emulate actual human 
performance. lAM, like ACME or its predecessor ARCS (Thagard et al., 1990), also 
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relies heavily on background knowledge and semantics in making mappings between 
domains. The MAC/FAC model (Forbus, Gentner, and Law, 1994), while retrie\'ing 
possible analogues in parallel, still employs the Structure Mapping Engine to 
perform mappings. 
4.4 Structural Approaches to Metaphor and I.Jearning of Conlputer-
Based Systems 
Douglas and Moran (1983) studied a number of computer-naive people learning the 
text editor EMACS. Learners were provided \vith the openltional metaphor of a 
typewriter by the teacher, and in some cases were seen to employ this analogy 
without prompting. Special attention was paid to the structure and semantics of 
operations from the typewriter source domain, and the semantics of operations in the 
EMACS target domain .. Rather than construct a mapping between the typewriter 
domain and EMACS domain representations, Douglas and Moran instead 
constructed a problem space (Card, Moran and Newell, 1983). This described both 
the EMACS system and the effect of EMACS commands (operators) on the system 
and the current document when attempting to perform tasks and achieve goals. 
Operators applicable in the typewriter domain \vere then mapped into the EMACS 
domain. This interpretation of the analogical reasoning process allowed Douglas and 
Moran to build a taxonomy of errors which occur when the operators' sel1lafltics are 
wrongly applied in the EMACS system. Douglas and Moran suggest that 62 out of 
105 errors (59%) observed in protocols obtained from novice EMACS users are 
explicable in terms of \vrongly applied operators from knowledge of typewriting. 
The cursor keys give rise to particular errors, for example, the visible effect of the 
<Cursor Right> key was mistaken for the visible effect of the space-bar, although the 
result on the document was different. The destructive effect of the <Backspace> key 
also caused learners problems. The insertion of an invisible character in the text at 
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the point where the <Return> key is pressed requires users to understand a more 
complex model of the space into which text is typed than the simple sheet of paper 
that would be used with a typewriter (Kohl er, 1987). The model of the space which 
EMACS and other text editors employ is the saw-tooth sheet. Figure 4.3 shows part 
of a text file that has been highlighted (or selected) by lassooing a number of lines of 
text by pressing the mouse button down and dragging the pointer over the text. 
Unlike a sheet of paper where we might expect the selected region of space to extend 
to the right hand edge of the page, each line ends with the usually hidden end-of-line 
or line break character (depicted as the' symbol in Microsoft Word) giving the saw-
tooth shape to the selection. Rather than advance to the edge of a sheet of paper, the 
effect of pressing the <Cursor right> key when the cursor is at the position of the 
invisible Carriage Return character is to cause the cursor to advance to the first 
character of the next line. Mistaking the effect of the space bar and the <Cursor 
right> command, which is passive and has no effect on the actual text, at this point 
would give rise to very different effects when navigating or altering a document 
Figure 4.3 Highlighted text placed on a saw-tooth sheet 
Allwood and Eliasson (1987) report that in a similar study to Douglas and Moran's in 
which a database system was studied, only 6% of the learners' errors could be 
accounted for in terms of misapplied analogical mappings. , Although they suggest 
this figure may depend on the type of system being considered. Allwood and 
Eliasson also re-consider Douglas and Moran's results in terms of a greater number 
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of categories in which learners' errors could be placed. Rather than place all errors 
that could be accounted for in a category of errors caused by the use of a typewriter 
analogy, other types of analogical error were accounted for in additional categories. 
These additional categories included prilning analogy errors where a command was 
initially used correctly, but misused later, and anticipatioll analogy errors, where a 
command used matched a command that would be correctly used in a sub-task, but 
not in the context of the current task. With these additional categories, only 14% of 
learner's errors \\'ere said to be caused by use of a typewriter analogy, but errors 
caused by all types of analogies accounted for 60% of errors noted. Aliwood and 
Eliasson also suggest that 68% of all errors were due to analogies if inefficient uses 
of commands caused by analogical reasoning in system use were classified as errors. 
Examining the structure of the target domain of the desktop metaphor, Benyon et al. 
(1990: 30) notice that: 
" ... it is common practice to include an icon of a dustbin on the 'desk'. 
Not only does this contravene our expectations as to where to find 
dustbins (on the floor), but also the interface dustbin has other 
functions apart from its conventional use as a container for discarded 
objects. For instance, the dustbin is often the place where disk icons 
are put in order to eject the disk from the disk drive. This implies that 
one has to 'throwaway' a disk in order to retrieve it! Such an apparent 
contradiction can cause conceptual problems to first-time users since 
it is easy to think that the contents of the disk will be discarded when 
the disk is placed in the dustbin. " 
In addition to the inconsistent way in which objects such as the wasteba"ket behave , 
Carroll and Mazur (1986) report that rather than being able to employ the 
DESKTOP metaphor to understand the computer system beneath, users often find it 
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difficult to understand the desktop itself. This is discussed further in Section 4.5 
where the pragmatics of metaphors and system learning are considered. 
Structural approaches to the analysis of metaphors used to teach computing 
concepts, or in user interface design, are applied so that the worth of a particular 
metaphor may be determined from the quality of the mapping between the source 
and target domains (Carroll and Thomas, 1982). Carroll and Mack (1985: 39) 
suggest that exploring the use of metaphor according to operational and structural 
approaches ignores the "goal-directed learner-initiated learning process though 
which metaphors become relevant and effective in learning." Carroll and Mack 
propose an active learning process by which people learn unfamiliar systems in an 
open-ended way using the metaphorical features of a system to generate initial 
hypotheses and operations that are refined with increased exposure to the system, 
and greater experience using it. Evidence is mixed as to whether structural 
evaluation of analogies may be used to decide on the better analogy for use in a 
particular domain, or whether an active learning approach should be assumed, and 
that the choice of analogy for a domain matters little in eventually understanding the 
domain. 
Chee (1993) employed Genter's structure-mapping model of analogy to produce 
instruction materials to teach BASIC programming with a good analogy, a weak 
analogy, and in a control case, no analogy. According to the structure-mapping 
model, best results should be obtained with a good analogy, less good results 
obtained with no analogy, and worst results with the weak analogy. Chee found that 
the most successful learning was achieved with the best analogy, as determined by 
the evaluation mechanism in structure mapping. Contrary to expectations, the results 
for the weak analogy and no analogy cases were not substantiated, although the 
results were not significant, they were suggestive of the expected result. Chee 
suggests that the weak analogy might not have been as weak as it could have been 
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made, the criteria by which an analogy is evaluated within structure mapping arc 
linked and altering one criterion may affect another, which may improve the o\'crclll 
usefulness of the analogy. Galloway (1993), however, supports the active learning 
approach. Gallo\\'ay attempted to teach a number of computing concepts to groups 
who were taught using either weak or strong analogies (as determined by a structure-
mapping evaluation). Whether weak or strong analogics were employed had no 
effect on the eventual learning outcomes demonstrated by subjects in the two groups. 
Gallo\vay therefore suggests that both weak and strong analogies facilitate learning 
the previously unfamiliar domains. 
4.5 The Pragmatics of Metaphor 
The final current approach to the consideration of metaphors in user interface design 
is to consider the pragmatics of metaphors in use in real systems. Carroll, Mack, and 
Kellogg (1988) observe that using metaphors inevitably involves dealing with 
incompleteness, mismatches, and composite comparisons, yet they suggest that 
metaphor mismatches can prove useful. The Alternate Reality Kit (discussed in 
Section 2.4) is a useful tool, for example, because it allows the student to gain 
greater understanding from confronting their naive physics with accurate physical 
models encoded as ARK simulations. ARK is also of benefit by providing a safe 
environment in which to experiment with the objects under study and their attributes. 
In this section, some of the issues surrounding the pragmatics of learning and using 
user interface designs are discussed. Pragmatic approaches to metaphor examine the 
use of metaphor-based systems in plausible real-world situations in which the systenl 
might be used. In this way, more information may be gathered about the success of 
the metaphor than may be obtained from a structural analysis alone. 
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4.5.1 WIMP Systems 
The Apple Lisa, a forerunner to the Macintosh, was one of the first commercially 
available systems to employ the DESKTOP metaphor in its user interface. Carroll 
and Mazur (1986) conducted a study of learners using the Lisa for the first time This 
section briefly discusses the problems users encountered when attempting to learn 
this system, and the problems caused by the adoption of the desktop metaphor. 
Studies such as Carroll and Mazur's and the study described in Chapter 3 
demonstrate that these systems are often more difficult to use and learn than 
proponents of metaphor-based systems suggest. 
4.5.2 Instruction 
The Apple Lisa was supplied with an on-line tutorial entitled LisaGuide. LisaGuide 
will not be discussed in detail as it is specific only to the Lisa computer, but the 
methods it employs to provide instruction to novice users are worth describing. The 
LisaGuide tutorial is made up of a number of on-line lessons, each consisting of a 
number of exercises designed to make the user familiar with some aspect of the 
system. These exercises are to be performed one after another, and are to be 
performed by rote. Users are unable to structure the sequence of exercises, even 
though, as one of Carroll and Mazur's subjects found, the exercises seem pointless 
and simple to master in their given order. The LisaGuide teaches simple skills at 
first, such as use of the mouse and mouse buttons, and goes on to teach more 
complex skills that comprise, in part, the simpler skills taught earlier. The LisaGuide 
system itself caused users problems, in addition to those caused by the training 
strategy adopted by the system, these problems are detailed in Carroll and Mazur 
(1986) and Carroll (1990), and will not be described further here. 
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4.5.3 Basic user interaction 
Direct manipulation systems, of which the Lisa is an cxamplc, arc assunled to be 
easier to learn than command-bascd uscr intcrfaccs, thc learning costs of 
remembering commands and of understanding thc cffcCl~ of commands are 
presumably reduced. Direct manipulation systems, howcvcr, do not rcmovc the nced 
to learn the simple operations and commands that must be understood by the user. 
Basic user operations involving the mouse must be learned before more complex 
tasks may be attempted. Examples of the simplc opcrations that make up human-
computer dialogues with direct manipulation systems arc termed clicking, pressing, 
selecting, and dragging. Even this terminology provcd confusing to users, 
explanations of these terms were not provided in the Lisa's documentation, yct morc 
complex tasks were described in terms of these operations. Although these skills 
were taught and practised using the LisaGuidc, they wcre not named, users were 
forced to make the (hopefully correct) association between their action and the effect 
on the system, and then to relate their action to a concept namcd in the 
documentation. Carroll (1990) reports that this problem can trouble users cvcn after 
over an hour of using the system. 
Double clicking of a mouse button to perform operations was also a cause of users' 
problems. Acceptable delays between the first and second click proved difficult to 
judge, and some users were never able to open and run applications by methods 
involving a double mouse click. One user was reported as hypothesising the effect of 
a double mouse button click, but he attemptcd to confirm this hypothesis using a file 
which did not respond to a double click and was confused by the resulting 
unexpected system response. Where clicking was applied to on-screen objects, again 
the lack of an explicit association between a skill and its name, or between the effect 
of an action and its name, caused users problems. One user wa~ unable to perfonn 
tasks that required a particular icon to be selected and become highlighted until he 
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deduced that when an icon darkened in response to a mouse click it was in fact 
highlighted. 
4.5.4 The Desktop 
According to Carroll (1990: 62), with the Apple Lisa: 
"The user is encouraged to think of the display as a desktop 
-
containing objects that can be manipulated on analogy with physical 
manipulation. This approach attempts to make learning a computer 
easier by designing interface actions, procedures, and concepts to 
exploit specific prior knowledge that users have of other domains. 
Instead of making the interface simpler, this approach seeks to 
increase the initial familiarity of actions, procedures and concepts that 
are already known. " 
Above, problems caused by the use of a typewriter analogy to explain text-editing 
systems were described. These problems also arose in the Lisa system, space 
characters were inserted into documents when the user expected these characters to 
replace and overwrite unwanted characters in the document. 
As with basic user interaction, the vocabulary used to describe objects on the 
electronic desktop also caused users problems. Users seemed unable to associate the 
terms "clipboard", ·stationery pad", "typing", "tear-off stationery" and "folders" with 
the analogous on-screen objects presented, data structures or tasks. Where objects 
were understood, when users attempted to apply skills from the real world in the 
electronic domain, they discovered that these skills were not supported. "Tearing 
off" a sheet of stationery from the on-screen pad of paper used to create short notes 
and documents proved difficult to perform. One user was seen making sweeping 
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motions with the mouse. clicking the mouse button while the pointer was oyer a 
corner of the pad mimicking the action performed in the real world. Objects in the 
electronic domain were also found to not support the steps nlaking up more complex 
tasks in the order in which the steps would be pcrfornled in the real world. 
Some of the basic concepts underlying the desktop metaphor were criticised by 
Carroll and Mazur. On-screen objects are divided into data files (which resemble 
documents. pictures and folders). functions (for example file copying is denoted by a 
photocopier), and application tools (such as word processors and spreadsheet 
software). Carroll and Mazur (1986: 41-42) describe the notion of an application tool 
as: 
" ... a good example of an ancillary metaphor too general to imply 
anything useful." 
Data files are the product of application programs, but users preferred to perform 
tasks directly using the data file, rather than open the application that produced it and 
to view the data file as the data manipulated by the application. It also seems 
difficult to reconcile application tools with the desktop metaphor, it may be asked 
what meaning dragging an application onto the desktop means, applications having 
no immediately obvious real-\\'orld analogue. 
4.6 Discussion: Metaphor and System Learning and Use 
Metaphors are often proposed as a design solution to the problem of creating usable 
computer systems. This chapter discussed models of metaphorical and analogical 
reasoning and understanding in the learning of previously unfamiliar computer 
systems. Users can obtain the information needed to use an unfamiliar computer 
system from a number of sources. One source is the documentation supplied \\'ith a 
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system, In the form of manuals, on-line tutorials, and instruction on audio- or 
videocassette (for example Apple, 1983). It is well known that users resist using 
manuals whenever possible (Carroll and Rosson, 1987), and even when manuals are 
used they may not best support users. The Lisa study described above again shows 
users' reluctance to use manuals, as does the Macintosh study described below. The 
manual supplied with the Lisa system is an example of a manual that fails to support 
users in their efforts to learn the system. The learning of a computer system has been 
likened to being immersed in a foreign culture - a major requirement of learning 
the new system is to learn the language used to describe it. CarroIi and Mazur (1986) 
found that many simple skills required to use the system were described using terms 
that were not described in the documentation. Users also often change the wording 
of tasks into their own familiar vocabulary, as will be demonstrated in the study of 
novice Macintosh users described in the next chapter. Mayer (1981) found that 
allowing users to put instruction material in their own words increased the time 
taken to learn a domain, but increased the quality of their learning. Manual authors 
seem not to recognise this, and tasks become more difficult to learn and perform as a 
result. This vocabulary problem (Furnas et al., 1987) is well-recognised by others. 
Even when many aliases and synonyms for commands or objects in many task 
domains, are provided, studies show that the probability of the system designer and 
users using the same word when attempting to name the same action or concept 
tends to be very low. 
The learning mechanism assumed by the Lisa and Macintosh manuals seems to be 
that described by Anderson (1982). In Anderson's model skills are acquired by the 
compilation over time of a declarative representation of a problem, or task to be 
performed, into productions which are used in the performance of routine cognitive 
skills. the initial declarative representation eventually being lost. This model 
accounts for how people are often able to perform tasks (knowing how) without 
being able to articulate the process by which a task is performed (knowing what). 
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More complex skills and tasks are described in terms of being built up from simpler 
existing skills. In this way, the Macintosh documentation teaches menu use by first 
teaching the simpler skills of manipulating the on-screen pointer using the mouse 
and clicking the mouse button at appropriate times. This model of skill acquisition is 
realised in the ACT* and ACT-R models of cognition (Anderson, 1983, 1993). 
Criticisms, however, of the ACT* model as applied in human-computer interaction 
are presented in Lansdale and Ormerod (1994). 
Waem (1990) suggests that two aspects of learning need to be considered "in human-
computer interaction, \\-'hat the user already knows and what the user has to learn. 
Accounts of learning assume that in order to acquire ne\v facts and skills, the learner 
must already possess considerable knowledge. Another source of information that 
can aid a user to learn a new computer system is transfer of existing skills and 
knowledge to the new domain. If systems support or encourage the use and transfer 
of existing knowledge, Waern (1985) proposes that this may not aid learning the ne\\' 
system if negative transfer occurs and existing knowledge interferes with the actual 
knowledge required to use the system. Singley and Anderson (1989) conclude from 
their studies of learners using a different text-editing system from a familiar one that 
transfer of existing skills can only take place at the level of individual productions, 
the smallest unit of cognitive skill. Transfer from one direct manipulation interface 
to another can be achieved if the interfaces are sufficiently similar. This can be seen 
in (Young, 1981) and in the study of Macintosh users described above where users 
could be seen trying to load data files into an application by typing MS-DOS 
commands into a text entry field in dialogue boxes rather than selecting files fronl a 
list shown. 
As direct transfer of existing knowledge cannot account for all the knowledge 
required to use an unfamiliar computing system, analogical processes become more 
important in learning and using a computer system. Many of the problems of specific 
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user interfaces, systems, and computing domains have been described above. In 
general, the process of analogical reasoning in humans presents difficulties for user 
interface software designers and users. In the cases considered above, users are 
provided with an analogical source domain, either in the form of the model world 
represented on-screen, or in some form of instruction. Studies of humans provided 
with a useful analogy before attempting a problem solving exercise shows that the 
analogy may often not be applied to solve the problem (Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 
1983). Some evidence of this is seen in the Macintosh study presented above where 
some subjects seem incapable of applying knowledge about waste baskets (which are 
depicted on-screen) in order to plan and execute methods of retrieving files from the 
waste basket or trashcan. 
Where direct transfer of knowledge cannot be achieved, Singley and Anderson 
(1989) suggest that a more declarative representation of a domain or problem must 
be retained in order to facilitate analogical processes in reasoning. Singley and 
Anderson state, however, that if the target domain differs from what is expected 
from the result of analogical mapping, the problem solver is unable to resolve and 
explain mismatches. In the Copycat model of analogical reasoning, where no 
mapping can be made due to there being no concept in the target domain that 
satisfies an analogical mapping from the source concept, the problem server is faced 
with the problem of conceptual slippage (Mitchell, 1993). If no mapping can be 
made from a source concept, the set of possible sources must be relaxed, or must 
slip, until a concept that can be mapped is found. Conceptual slippage is realised in 
the Copycat model in a slipnet knowledge representation structure. 
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Figure 4.4 Building blocks of sIipnets (French, 1995: 57). 
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Figure 4.5 Part of a slipnet representing the alphabet (French, 1995: 58). 
In a slipnet (Figures 4.4 and 4.5), concepts are represented as nodes. Activation of 
nodes can spread to concept nodes that map less well to suitable concepts in the 
target domain. This multivalued model of concepts that may possibly be mapped 
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analogically explains why in Copycat there is no one single mapping made every 
time the mapping is made. Instead" a number of different problem solvers will 
choose different source concepts. The possible patterns of activation may result in a 
plausible (according to the slipnet, and indeed the problem context) analogical 
mapping being made, but which is unwanted, unhelpful, or unintended. If, as Smith 
(1987) suggests, all user interfaces will present behaviour and features that cannot be 
explained in terms of the metaphor represented, the means by which mismatches are 
explained, and the mechanisms used to generate accounts of mismatches require 
investigation. Mismatches between an analogical source and a target computing 
system are considered by the active learning approach to systems. 
An important issue raised by analogies being made by stochastic processes such as 
in Copycat, and TableTop (French, 1995), is that there is no one "correct" analogical 
mapping, there are only mappings that are more likely to be made. Some inferences 
may have such a high probability of being chosen that their selection can be almost 
assured, but the mechanisms underlying such models cannot rule out an unlikely 
inference being chosen by surviving with a sufficiently high excitation level. Indeed, 
some analogical inferences made can be described as "almost sick" (Hofstadter, 
1985: 575). The nature of the conceptual models captured in slipnets means that the 
knowledge possessed by the system making the analogy confuses and complicates 
the process, and the making of analogies between domains will always be subjective 
and imprecise. 
Analogies are employed to ease the learning and use of a computing system by 
encouraging the use of existing skills and knowledge in the new domain of the 
computing system. It is possible, however, for a graphical user interface to adopt an 
analogy, but one which gives users no suggestion as to the skills that may be applied. 
The user interface shown in Figure 4.6 attempts to realise a graphical user interface 
which adopts the analogy of, and which is intended to be as flexible in the uses to 
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which it can be put as, a sheet of paper. However, as Buxton (1993) has stated, no 
suggestion as to how to use the intcrfacc is given to the novice user. Dialogue \\'ith 
this system is initially very ullder-determined (Thimbleby, 19HO). 
Figure 4.6 GEdit, a paper-like interface3• 
4.7 Types and Theories of Metaphor 
Mentioning the ideas of Douglas Hosftadter and his colleagues in the Auid 
Analogies Research Group introduces the major division in the types of theories of 
metaphors that have been previously presented. While metaphor has been a topic of 
thought and debate since the time of Aristotle, theories of metaphor have yet to 
achieve sufficient influence in the understanding of metaphor itself, let alone in the 
understanding of cognition in general, for it to be possible either to undertake an 
historical survey of theories from either Karl Popper's or Thomas Kuhn's \'iewpoinL~ 
of scientific progress. Instead, theories of metaphor can merely be said to fall into 
one of two categories, comparison theories, or interactiolllheories. 
3 Developed by Gonion Kurtenbach (Kurtenbach and Buxton. 1991). all interaction wilh the system is 
by means of gestures communicated to the system via the mouse. 
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Comparison theories, which account for what Indurkhya (1992) terms similarity-
based metaphors, rely on there being some underlying similarities between the 
(familiar) source and the (unfamiliar) target domains to permit meaning to be 
transferred. We can see that comparison theories are assumed by those, such as 
Halasz and Moran (1982), who denounce the use of metaphor as a way of explaining 
interactive devices and who state that metaphor plays little part in explanation and 
that it can only serve as a rhetorical flourish. According to Ortony (1993) Aristotle 
held similar views. The majority of theories of metaphor that have been applied to 
date in HCI and user interface design are comparison theories- despite interaction 
theories of metaphor predating the first user interface metaphors. 
4.7.1 Interaction Theories 
A number of interaction theories of metaphor have been proposed - Indurkhya 
(1992) surveys those that were the most well-formulated at the time he was writing. 
Below we shall describe and make use of the interaction theory due to George 
Lakoff and his colleagues. We shall follow Indurkhya's (1992) claims that Lakoffs 
theory is an interaction theory even though Lakoff himself, according to Indurkhya, 
sides his theory more with comparison theories. The principles of an interaction 
theory of metaphor were stated best by Max Black (1993: 27-28)4: 
"1. A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be 
identified as the 'primary' subject' and the 'secondary' one ... 
2. The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an 
individual thing. 
" Black's paper was originally written for the fIrst edition of the volume in which it appears which 
was published in 1979. 
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3. The metaphorical utterance works by 'projecting upon' the primary 
subject a set of 'associated implication' comprised in the implicative 
complex, that are predictable of the secondary subject. .. 
4. The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, enlphasil.es, 
supresses, and organises features of the primary subject by applying 
to it statements isomorphic with the mem hers of the secondary 
subject's implicative complex ... 
5. In the context of a particular metaphorical statenlent, the two 
subjects 'interact' in the following ways: (a) the presence of "the 
primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary 
subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel 
implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) 
reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject." 
A possible explanation for why Lakoff chooses, according to Indurkhya (1992), to 
speak of his theory of metaphor as a comparison theory is because he and his 
colleagues (for example Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) often analyse metaphors that are 
called "dead" by some authors (for example, Mac Cormac, 1985). These are 
utterances that are metaphors but which no longer possess any power to shock or 
surprise because they are such everyday aspects of speech. Where Lakofrs theory 
can be terms an interaction theory is in regarding the things being metaphorically 
compared as rich systems of relationships (the "implicational complex"), r~ther than 
single objects. While structure-based approaches to domain representation are 
systems of relationships, they have until recently lacked the complexity and richness 
that Lakofrs theory has addressed from the beginning. Forbus (2001) signals a shift 
by one group of structure-based analogy researchers to consider more complex 
knowledge structures. 
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Interaction theories are important in HeI for two other reasons. The first, which will 
considered as further work, is the way in which interaction between domains gives 
rise not just to understanding of the unfamiliar domain, but it also causes changes to 
the understanding of the familiar domain. Interaction theories do not just address 
common-place, or dead, metaphors, but seek to explain novel metaphors, or what 
Indurkhya (1992) terms similarity-creating metaphors. How our user interface 
metaphors change our existing conceptual structures and perhaps subsequently 
constrain the ways in which we can imagine interaction with computing devices is a 
topic that remains for further work. The second reason why interaction theories are 
important, which HCI has not considered in great depth to date, but which is central 
to the Lakoff theory, are the issues arising in system use, cognition and 
understanding from the fact that users are embodied. Indurkhya (1992: 402) makes 
the following observations of the interaction theory he presents, which like the 
systems developed by Hofstadter, French, Mitchell and other members of the FARO, 
particularly considers physical actions performed by the 'user': "The model would 
work by producing a conceptualization of the target sensorimotor data set in terms of 
the source concepts. The resulting representation would be metaphorical, if it would 
be something that the system would not have produced by itself when the source 
were not explicitly given." Interaction theories stress that action and models of how 
actions are performed must be considered as part of source domains if target 
domains are to be metaphorically understood. The Lakoff theory of metaphor 
described below is valuable for directly addressing this concern. 
4.7.2 Metaphor and Analogy 
In user interface design. as mentioned, the words "metaphor" and "analogy" appear 
to others to be synonymous. It may be asked if this is simply another example of the 
limited understanding of metaphor that HCI as a whole possesses, if the mental 
processes that underlie these tropes are the same, or if these "tropes", as exhibited by 
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user interfaces, are the same. However, the use of terminology in the metaphor and 
cognitive science literature makes these questions difficult to answer currently. 
Donald Schon's (1983) analysis of professional's behaviour in terms of them being 
reflective practitioners views discovery and hypothesis gener~tion as part of this 
form of practice as new problems being framed in terms of descriptions that arc 
perceived to be similar to previous experience. This framing is tenned seeing-as by 
Schon. For Schon, analogy is synonymous to a form of metaphor termed generative 
metaphor which is when seeing-as occurs when the domains of experience arc 
different. Schon's key example of this, which is often cited elsewhere, is of a group 
of designers \\'ho \\'ere trying to replicate the properties of paintbrushes with bristles 
made of natural materials with bristles made of artificial materials. Copying 
superficial properties of bristles did not give useful results, but when one of the 
designers that Schon \\'as studying observed that" ... a paintbrush is a kind of pump!" 
(Schon, 1983: 184) the designers were able to replicate the key aspects of brushes 
and to consider new designs. For Schon, only generative metaphors create insight in 
this way and allow people to not only understand the unfamiliar domain, but also to 
develop a ne\v understanding of the familiar, presumed fully understood, donlain. 
The nature of the similarity between domains may influence whether the process of 
understanding one domain in terms of another is metaphorical or analogical. A 
particular problem that affects some user interface designs, as will be discussed 
further in the follo\ving chapter, is that the model world does not behave in a causal 
way. Even if the software does not betray the user's notions of causality, as Spiro et 
al. (1989: 507) note "Some analogies are vcry effectivc at characterising surface 
features and relationships but gloss over underlying causal mechanisms. The result is 
that learners tend either to fill in a convenient but incorrect causal account of their 
own, or just leave the causal mechanism unexplained as a kind of 'black box.'" They 
go on to suggest that "It might be said that a comparison based primarily on surface 
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descriptive aspects is more metaphorical than analogical. However, our point here is 
that an underlying relational structure is indeed transferred - that is, people have a 
tendency to interpret metaphors analogically." (op. cit.: 507). 
Fraser (1993: 332) holds that this connection is even stronger than Spiro et al. 
believe. He defines a metaphor as "an instance of the non-literal use of language in 
which the intended propositional content must be determined by the construction of 
an analogy." Fraser is clear to point out that he does not regard metaphor and 
analogy as synonymous, but that analogy is a process that muse be involved in the 
understanding of a metaphor. Gentner and leziorski (1993) view metaphor as a broad 
category encompassing analogy, matches that map structure independently of object 
descriptions, and other kinds of matches between domains. Gentner's work has been 
primarily concerned with analogy understanding, in which the structure-mapping 
process is the primary mechanism. Many of the figurative expressions studied by 
Lakoff and 10hnson (1980) are claimed by Gentner and leziorski to be analogies 
rather than metaphors. Gentner et al. (2001) attempt to unify metaphor with analogy, 
more precisely to claim an equality between the set of metaphors and the set of 
analogies, and hence to be able to account for metaphors by their structure-mapping 
model of understanding analogies, but do not completely succeed. Some forms of 
metaphor cannot be described in terms of their unified account, although, like Schon, 
they state that novel metaphors can be accounted for by processes of analogical 
understanding. In the more problematic case of what they term conventional 
metaphors, where the base term refers both to a literal concept and a metaphoric 
category, metaphors are said to have a career. The career of a metaphor can be 
likened to the change in fuzzy category membership in Mac Cormac's model, 
metaphors that are at first novel can, in Gentner's et al. view be handled in structural 
terms. As the metaphor becomes more familiar, understanding it is more the task of 
determining its category membership, no further change in understanding of either 
source or target domain is possible, and it becomes what Mac Cormac would call 
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dead. It at this point requires no structure-mapping processes to understand when 
encountered again. 
In the Lakoff/lohnson theory, the relationship is reversed. Rather than (some, most. 
or all) metaphors being comprehensible in tenns of processes and nlcchanisms of 
analogical reasoning, analogies are forms of metaphor. Lakoff. from analyses 
undertaken by Mark Turner, suggests that the general mcchanism of analogical 
reasoning is the GENERIC IS SPECIAC metaphor. This metaphor maps schemata 
onto their generic-level schemata. The following sections dcfine the tcrnl schemata 
and present the details of the Lakoff/lohnson theory of nlctaphor. Among the 
advantages provided by this theory as a tool for undcrstanding user interface 
metaphors, is the provision, through the existence of generic-level schcnlata, of \\'ays 
of addressing the fundamental questions of how novice users make a mapping 
bet\veen a known domain (the metaphorical source) and a completely unkno\\'n 
domain, and ho\\' they can fonnulate motor scquences to interact with this domain. 
4.8 Is Metaphorical Understanding of User Interfaces 
Possible? 
Above, the problems of existing metaphor-based user interfaces have been 
discussed, as \vell as the difficulties of attempting to develop new metaphors for 
model world interfaces to computing systems from an understanding of previous 
work in understanding metaphorical and analogical reasoning. In this section \\'e 
consider a serious objection to the world view underlying much of the \\'ork 
discussed above. This objection is one that, while it suggests that mctaphors and 
analogies should have no place in the design of graphical user interfaces, we \\'ill 
take as the starting point to employ a particular recent interaction theory of metaphor 
understanding as another tool to use to criticise existing metaphor-balied User 
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interfaces and to employ in the analysis and design of two new interface designs that 
will be presented later in the thesis. 
The work that has had the greatest influcnce on current work on metaphor and 
analogy in user interface design adopts the Objectivist world view. This model of 
reality, meaning and reference, long-standing in Western science and philosphy, 
adopts the following assumptions: 
"- Thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. 
- The mind is an abstract machine, manipulating symbols essentially 
in the way a computer does, that it, by algebraic computation. 
- Symbols (e.g. words and mental representations) get their meaning 
via correspondences with things in the external world. All meaning 
is of this character. 
- Symbols that correspond to the external world are internal 
representations of external reality. 
- Abstract symbols may stand in correspondence to things in the 
world independent of the peculiar properties of any organisms. 
- Since the human mind makes use of internal representations of 
. external reality, the mind is a mirror of nature, and correct reason 
mirrors the logic of the external world. 
- It is thus incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason 
that human beings have the bodies they have and function in their 
environment in the way they do. Human bodies may play a role in 
choosing which concepts and which modes of transcendental 
reason human beings actually employ, but they play no essential 
role in characteriSing what constitutes a concept and what 
consi tutes reason. 
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- Thought is abstract and disembodied, since it is independent of any 
limitations of the human body, the human perceptual system, and 
the human nervous system. 
- Machines that do no more than mechanically manipulate symbols 
that correspond to things in the world are capable of meaningful 
thought and reason. 
- Thought is atomistic, In that it can broken down into simple 
'building blocks' - the symbols used in thought - which are 
combined into complexes and manipulated by rule. 
- Thought is logical in the narro\v technical sense used by 
philosophical logicians; that is, it can be modelled accurately by 
systems of the sort used in mathematical logic. These are abstract 
symbol systems defined by general principles of _ symbol 
manipulation and mechanisms for interpreting such symbols in 
terms of 'models of the world'." (Lakoff, 1987: xii-xiii) 
This model of the \vorld is one that has become subject to recent severe cri ticisms, 
these criticisms will need to be taken into account as further \\-'ork in role of 
metaphor and analogy in human-computer interaction is undertaken. The severest 
criticism of the Objectivist \vorld view has been provided by Hilary Putnam (1981) 
who haS provided a well-known theorem that refutes many of the assumptions of 
Objectivism listed above. Putnam's Theorem is stated as follows (Putnam, 1981: 
Appendix): 
"Let L be a language \vith predicates FI, F2, ... , Fk (not necessarily 
monadic). Let I be an interpretation in the sense of assigning an 
intension to every predicate of L. Then if I is non-trivial in the sense 
that at least one predicate has an extension which is neither empty nor 
universal in that at least one possible world, there exists a second 
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interpretation J which disagrees with I but which makes the same 
sentences true in every possible world as I does." 
Putnam uses this theorem to show that a sentence such as "a cat is on a mat" can be 
transformed so that "cat" refers to "cherry" and "mat" refers to "tree" without 
changing the truth value of the sentence in any possible world. Predicates of this 
form make up the models of the target and source domains between which an 
analogical mapping is made in the structure mapping and ACME models. Putnam 
continues by stating that "a more complicated reinterpretation ... can be carried out for 
all sentences of a whole language. It follows that there are always infinitely many 
different interpretations of the predicates of a language which assign the 'correct' 
truth-values to the sentences in all possible worlds, no matter how these 'correct' 
truth-values are singled out." (Putnam, 1981: 35, original italics). 
The effect of Putnam's Theorem is to render meaningless the notion of reference, the 
connection between symbols in the mind and distinct objects in the external world 
that can be categorized. While the impact of Putnam's Theorem has been felt most 
fully in the fields of cognitive science, philosophy and linguistics, its results also 
apply in the prospects for theories of metaphorical understanding. Lakoff (1987: 
172) states that: 
"The Objectivist paradigm also induces what is known as the literal-
figurative distinction. A literal meaning is one that is capable of 
fitting reality, that is, of being objectively true or false. Figurative 
expressions are defined as those that do not have meanings that can 
directly fit the world in this way. If metaphors and metonyms have 
any meaning at all. they must have some other, related literal 
meaning. Thus, metaphor and metonymy are not subjects for 
objectivist semantics at all. The only viable alternative is to view 
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them as part of pragmatics - the study of a speaker's meaning. 
Moreover, it follows from the objectivist definitions of definitio1l 
itself that metaphor and metonymy cannot be part of definitions. They 
cannot evcn be a part of conccpts, since concepts must involvc a 
direct correspondence to entities and categories in thc rcal \\'orld (or a 
possible world)." 
Putnam (1981: 72-74), in addition, says that: 
"Even if the notion of a 'similarity' between our conccpts and what 
they refer to doesn't work, couldn't there be some kind of abstract 
isomorphism, or, if not literally an isomorphism, some kind of 
abstract lnapping of concepts onto things in the (mind-indcpendcnt) 
world? Couldn't truth be defined in terms of such an isomorphism or 
mapping? 
The trouble \\'ith this suggestion is not that correspondences betwcen 
words or concepts and other entities don't exist, but that too Inany 
correspondences exist. To pick out just one correspondence bct\\'ecn 
words or mental signs and mind-independent things we would have 
already to have referential access to the mind-independent 
things ... This simply states ... the intuitive fact that to single out a 
correspondence between two domains one needs some independent 
access to both domains. " 
This independent access to domains between which a mapping is to be drawn, this 
God's eye view of the world as Putnam terms it, is what Putnam's Theorem states 
can never be available. Therefore much of the work on metaphorical comprehension 
and analogical reasoning, assumed to a considerable extent in human-computer 
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interaction, becomes subject to Mitchell and Hofstadter's (1995: 290) criticisms of 
these systems. They claim that there is nothing in the existing models of analogy 
making that makes "symbols stand for anything in a recognisable way. Only the 
person who used them to encode 'pieces of knowledge' sees them as standing for 
anything." The conclusion drawn, therefore, is that metaphor will never allow users 
to understand the systems they use, if concepts and models of the system are to be 
formed to a large part by metaphorical mappings between domains modelled in a set-
theoretic, Objectivist, way. It might be concluded, as a result, that users should be 
provided only with literal accounts of the system they are to learn and use. In doing 
so, however, devising training material would prove difficult and we would reject 
the advantages that some forms of mental models give to users. We would also be 
rejecting the pervasive nature of metaphor and analogy in understanding the world 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Before presenting the design of the Medusa system, 
therefore, we are required to explore to some extent the role that metaphor will play 
in its design and the theory of metaphor that is assumed in its model world, in doing 
so, we continue a programme begun by Rohrer (1995)5. 
4.9 Cognitive Semantics of User Interface Metaphors 
Below, the motivations behind a new interface design named Medusa are discussed. 
The design of this user interface, while trying to avoid the problems posed by 
existing systems based on metaphors and analogies discussed above, appreciates that 
analogy and metaphor are an inescapable part of learning and understanding. In 
recent years, the Objectivist world view underlying the understanding of 
metaphorical and analogical reasoning assumed in the theories of metaphor 
5 Very recently. use of the LakofflJohnson theory of metaphor understanding in HeI has also been 
adopted by others. fa- example BenyOll and Imaz (1999). but these authors have yet to consider the 
number of interface designs and task domains considered in this thesis. 
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described earlier in this chapter has come under criticism. These criticisms have led 
to the development of a contemporary theory of metaphor by George Lakoff and his 
colleagues (Lakoff, 1993). Below, an attempt to formulate this theory of metaphor in 
terms of user interface design is presented. This fOImulation of the theory is 
employed to underlie one version of the Medusa user interface design that will be 
presented in Chapter 6. 
4.9.1 Image Schemata and Metaphorical Projection for 
Understanding 
Putnam's Theorem gives rise to the conclusion that metaphor can play no part in our 
understanding of concepts \vithin an Objectivist world vie\v. Mappings bct\\'een 
domains, as assumed in existing work on metaphorical understanding of user 
interface model worlds, teach us little about the quality of a user interface metaphor 
according to Putnam's Theorem as the concepts and representations of the external 
world modelled have no connection to mind-independent things. We must therefore 
confront how meaning is obtained and what role metaphor can play in the world. The 
conclusion drawn by Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) is that meaning is grounded 
in terms of image schemata, and that the world can be understood in terms of these 
schemata and metaphorical mappings from these schemata to describe a situation or 
statement. Johnson (1987: 28-29) provides the following definition of the tcnn 
" image schemata": 
"On the one hand, they are not Objectivist propositions that specify 
abstract relations between symbols and objective reality. There might 
be conditions of satisfaction for schemata of a special sort (for which 
we would need a new account), but not in the sense required for 
traditional treatments of propositions. On the other hand, they do not 
have the specificity of rich images or mental pictures. They operate at 
94 
one level of generality and abstraction above concrete rich images. A 
schema consists of a small number of parts, images, and events. In 
sum, image schemata operate at a level of mental organisation that 
falls between abstract propositional structures, on the one side, and 
particular concrete images, on the other. 
The view I am proposing is this: in order for us to have meaningful, 
connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, 
there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and 
conceptions. A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity 
in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities. These patterns emerge as 
meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily 
movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our 
perceptual interactions." (Original italics) 
We shall give one example of understanding based on image schemata before 
considering a number of case studies applying the Lakoffllohnson model of 
metaphor comprehension to aspects of existing user interface designs. 10hnson 
(1987: 32) presents examples of how a small number of image schemata based on 
experience of IN-Our relationships can account for many uses of the word "out" in 
English. Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 show these uses with depictions of the schema6 
being relied upon for understanding. 
, These schemata were devised for Qaudia Brugman's 1981 University of California at Berkeley MA 
thesis The Slory of Over. 
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John went out of the room. 
Pump out the air. 
Let out your anger. 
Pick out the best theory. 
Drown out the music. 
Harry weasled out of the contract. 
Pour out the beans. 
Roll out the red. carpet. 
Send out the troops. 
Hand out the information. 
Write out your ideas. 
Figure 4.7 The OUT I schema 
Figure 4.8 The OUT 2 schema 
I..M TR 
The train started out for Chicago. ... 
Figure 4.9 The OUT 3 schema 
It should be noted that these depictions of image schemata are only depictiolls, but 
they seIVe to illustrate the bodily experiences captured in, and described by, the 
schemata. In the schemata shown LM is the "landmark" in relation to which TR the 
"trajector" moves. Considering the schema OUT 1 and the sentence "John went out of 
the room", the circle (LM) represents the room as a container, and John moves along 
the arrow (as TR) out of the room. The diagram does not represent information, such 
as the shape of the room (which may not be circular), or the vector along which John 
moves, but it instead "gives only one idealised image of the actual schema .. .lt is, 
rather, a continuous, active, dynamic recurring structure of experiences of similar 
spatial movements of a certain kind." (Johnson, 1987: 36). 
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The intention behind the Lakoff/Johnson theory of metaphor is to be able to account 
for human understanding of concepts and language. In order to do so it must be able 
to describe the non-physical as well as the physical. To this end. all understanding is 
achieved by metaphorical extensions from image schemata. An example given by 
Johnson (1987: 35) is the sentence "I don't want to leave any relevant data out of my 
argument." This relies upon the our schema in order to be understood. but also 
relies upon the ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER metaphor. claimed to be a very 
common metaphor in Western culture (Lakoff and Johnson. 1980). 
There are, obviously, more schemata in addition to IN-Our used to ground our 
comprehension of the world. Johnson (1987: 126) presents a partial list of schemata 
(shown in Figure 4.10), which he claims are" ... pervasive, well-defined, and full of 
sufficient internal structure to constrain our understanding and reasoning." (original 
italics). Some of these schemata will be used below in case studies. and in the 
following chapter where the details of a revised design of the Medusa system are 
presented, to be useful in attempts to provide meanings of and to discuss interaction 
with aspects of graphical user interfaces. 
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CONTAINER BALANCE COMPULSION 
BLOCKAGE COUNTERFORCE RESTRAINT REMOVAL 
ENABLEMENT ATTRACTION MASS-COUNT 
PATH LINK CENTER-PERIPHERY 
CYCLE NEAR-FAR SCALE 
PART-WHOLE MERGING SPLITTING 
FULL-EMPTY MATCHING SUPERIMPOSITION 
ITERATION CONTACT PROCESS 
SURFACE OBJECT COLLECTION 
Figure 4.10 Some pervasive image schemata 
4.9.2 The Lakoff/Johnson Theory in HCI 
A criticism that can be made of the use of metaphor in HCI is that few authors who 
apply a particular theory of metaphor comprehension, or who apply particular 
theories of metaphor comprehension in their interface designs, state which theory 
they are adopting. The Lakoff/Johnson theory is different in that most authors that 
employ it explicitly state that they are adopting, or testing, this theory. However the 
entire body of literature on use of the Lakoff/Johnson theory in HCI prior to 
(Treglown 1999; 2(00) comprised (Rohrer, 1995). The use of the Lakoff/Johnson 
theory in later parts of this thesis was begun independently of Rohrcr's work, and \vc 
have considered a larger number of case studies (reported in Chapter 6) than he did. 
This should not be taken as a criticism of Rohrer's efforts, he mcrely rcturncd to his 
work in cognitive science and linguistics after providing his contribution to HC!. 
Rohrer's (1995) contribution is to show that some aspects of the Apple Macintosh 
user interface can be analysed and reasoned about in terms of the Lakoff/Johnson 
theory of metaphor. Much of (Rohrer, 1995) addresses the trash can which \\'as 
98 
found in the emprical study reported on in Chapter 3, and in work reviewed in this 
chapter, to be particularly problematic. We shall return to this user interface feature, 
and Rohrer's examination of it, in one of the case studies undertaken in Section 5.x. 
Rohrer's interest in metaphor comes from his claiming to " ... see not only a tension 
between literal and magical qualities of metaphor, but a tension between the users' 
feeling that the computer is an extension of their bodies and believing that it is an 
'other' - a sentient being wi tha consciousness of its own." We shall return in Section 
5.4.3 to the teaching strategies employed by Rohrer to explain the trash can, and 
other features of the Macintosh user interface, including explaining it in terms of 
another agent with which to communicate. It is in terms of Rohrer's interest in ideas 
of embodiment and their impact on theories of cognition and interaction, and his idea 
that "The magical features of the DESKTOP metaphor are inextricably bound up 
with the users [sic] aesthetic feel of the system" that the Lakoffllohnson theory 
deserves to be considered as a candidate theory of metaphor in HCI and provides 
explanatory power that other theories of metaphor do not yet offer to HCI in the 
level of detail at which they are currently described. 
An example that Rohrer gives where embodiment plays a key role in understanding, 
or appreciating, an interface design feature is the use of "zooming" of windows as 
they open. A closed window can take many forms, in early WIMP systems, as was 
mentioned above, they were denoted as an icon on the root window. In the Microsoft 
Windows 95 user interface, a closed window is denoted by a rectangular region, or 
button, on the task bar along the bottom of the screen. Clicking on a button on the 
task bar will open or close the associated window depending on its current state. In 
most systems (including the Macintosh, when an icon is double-clicked on) the 
window opens by expanding, or zooming, from a small region of the screen to 
occupy a far larger region. Rohrer describes this enlargement as "zooming", 
mimicking the enlargement of a document as ones head moves toward it, or as it is 
brought closer to the viewer. To Rohrer "Zooming is more than just a nice touch ... it 
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is one of the best examples of how user interface design can draw on common 
patterns of feelings. Zooming is a pattern of feelings that takes place ill and through 
tbne; the realisation that all feeling takes place in and through time is the most 
important step in thinking about users' bodies. Part of being en1bodied is being a 
creature in time, and being in time is part of what the Cartesian theory of mind and 
ideas as objective entities hides from our attention." The closest to an account of 
zooming provided in the cognitivist tradition in HCI is Barnard and May's (1995) 
configuration of Bamard's ICS (Interacting Cognitive Subsystems) cognitive 
architecture to comprehend transitions between displays and depictions of system 
and program states that are borrowed from the grammar of film-making, and 
accounted for by theories of film. Instead of borrowing methods from the visual arts, 
and trying to explain how the mind can comprehend them in order to answer the 
questions "Why make windows zoom? Why make an event that could happen 
instantaneously on the computer screen take longer than necessary simply for the 
sake of metaphorical consistency?" For Rohrer "Making users fcel at home in their 
user interface is important to the development of users [sic] abilities to imagine and 
intuit ho,v the user interface will ,vork." Zooming, to Rohrer, is an example of an 
image schema that captures a familiar pattern of experience with the physical world, 
one that Kosslyn (1994) claims can be rehearsed and visualised by the human 
capacity for mental imagery. Beyond mere explanation of how ccrtain computer 
animations can be accounted for, Rohrer argues that " ... the aesthetics of User 
interface design requires thinking about subjective, preverbal bodily patterns of 
feeling... The development of good user interfaces depends on careful 
phenomonological and psychological research on subjective bodily experiences." 
These are what HCI has typically, so far, ignored. These aspects of interface \\'ill be 
returned to at the end of the next chapter, and at other later points in the thesis. 
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4.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the use of analogies and metaphors in user interface 
design. Although analogies are suggested as a solution to the problem of designing 
usable software. as the review above discusses: 
• Analogies are often the source of difficulties for learners; 
• Human ability to make use of analogies provided to aid problem solving is 
limited; 
• Where mismatches occur between the source and the target computer system the 
mechanisms by which mismatches are explained are poorly understood; 
• Analogy-based user interfaces may not suggest ways in which they may be used. 
and existing analogy-based systems can prove difficult to learn and use when 
performing realistic tasks in realistic setting. 
Within HeI metaphor has typically been seen as only one mechanism for. or 
description of. understanding of computing systems. The following chapter surveys 
some of these other mechanisms and places metaphor in a wider context of these 
models and mechanisms. 
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Chapter 5 
Users' Models of Interactive Systems 
"The situation gets quite confused. with people turning different knobs, the effects of 
which they have no way of knowing. " 
- John Cage. 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 the drawbacks of adopting the use of analogies and metaphors in the 
design of interactive user interfaces were examined. In particular, the recognition 
phase (finding a suitable source domain) and the elaboration (mapping between 
domains) phase of the analogical reasoning process identified by Hall (1989) were 
considered. Where the mapping gives rise to mismatches, and elements of the source 
domain cannot be applied in the target domain, the model of the target domain 
employed must be evaluated and debugged. The final phase of analogical reasoning 
identified by Hall is to consolidate repairs of the target domain model in order to 
improve future perfonnance. 
The debugging of target domains has been addressed in models presented by 
Burstein (1986) and Adelson (1989). Both of these models rely on understanding 
causal mechanisms in the source and target domains in order to remove inferences 
from the target model that cannot be applied and used, and to add mechanisms 
within the target model in order to account for the behaviour of the target model. 
This process depends on the target domain being capable of being described in 
causal terms, some interface designs, however, have been implemented which do not 
display causal behaviour. In an attempt to examine direct manipulation user 
interfaces based on analogies and metaphors, efforts were made to formalise 
knowledge of the physical world and to examine user interfaces based on physical 
world analogies. Considering an earlier version of the Macintosh Finder, it was 
noted that the behaviour captured in the action-effect rule (Monk and Dix, 1987) 
shown in Table 5.1 is exhibited. In Treglown (1994) it was shown possible to model 
moving files around the Macintosh file system and deleting files from the file system 
using the notation of Qualitative Process Theory (Forbus, 1984). It, however, proves 
impossible to describe the behaviour in Table 5.1 in terms of the objects visible on-
screen and physically realistic changes to attributes of the objects (such as spatial 
position) alone. Norman (1983) notes that some users' behaviour when using 
interactive systems involves superstitious beliefs. In this case, without generating an 
account of the system behaviour in terms of mechanisms in the underlying software, 
the system cannot be described in terms of any understanding of physics, either 
existing or conjectured (Sheldrake, 1994). 
RI: <Drag file icon over the disk icon and release mouse button>:: File icon appears 
in window associated with disk if window is open and file is copied across. The 
trashcan empties if 'full' and the trashcan icon shows 'empty'. 
Table S.l An action-effect rule describing partial behaviour 
of the Macintosh Finder interface. 
The conclusion derived and assumed in the remainder of this thesis is that the use of 
analogies and metaphors in user interface design as currently assumed does not 
provide an ideal solution to the problem of designing user interfaces. This conclusion 
is not original, it is one arrived at by Halasz and Moran (1982), among others. They 
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argue that metaphor should be used as they claim it is used in literature, in passing, 
and to convey meaning at a particular point in the development of understanding, not 
in an attempt to describe the entire system. Even where a number of analogies are 
used to describe different aspects of the system, users may apply the incorrect 
analogy to describe the part of the system currently of interest (Rumelhart and 
Norman, 1981). In order to relate a number of less all-enconlpassing, more specific 
metaphors, Halasz and Moran (1982: 384) conclude and suggest that systems be 
explained in terms of a conceptual model: 
" ... to present the underlying conceptual structures directly to the user, 
providing him \vith an appropriate basis for reasoning about the 
system." 
Norman (1998: 180-181) also discourages the use of metaphors, saying: 
"Basically, those who espouse the use of metaphors arc giving 
human-centered development a bad name, almost as bad as those who 
believe in 'user-friendly' systems ... Designers of the world: Forget the 
term 'metaphor.' Go right to the heart of the problem. Make a clean, 
clear, understandable conceptual model." 
A similar conclusion is reached by Laurel (1993). She suggests that what have been 
termed user interface metaphors, an assumption employed in the previous three 
chapters, are in fact user interface silniles, which assert that one concept is like 
another. Metaphor-based systems are intended to resemble the metaphorical source, 
but may differ. Smith (1987) suggests they will always differ. Differences between 
the source and target domains and the problems they pose for users were the subject 
of the previous chapter. User interface similes act as a mediator between three 
concepts, the real-\\'orld object, the representation of the object, and the functionality 
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and data structures implemented by the computing system denoted by the 
representation. The user is forced to fonn "mental models of what is going on inside 
the computer that incorporate an understanding of all three parts" (Laurel, 1993: 
130). 
In the remainder of this chapter, the models of computing systems formed and 
employed by users in order to understand metaphor-based systems and perform tasks 
using such systems, are discussed. This discussion will form the basis for presenting 
user interface designs for supporting tasks supported by the sorts -of metaphor-based 
systems discussed in Chapter 2. These new designs attempt to overcome some of the 
drawbacks found with metaphor-based systems and to present a useful conceptual 
model to users. 
5.2 Types of Users' Models of Systems 
Users are said to have knowledge of two aspects of the systems they use, task 
knowledge ('how to do it' knowledge), and device knowledge ('how it works' 
knowledge). Carroll and Olson (1988) list three types of model to account for these 
two aspects: 
• knowledge of simple sequences of commands and key-presses, learned by rote and 
memorised with little or no understanding, 
• methods (more complex task knowledge), and 
• mental models. 
Task knowledge is often described in terms of Card, Moran, and Newell's (1983) 
GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection Rules) model, extensions of 
GOMS and alternative models and notations that express similar knowledge. 
Problems arising from use of GOMS in human-computer interaction are well known. 
105 
GOMS addresses only routine cognitive behaviour of the sort eventually realised by 
the ACf* model of learning and supported by traditional documentation design, and 
it addresses errors in human performance only if knowledge used to overcome errors 
can also be described in terms of GOMS. For novice users of a new system any 
routine skills that might be applied in the new system are those that can be 
transferred from their knowledge of existing systems. 
Users' device knowledge is thought to be represented in the form of their mental 
models. The term mental model has given rise to much confusion, being applied to a 
number of different entities, so much so that the term mental lnuddles has been used 
in some discussions. Norman (1983) offers some additional terminology in order to 
resolve misunderstandings, he suggests that four notions need to be identified in this 
discussion, the target systeln, the conceptual model of the target system, the user's 
mental model of the target system, and the scientist's conceptllalisatioll of the mental 
model. The conceptual model is the creation of a system designer or teacher, it is 
intended to provide "an appropriate representation of the target system, appropriate 
in the sense of being accurate, consistent, and complete" (Norman, 1983: 7). 
Through interaction with the system, people are said to construct mental models 
(although the psychological support and evidence for mental models is still the 
subject of debate). Mental models are structures that evolve with time and with use 
of the system and are formed to represent the conceptual model as represented by the 
system image, the view of the conceptual model represented on-screen and in system 
documentation. These notions do not identify all the models that may be held by the 
agents identified by Norman. The designer's model of the system is the conceptual 
model, the user's model of the system is their mental model, the researcher will 
possess the scientist's conceptualisation of the mental model (a model of a model). It 
is also possible, as seen in adaptive systems and intelligent tutoring systems, for the 
system to possess a model of the user. The conceptual model and the scientist's 
conceptualisation of the mental model will be focused on below. 
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Norman (1983: 8) makes the following observations on the nature of mental models 
which need to be considered if system design taking into account mental models is to 
be undertaken: 
" 1. Mental models are incomplete. 
2. People's abilities to 'run' their models are severely limited. 
3. Mental models are unstable: People forget the details of the system 
they are using, especially when those details (for lhe whole 
system) have not been used for some period. 
4. Mental models do not have firm boundaries: similar devices and 
operations get confused with one another. 
5. Mental models are 'unscientific': People maintain 'superstitious' 
behaviour patterns even when they know they are unneeded 
because they cost little in physical effort and save mental effort. 
6. Mental models are parsimonious: Often people do extra physical 
operations rather than the mental planning that would allow them 
to avoid those actions; they are willing to trade-off extra physical 
action for reduced mental complexity. This is especially true 
where the extra actions allow one simplified rule to apply to a 
variety of devices, thus minimizing the chances for confusions. " 
Carroll and Olson (1988) discuss four types of mental models: metaphors, networks, 
glass box models and surrogates. The notion of surrogate models is due to Young 
(1983) who also introduces a number of device models: strong analogies, mappings 
(or task/action mappings), coherence, vocabulary, problem spaces, psychological 
grammars and commonality. Metaphors, and hence strong analogies, have been 
discussed in detail above, the remaining models mentioned by Young (1983) which 
are not discussed in detail here, have received little further attention. The exception 
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is the use of problem space models (Card, Moran, and Ncwcll, 1983) which Young 
(1983) initially ignored since problem spaces arc mostly used to model of routine 
cognitive skill of the sort described by GOMS, whcre problcm solving when using 
devices is ignored. Young's views have since altcrcd (Young and Simon, 1987; 
Simon and Young, 1988) to where problem spaccs are thought to fornl the basis of 
an approach to interaction in which planning and routine cognitive skill are opposite 
ends of the same continuum. Where skills to perform tasks and subtasks do not exist~ 
plans that make use of what appropriate skills the agent does havc can be constructed 
using well-known backwards-chaining methods into which existing skills can be 
interleaved. This work also gives rise to an important claim that only a limited 
amount of planning \\'ill be undertaken in HC! tasks. Where planning is necded, it is 
closely tied to execution of planned actions, and can only be partial as much 
planning is often a matter of the user revising their intentions in response to system 
feedback follo\\'ing previously performed actions. 
5.2.1 Networks 
Generalised transition networks (GTN's) have been proposed as a nlodel of 
interactive systems (Keiras and PoIson, 1983). GTN's comprise nodes representing 
states, and arcs that represent transitions from one state to anothcr and thc actions 
performed on registers in response to user input. The complexity of graphiCal 
notations for finite state machine models of systems is partially ovcrcome in the 
GTN by pennitting sub-networks to be described separately and called recursively 
from nodes in other networks. GTN's are employed as device models in Keiras and 
Poison's Cognitive Complexity Theory (Keiras and PoIson, 1985), in which task 
knowledge is represented in a form of a GOMS model. GTN's are also proposed as a 
means of determining how easy the system is to learn and rcmcmber. This is 
achieved by comparing a user's GTN model of the system with the actual, ideal~ 
GTN. Missing nodes and arcs in the user's model denote missing or faulty 
108 
knowledge. The types of systems that may be described easily by GTN's are limited, 
however. GTN's are a difficult model in which to model interleaving (Cockton, 
1992), which must be supported in order to realise systems such as Rooms and task 
switching in other systems such as the desktop. GTN's, as described by Keiras and 
PoIson (1983), adopt a stimulus-response view of systems, the systems described 
produce feedback and change state in response to obvious commands, such as 
control characters and typed commands. In the direct manipulation systems 
described in Chapter 2, commands may consist of hundreds of discrete events that 
are interpreted as a high-level user intention. Although a GTN may be used to 
realise such systems in user interface management systems, it seems unlikely that the 
user's model of the device includes awareness of, or makes use of, the events 
generated by devices such as a mouse. The sense of engagement with the mouse that 
users are intended to develop with accurate tracking of the on-screen pointer as the 
mouse is moved precludes such detail being made available to the user. GTN's, as 
described by Keiras and Poison (1983), describe systems that consist of a single state 
altered in response to user input. In the design and implementation of object-based 
systems, such as the desktop and the Alternate Reality Kit, the system's state is 
distributed over a number of on-screen or software objects. This is another 
manifestation of the problem of interleaving which is not, as discussed above, 
addressed well by the GTN either in terms of system implementation or users' 
models of the system. 
5.2.2 Glass Box Models 
Glass box models (Du Boulay, Q'Shea, and Monk, 1981) are said to combine 
elements of both metaphors and surrogate models (which are described below). 
Glass box models are intended to provide a perfect mimic of the target system, but 
provide some semantic interpretation, in the form of metaphors, of relevant 
components. Glass boxes are based on an analogy of cut-away windows in physical 
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devices to reveal some of the workings inside. This notion fomls part of the idea 
underlying a glass box model, that interaction with components should be achieved 
with simple input and simple forms of output, and that hidden actions and states 
should be illulninated. Glass box models are more prescriptive than descriptive, 
concepts are introduced in order to describe the notional machine in order to perform 
some task. CarroIl and Olson (1988) relate glass box nHxJcIs to operational 
metaphors; rather than attempt to provide novices with an account of existing 
programming languages, however, the gla~s box. concept has been employed in the 
design of novel programming languages and simplified interfaces to ex.isting 
programming languages. Being prescriptive models, however, the glass box. offers 
little in the \\'ay of description of the sorts of models of systenlS that users may 
generate and use. 
5.2.3 Surrogates 
A surrogate model is based on the notion of a "working model", an account of a 
system intended to explain ho\v a system works. A surrogate should perfectly mimic 
the target system's input and output, but the process by which the system's output is 
produced need not be the same as realised by the target systenl, and the internal 
workings of the surrogate need not be isomorphic to thc target systcnl. Young (1981, 
1983) attempts to construct surrogate models of some simple computing dcvices, 
namely three types of pocket calculator: 
• a simple four arithmetic operation calculator, 
• a calculator supporting more complex algebraic expressions, and 
• a calculator based on the reverse polish notation which relics on a stack as a store 
of numbers input and postfix use of ari thmetic operators. 
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While Young was able to provide surrogate models of the four function calculator 
and the reverse polish notation calculator, the other calculator, which accepts more 
complex algebraic expressions, was shown to be more difficult to construct a 
surrogate model of. This is because no account could be provided of how the system 
responds to 'ungrammatical' sequences of key presses. 
In addi tion to the difficulty of providing an account of some aspects of the 
calculators in tenns of registers, stacks, and how data is placed in - and moved 
between - registers and the display, Young (1983) doubts "the psychological 
validity of surrogates. He claims that they are of little use for describing routine 
behaviour (although they have a greater role in problem solving and predicting the 
outcome of novel calculations), and that the cognitive workload of employing a 
surrogate model may be too large for users. The calculators studied, even if they 
could produce results to ill-structured sequences of key presses, rely on well-fonned 
sequences of key presses in order to produce meaningful results. The structure of 
commands, key presses and other user input actions accepted by devices and 
required in order to perfonn tasks is the concern of another fonn of knowledge about 
systems, lask/action mappings. These are multi-levelled models developed from 
Moran's (1981) Command Language Grammar which describe the interface between 
the user and an interactive system, and the transformation of a user's task to the 
sequence of actions needed to perform the task on the system. The models of the 
calculators that Young describes are referred to as 'implied register models' (Young, 
1981), they introduce registers, internal state and other data structures sufficient to 
describe the outputs produced by the calculators. In general, however, Carroll and 
Olson (1988: 51) observe that: 
" ... while the surrogate always provides the right answer (the one the 
target system would have generated) it offers no means of 
illuminating the real underlying causal basis for the answer. It is a 
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good, complete analogy that may allo\\! the user to construct 
appropriate behaviour in a novel situation, but does not help the user 
why the system behaves the way it does." 
System Learnin& usin& Surrogate l\;lodels 
Young (1981, 1983) presented surrogate models of a number of pocket calculators, 
but did not explore how providing learners \vith these surrogates might affect 
learning and use of the calculators. Halasz and Moran (1983) considered learners' 
use of a reverse polish notation calculator when groups of learners were provided 
either \\'ith no surrogate, or a surrogate model of the calculator. The surrogate nlodel 
taught was intended to provide a problem space in which learners could invent 
operator sequences and carry out problem solving. This problem space consisted of 
the calculator's stack and rules describing the changes in the stack's contents as the 
user pressed keys. Halasz and Moran (1983) found that the learners who were not 
provided with the model performed routine tasks up to 40% faster than the learners 
who were provided \vith the model. Young (1983) suggests that surrogates play no 
role in routine behaviour, the results of Halasz and Moran suggest that surrogates 
impose an extra load on the user when performing routine tasks. When performing 
invention tasks where operator sequences must be planned in order to perform novel 
calculations, learners provided with the model were able to perform tasks 15% fa~ter 
than the group of learners who were not provided with a model. 
Keiras and Bovair (1984) employed a novel device in their examination of the role 
of surrogates in learning. They also adopted the method of comparing users Who 
were taught only rote procedures for using the device with those users who were 
taught an explanatory model of the system in addition to the rote instructions. This 
explanatory model was in the form of a "cover story" and a diagram describing the 
topology of the internal components of the device. Providing a model to the learners 
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meant that the model group learned the procedures needed to use the device faster, 
and learned more efficient procedures. The model group also retained knowledge of 
procedures needed to use the device better than the group taught only the rote 
procedures, and remembered more efficient procedures. In a second experiment, 
Keiras and Bovair (1984) examined the effect of the device model provided on 
learners' inference of procedures performed when using the device. They found that 
learners provided with the model took fewer actions to infer procedures than the 
other group, and, once they had learned a first procedure, took fewer actions to infer 
a second procedure to perform the same task. A third experiment examined which of 
the "cover story" and the description of the topology of the device's components is 
the important factor in learning. 
The third experiment performed by Keiras and Bovair (1984) suggested that the 
topology of the device's components is the important factor in a device model 
presented to learners. Keiras (1992) presents further experiments that confirm this 
suggestion. The topology of the device components is an aid to learning even in 
systems where the internal state of device components is made apparent to the user. 
Kieras (1992) is able to derive a set of guidelines for the design of device models, 
especially for diagrammatic displays presented on-screen. These guidelines are listed 
as follows (Keiras, 1992: 893-894): 
Topological structure 
Show the topological and causal structure of the system, such as the 
pathways between components, controls and indicators using 
conventions that are visually clear. Structural relationships involved 
in understanding system states must appear on the diagram. 
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Control and indicator states 
Echo the topological effects of external controls, and show indicator 
states at the corresponding topological points on the system diagram. 
Internal states 
If information on the states of internal components is reliable and 
available, show the states that are significant to the user, so that there 
are no hidden states and no inferences are required to deduce 
significant component states. Provide the state information at (he 
corresponding topological point in the display. 
Causal relationships 
Show the pathway of causality through the topological structure, such 
as the colour-coding of energized connections. Distinguish 
component states from other state information that may be on the 
displays (for example, by using different colour-codes). 
Malfunctions 
Show failures of causal flow, such as malfunctions, in a perceptually 
salient way (for example, bright yellow for a component that fails to 
produce output \vhen it should). 
If one considers Carroll and Olson's (1988) comment about the surrogate model's 
lack of ability to describe causality and possible reasons for some system behaviour 
and if one also considers Keiras and PoIson's design suggestions, it is clear that 
further attention should be paid to the roles that device component topology and 
causal relationships bet\veen components play in mental models .. 
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5.2.4 Task-action Mappings 
Above an action-effect rule for the Apple Macintosh user interface was given. Such 
rules capture the ways that the display and relevant aspects of the system state 
change in response to actions performed by the user. Task-action mappings are also 
rules, but instead capture the user's tasks and the actions that they must perform in 
order to achieve these tasks. The following generic rules (taken from Schiele and 
Green, 1990: 60) show the deletion of a character of text in a number of Macintosh-
based application packages in the notation of the Task-Action Grammar: 
R2 "Delete a single character" 
T [Unit=char, extent=l, Effect = remove, Clipboard=no]:= 
MOUSE-point(%location) + MOUSE-click + 
edit [Unit=char, Effect=rernove, Clipboard=no] 
R9 edit [Unit=char/word/cell-entry/object, 
Effect=remove, Clipboard=no] := "BKSP" 
Task-action mapping models, while proving useful in judging the consistency and 
learnability of commands (Lee et al., 1994~ Howes and Young, 1991), and while 
having strong claims to being psychologically meaningful (Schiele and Green, 
1990), suffer from considerable drawbacks as a means of modelling interactive 
systems in their basic forms. Basic task-action mapping models ignore the role of the 
display in system use, it is assumed that a sequence of actions will perform the task 
irrespective of display contents. The D-TAG and E-T AG versions of the Task-
Action Grammar were developed to overcome this limitation. Another drawback of 
task-action mappings lies in their application to metaphor in interface use. The 
model presented by Rieman et al. (1994) implements in the ACT-R and SOAR 
cognitive architectures task-action mapping rules for a direct manipulation user 
interface and also implements a process model of metaphorical system use similar to 
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Hall's (1989). The resulting systems transform the knowledge of running an 
application by double clicking on its icon by an analogical process to derive the task 
to run another application. While valuable in concentrating on a task and ho\\' task 
knowledge may be metaphorically extended, the model that Rieman et al. (1994) 
present is very limited and, for example, provides no account of how nlctaphorical 
understanding might have led to the initial method for running an application being 
acquired. 
5.2.5 Qualitative Models as Mental Models 
Keiras's (1992) design suggestions present an account of dcvice models that matches 
Olson's (1992) definition of a mental model: 
"Mental models are knowledge that the user has about how something 
\vorks, its component parts, the processes, their interrelations, and 
ho\v one componentinfluences another." 
A similar definition is provided in Halasz and Moran (1983). Given this definition of 
mental models, a potentially productive method of modelling and exploring mental 
models, supported by existing notations and software tools, might be to employ 
qualitative reasoning (Bobrow, 1985). The use of artificial intelligence methods in 
the study of mental models has been previously suggested (Decortis et al., 1991), 
and the use of qualitative reasoning in an HeI domain is observed by Payne (1991a). 
Qualitative models have to date been employed in the modelling of physical systems 
(Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Hayes, 1985) and of simple devices or simple 
components within complex systems (Bobrow, 1985). Owen (1986) suggests that the 
study of human-computer interaction would benefit from invcstigating qualitativc (or 
"naive") models of computing systems, but he does not provide any such accounts 
himself. Payne (1991a), however, does explore users' understanding and models of a 
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computer-based system derived from their existing knowledge and inferred from the 
system's behaviour. 
The qualitative notations and algebras that have been devised and employed to date 
to model systems and devices other than computer-based systems are of interest as 
they may be used to confront the fact that computing hardware is not infinitely fast 
(Dix, 1987). On-screen objects may be subject to uncertain delays in rendering and 
screen updates, and functionality provided by the underlying software may engage in 
lengthy computations, or may make remote procedure calls where network delays 
become noticeable. Qualitative notations which are able to model change over time 
and rates of change may prove of increasing interest in the description of mental 
models. In (Treglown, 1994), an attempt was made to use Forbus's (1984) 
Qualitative Process Theory (QPT) notation to model device knowledge to account 
for mismatches between a metaphor-based graphical user interface and the actual 
behaviour of on-screen objects. This work is summarised below by discussing 
models of the behaviour of on-screen objects in the Alternate Reality Kit system, the 
mismatch between describing the task/action mapping and user feedback of moving 
files around a desk top metaphor system's file space, and the underlying 
functionality. 
In the QPT notation, systems are described in terms of objects, which have a number 
of attributes, and processes that act on objects to alter their attributes. It was shown 
possible in (Treglown, 1994) to describe the attributes of on-screen objects in user 
interfaces based on a physical world metaphor using QPT. A number of attributes, 
denoted by the Quantity-type predicate, that may be associated with data files, and 
the attributes associated with a text file are shown in Figure 5.1. Processes can act on 
objects to change attributes of objects when a number of pre-conditions hold. These 
pre-conditions depend upon factors that lie outside the QPT model, the amount of 
water in a bath cannot increase until someone turns on a tap, for example. Conditions 
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that can be described by the QPf model, termed Quantity-conditions. also detennine 
whether a process is active or not, and whether it is able to affect those attributes of 
the object that the process acts upon. While processes are active. influellces (other 
values relevant to the model) may alter values of attributes directly, or may have an 
effect of qualitative proportionality where the relationship and innuence are less well 
defined. 
Quantity-Type (size) 
Quantity-Type (creator-application) 
Quantity-Type(size-if-run) 
Quantity-Type (printable-object) 
doc a document 
Has-Quantity(doc, size) 
Has-Quantity (doc, creator-application) 
Has-Quantity(doc, printable-object) 
video a video-fragment 
Has-Quantity (video, size) 
Has-Quantity (video, creator-application) 
Figure 5.1 QPT notation attributes and on-screen objects 
This approach to modelling systems, in terms of objects, attributes, and processes is 
termed object-centred. This approach was adopted in (Treglown. 1994) over device-
centred approaches to qualitative modelling (de Kleer & Brown, 1984; Kuipers. 
1985) as the process-centered models make minimal reference to hidden values and 
mechanism within the system which detennine the system's beha\'iour. Methods to 
determine and elicit mental models are still early in their history as topics of research 
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(Payne, 1991; Rutherford and Wilson, 1992; Carroll and Olson, 1988; Rogers, 
1992). Attempts such as Payne's (1991) exploration of the mental models formed of 
simpler computing devices have not yet been undertaken with more complex 
systems such as those described in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is uncertain how much of 
the system's mechanism is apparent to users, and can be modelled in a device-
centered notation. The User Virtual Machine notation (Tauber, 1988) has been 
employed to describe the mental model of a software application. It can model the 
state of hidden components of which users are aware and which they employ when 
performing certain tasks, but it does not model components which may be perceived 
or inferred by users. The notation also makes no reference to the temporal behaviour 
of changes of state of the components modelled. 
Smith (1987) observes that his Alternate Reality Kit displays behaviour that cannot 
be termed either literal to the metaphor or magical, this behaviour cannot be 
described in terms of the physical world metaphor on which the system is based. An 
example he gives is the increasing delays in updating the disglay as the number of 
on-screen objects in an ARK simulation, and hence the system load required to 
compute and render the display increases. This causes moving on-screen objects to 
move in an increasingly ~erky' and unrealistic way. Figure 5.2 shows a proposed 
model for a freely moving object in an ARK simulation where objects are not subject 
to friction or any gravitational or frictional forces. This model is able to describe the 
behaviour of such an object, but must include the influence on the speed of the 
object of the computational load on the system. 
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Process Motion(B, dir) 
Individuals: 
B an object, Mobile(B) 
dir a direction 
Preconditions: 
Free-Direction(B,dir) 
Direction-Of (dir, velocity(B» 
QuantityConditions: 
Am[velocity(B)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
A[velocity(B)] ~Q_ system-load 
Influences: 
I+(position(B), A[velocity(B)]) 
Figure 5.2 A QPT model of a moving object in an ARK simulation 
In desktop interfaces, the task of moving a file is often performed by the user 
pressing the mouse button while the pointer is over the icon denoting the file, by 
dragging the icon until it is over a particular folder, and by finally releasing the 
mouse button. If one assumes that a metaphor·based system suppons direct 
engagement, and that users perceive the on·screen object to actually be the data file 
of interest to them (Hutchins, Hollan, and Norman, 1986), it should be possible to 
model the movement of an on-screen object, and hence of the file it denotes within 
the file space, in a process such as that shown in Figure 5.3. This process is more 
complex than one needed to model on-screen objects in many metaphor-based 
systems, objects tend not to have a perceivable mass, although computer·based 
simulations that employ input devices with force-feedback can communicate a sense 
of an object's mass to the user. The Aristotelian idea of motion described in this 
model, where objects require that a constant force be applied to them in order for 
them to move at a constant rate reflects dragging an on·scrcen object. 
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Process motion 
Individuals: 
B an object, Mobile(B) 
dir a direction 
Preconditions: 
Free-Direction(B, dir) 
Direction-Of (dir, net-force(B» 
QuantityConditions: 
Am[net-force(B)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
let velocity be a quantity 
velocity ocQ+ net-force(B) 
velocity ocQ_ mass(B) 
Influences: 
I+(position(B), A[velocity]) 
Figure 5.3 A QPT model of motion (Forbus, 1984: 134). 
The feedback in the display should be immediate and appropriate as the on-screen 
pointer and file icon being dragged track the user's movement of the mouse. The 
computation performed when moving the data making up a file from one directory in 
the file space to another directory, however, has a temporal duration. It is possible to 
model this computation in QPT as shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Process move-file 
Individuals: 
source-file an object, 
Has-Quantity(source-file, 
destination-file an object 
src a folder 
dest a folder, 
size) 
Has-Quantity(dest, free-space) 
path a data-path, 
Connection(data-path,src,dest) 
preconditions: 
(T task-is-move-file) 
Aligned(path) 
QuantityConditions: 
A[free-space(dest)] > A[size(source-file)] 
A[size(source-file)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
Let move-rate be a quantity 
A[move-rate] > ZERO 
move-rate cxQ+ device-speed (dest) 
move-rate cxQ_ system-load 
Influences: 
1- (size(source-file), A[move-rate) 
1+ (size(destination-file), A[move-rate]) 
-
Figure 5.4 A QPT model of moving a file \vithin the underlying system functionality 
Despite the action perfonned in the on-screen model world being intended to be 
analogical to the computation performed by the underlying application, these 1\"0 
proposed mental models represent different physical processes. These modelsare 
difficult to map between using the structure-mapping model of analogy and the 
framework of learning physical domains provided by Forbus and Gentner (1986). 
The temporal duration of the process performed by the functionality of the 
application implies that direct engagement with the file in the file space breaks do\\'n 
for this task and metaphor. 
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5.3 The Role of the Display as Source of Information in 
System Learning and Use 
Another aspect of design that needs to be considered is the role that the display plays 
as a source and store of information about the system state, both when learning a 
system and in routine use of a system. Lansdale and Ormerod (1994) class the 
knowledge and skills needed to learn and use human-computer interface software 
into three types: 
1. skills as procedures, 
2. skills as understanding, and 
3. skills as exploration. 
Skills in procedural form are explored and described in models such as GOMS and 
ACf* which tend to rely on what is termed the traditional "systems" approach to 
manual design and instruction. The problems with the systems approach to 
instruction have long been documented, as have the resulting problems in developing 
the routine cognitive skills modelled using GOMS and its variants. 
Viewing skills as understanding explores the forms of mental models of systems and 
their role in learning and system use. As have been examined above, some forms of 
mental models make skills in the form of understanding difficult to attain. While 
some forms of mental models have a useful role in system use, others, like 
metaphors, which attempt to aid initial steps in system learning and use have been 
shown to often create more problems for users than they may solve. Some models, 
like transition networks and metaphors, also prove incapable of representing every 
aspect of the model world and underlying functionality of the system they are 
intended to provide a useful representation of. 
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Understanding user skills as exploration requires examining the \vay in which users 
extract information from the interface and the way user interfaces may be designed 
to minimise the amount of features of the interface that users are required to learn. 
Such skills are examined by the study of display-based reasoning. Mayes et al. 
(1988) observed that experts' recall of command names on the pull-down menus of a 
screen-based \\'ord processor did not differ from that of novice users of the system. 
This result contrasts with many results in cognitive psychology where experts are 
found to have greater recall of meaningful patterns in the task domain than novices 
and people with intermediate levels of expertise. Mayes' et al. observation suggests 
that the interface itself is being employed as a form of externalised memoty. 
Operators may be observed in, and inferred from, the display, and the effect of 
operators on the system state tend to be observed rather than learned (Payne, 1991b). 
Hence, rather than learn the system, users simply use it. This view of user interface 
design and use requires some consideration be paid to the use of metaphor, analogy 
and prior knowledge and issues in problem solving, affordances and planning in 
learning to use a previously unfamiliar computing system. 
There are difficulties with reliance on users to use the interface itself as a store of 
information and a form of externalised memory. Users may not explore the system 
fully and potentially useful functionality may not be discovered. Users may not even 
explore the system sufficiently to discover the functionality that supports their tasks 
(Lansdale and Ormerod, 1994). Another problem caused by reliance on display-
based reasoning is that users may be forced to perform repetitive low-level actions to 
achieve some tasks. Frolich (1993) notes an increase in the importance of the 
converstation notion in human-computer interaction over the model-world notion in 
the mixed mode systems of which most metaphor-based systems are examples. 
Repetitive tasks and tasks which would require a reasonable length of time to 
perform may be delegated to a virtual partner or agent (Cypher, 1990). Such agents 
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can be hard to reconcile with the metaphors chosen for many user interface designs, 
such as those explored in Chapter 2. 
5.4 Using the Lakoff/Johnson Model for Analysis and 
Design of User Interfaces 
We have introduced the Lakoff/lohnson model of metaphor, in which experience 
and sentences in a natural language either appeal directly to image schemata, or can 
be understood by a metaphorical mapping to image schemata. It is our claim that the 
Lakoffllohnson theory of metaphor allows us to analyse and critique existing user 
interface designs, and provides a method for judging the success of new user 
interface designs. Below, the Lakoff/lohnson theory is applied to novel or 
problematic aspects of existing user interface designs in order to demonstrate its 
explanatory ability. In using the Lakoffllohnson theory in this way a claim stronger 
than the suggestion that metaphor is part of a way of understanding on interactive 
system (or mental model) is being made. While we do not claim (as Lakoff and 
10hnson do not) that all understanding is metaphorical, Indurkhya (1992) surveys the 
theories of a number of authors that do make this claim, the Lakoffllohnson theory is 
a theory of semantics. It should therefore be complete and sufficient to account for 
users' understanding of a device, or to give reasons why a problematic device has 
poor usability. In order to test that the Lakoffllohnson theory can explain user 
interfaces that are problematic, or which are hard for other HCI models to explain, a 
number of case studies are presented below. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Rohrer's (1995) work is described in more detail in Section 5.4.3 while the notorious 
trash can is examined. This follows two more case studies that consider systems that 
Rohrer (1995) did not address. 
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5.4.1 Case Study 1: An mmersive nvironment 
The artist Char Davies' virtual reality in tallation work "0 m 
Wertheim , 1999), shown in Figure 5.5, pre ents the challenge of und r tanding h w 
u ers obtain enough meaning from it in order to ucce fully interact with it. The 
Osmose model world consists of a number of level, depi tcd in igurc 5 .• 
containing a forest of semi-transparent styli ed trees, free floating w rd taken fr m 
texts by post-modernist author and the 0 mo e ource c de. U r h 
representation of the hand, or other cursor, they can only m v within th m c 
world and between levels, but they are passive in being able to e bjcct , but n t 
handle them. 
Figure 5.5 A view inside 0 mose (Wertheim, 19 9: 39) 
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Figure 5.6 The Structure of the Osmose model world 
Input to the computing machinery that runs Osmose comes from 3D position 
trackers on a headset and vest worn by the user, and from a strap placed around the 
user's chest which measures respiration, in the same way that polygraph or lie-
detector machines do. In fact the strap is taken from just such a device. In order to 
move in the horizontal plane, users must lean in the direction that they wish to travel, 
they then drift in that direction within Osmose until they return to an upright 
standing position. In order to move between layers, the user must adjust their 
breathing and fill their lungs to float up, or empty their lungs to sink. Such a novel 
environment. with its use of novel input devices, is difficult to model, but it cannot 
be impossible for users to devise and attempt suitable actions and movements of the 
body in order to move within the world, otherwise the Osmose world would go 
unused. 
Considering the user's motion between layers of the Osmose world, interaction 
would appear to rely on the COUNTERFORCE image schema. depicted in Figure 
5.7. 
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Figure 5.7 The COUNTERFORCE schema 
Motion up or down depends on the amount of air in the user's lungs, as is motion 
when diving, the experience that inspired the Osmose system's development. The 
'upward' force on the user derives from Archimedes' principle and is proportional to 
the 'buoyancy' of the user. The 'downward' force on the user derives from the user's 
'weight'. By controlling their breathing, the user is able to adjust the balance of 
forces and can float up or sink down through the medium in which the· user is 
suspended. This aspect of interaction requires very little metaphorical extension to 
the COUNTERFORCE schema, all that is required is a mapping from the air that 
surrounds the user to the medium that gives the user buoyancy in the Osmose world, 
a mapping such as the metaphor AIR IS A A....UID. By its use of an additional novel 
input device, Osmose is able to provide functionality to support "flying" in an 
immersive environment that is as natural to the user's physical experience as 
possible. Other virtual realities (Weimer and Ganapathy, 1989; Fisher et al., 1986) 
provide far less satisfactory approaches. In these systems in order to request a menu 
that appears before them as a free-floating panel (from which they must select an 
option) the user must make a special grasping gesture. Subsequently the hand-shaped 
cursor acts not as a grasping facility, but as a positioning facility for the user's point 
of view. By adopting this approach, direct manipulation is replaced in this mode by 
the conversation paradigm of user interaction, an unseen agent (the computing 
hardware) must be informed as to the way in which subsequent user input from a 
dataglove is to be interpreted. 
While interaction with the Osmose system based on the "floating" experience can be 
accounted for by the Lakoff/Johnson theory, movement in the horizontal plane must 
also be explained. The BALANCE schema; "consisting of force vectors (which can 
represent weight as a special case) and some point or axis or plane in relation to 
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which those forces are distributed. In every case, balance involves a symmetrical (or 
proportional) arrangement around a point or axis" (Johnson, 1987: 85); suggests a 
common experience which may form users' understanding of this aspect of 
interaction with the system. In leaning in the intended direction of travel, equilibrium 
is disturbed and a net force is created in that direction1• The user will then move, 
Osmose having Newtonian physical laws in its model world, until an arresting force 
is created as the user regains an upright position. It seems, therefore, that the 
BALANCE schema can be appealed to almost directly in order to understand this 
aspect of interaction with Osmose. 
5.4.2 Case Study 2: Snap-Dragging 
Drawing and computer-aided design application software is often required to support 
the precise placement of line segments and other shapes. Various facilities can be 
provided for this, including the displaying of grid points within the drawing area of 
the application's window onto which objects may be accurately placed, and the use 
of constraint systems. These mechanisms are limited, however, as some drawing 
tasks can be difficult to perform, and that some relationships between drawn objects 
and line segments may be difficult to maintain if one object is moved. Bier and 
Stone (1986) present snap-dragging as a better alternative to grids and constraints. 
Presentation of Bier and Stone's system can be found in their article, our task is only 
to consider how it can be understood and used by the system's user, and to explore 
the possible role of the Lakoffllohnson theory of metaphor in the process of 
understanding snap-dragging. 
I We see this interaction style implemented in the Segway personal urban transportation device 
which has two wheels, one either side of the rider, unlike other "scooters" where wheels are aligned 
one in front of the rider, one behind Computers in Segway cause it to steer and accelerate depending 
on the way in which the rider leans their body. 
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The snap-dragging system differs from other drawing packages in that the cursor 
does not hold and move the drawing implement or tool directly, but is used to pick 
up a "caret" which is subject to attractive forces generated by the cursor and othcr 
objects such as line segments. As the cursor moves, the caret movcs with it unless it 
becomes attracted to an artifact, such as a circle of particular radius or line extending 
from an existing line segment, that \vas defined by the user beforehand using simple 
commands on a pop-up menu. The artefact appears for a short time as the caret 
approaches it. Unless the user moves the caret away from the artefact, it will snap-
drag 10 the point or line. Other shapes may then be drawn precisely from a point of 
intersection or tangent. The principle schema which can appealed to for 
understanding in Bier and Stone's system is ATTRACTION, depicted in Figure 5.8. 
Once again, this schema represents a pervasive physical experience, and the snap-
dragging system, in its use of animation when tracking the cursor position requires 
little metaphorical extension in order to be understood. Johnson (1987: 38), though, 
allows attracting vectors to be either actual or potential and allows for the existence 
of additional objects in order to describe a situation. In a computer-aided design 
drawing in which there are a number of snap-drag artefacts, users might observe 
chaotic behaviour in the movement of the caret. 
Figure 5.8 The ATTRACTION schema 
In Bier and Stone's snap-drag system, the ATTRACTION schema may be appealed 
to directly for understanding as the source of the attractive force is visible. Other 
systems, however, exhibit snap-dragging, or snap-to-a-grid behaviour, but are more 
complex to understand. Some implementations of the DESKTOP metaphor, for 
example, do not allow icons on the desktop or workbench, or within open folders, to 
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be placed at just any position. While icons may be placed on top of another, 
obscuring or hiding the one below, the number of locations in which it may be 
placed is limited. If an icon is "dropped" in a position other than the set managed, it 
will snap to a different position upon landing. This behaviour cannot be simply 
explained in terms of the ATTRACTION schema. Within the desktop environment, 
the grid of points to which icons snap is invisible, the attracting object within the 
schema is therefore missing and must be inferred by the user for the system 
behaviour to be understood in terms of the ATTRACTION schema. Even if such an 
inference is made, the behaviour of an environment intended to De understood in 
terms of the behaviour of physical world objects wiII always be unpredictable. 
There are some ontological issues raised by snap-dragging, however, that the image 
schema theory exposes. While the caret is attracted to the cursor and to other 
attracting objects, its course is deflected by being attracted the stationary artefacts. 
Attraction is only one-way, however, the caret cannot deflect the path of the cursor, 
nor can the attractive forces of the CAD objects deflect the path of the cursor. This 
behaviour would be difficult to find a physical world analogy for - say in terms of 
magnets of various strengths and objects made of lead or soft iron - recourse to the 
uni-directional ATTRACTION schema allows a more realistic account of the snap-
dragging system to be developed by users. 
5.4.3 Case Study 3: The Apple Macintosh Trashcan 
The file deletion mechanism employed within the implementation of the DESKTOP 
metaphor on the Apple Macintosh, the trashcan, is notorious for the problems it 
causes users. as was discussed in Chapter 3. The difficulty it creates for users that is 
discussed here is its second use as the means of ejecting floppy diskettes from the 
disk drive by the user dragging the icon of the disk into the trashcan. This action 
sequence has been found to cause users distress when they first perform it. many 
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anecdotes tell of users' feelings that the contents of the disk will be deleted when the 
icon is placed inside that trashcan. The study of first-time users of the Apple 
Macintosh reported in Chapter 3 also found that the action sequence does not occur 
to users, it is not suggested by the metaphor as a means of achieving the task. 
Rohrer (1995) describes his attempts to teach the use of the Macintosh to novice 
users, and reports difficulties arising from a number of different teaching strategies. 
Rohrer argues that the DESKTOP metaphor is part of a larger PHYSICAL WORLD 
metaphor from which the notion of removing an object from view can be inherited to 
explain the use of the trashcan. By indicating differences between the actual system 
behaviour and the behaviour suggested by the metaphor, Rohrer's students 
mistrusted the DESKTOP metaphor entirely, and Rohrer claims that they would not 
generalise from specific cases of system behaviour to the general. This in contrast to 
claims by CarroU, Mack, and Kellogg (1988) that mismatches can be productive in 
forcing a greater understanding of the system. Rohrer's second teaching strategy \\'as 
to provide technical explanations of why the particular action sequence to be 
performed to achieve the task might have been programmed in the way it was. 
Instead of users adopting a "design stance" towards the system (Dcnnctt, 1978), 
however, users were seen to adopt an "intentional stance", and to try to guess the 
motives of the Macintosh's designer, and adopting a conversational interaction style 
with a perceived agent \\'ithin the machine. 
Rohrer, in an effort to understand the failure of the trashcan, adopts Smith's (1987) 
distinction between literal and magical features in user interface metaphors. He 
suggests that "The magic of a trash can has to do with its being a portal to the 
beyond in the PHYSICAL WORLD metaphor - the beyond of the landfill, the 
beyond of the electronic bit bucket, and the beyond of the world outside of the 
computer." This statement hints at an explanation as to why the trashcan fails, there 
is a confusion as to which domains the mapping is made between, and the image 
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schemas underlying understanding of the system. Dragging a disk icon into the 
trashcan appeals directly to the IN schema. an object is placed within a container and 
according to the schema should remain within the container. Within the domain of 
the computing functionality and hardware. however. which following Laurel (1993) 
and Treglown (1994) should be the target domain considered, the floppy disk is 
ejected from the disk drive. which can be understood directly by the OUT 1 schema. 
The Macintosh trashcan requires the user to construct a mapping between two 
opposite actions. the schema that explains the disk being ejected has no metaphorical 
mapping in the desktop model world. and is unlikely to occur to· users. as found 
during empirical studies. By requiring an OUT schema to be realised by performing 
actions that make up an IN schema. the meaning of the operation is the opposite of 
the way in which it is articulated. it is possible to claim that the task and the trashcan 
are being ironic. Irony being: 
" ... traditionally seen as referring to situations that postulate a double 
audience. one of which is 'in the know' and aware of the actor's 
intension. whereas the other is naive enough to take the situation or 
utterance at its face value." (Gibbs. 1993: 262) 
The trashcan is an example of an aspect of a user interface metaphor that can also be 
said to break the "Invariance Principle" (Lakoff, 1993: 215) which states that: 
"Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the 
image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent 
with the inherent structure of the target domain. " 
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5.5 Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, the use of analogies and metaphors in user interface design 
was examined. Work in this field has demonstrated that analogies often cannot 
account for all of the functionality and behaviour of a target computer-based system. 
Where the analogy cannot account for the system image users must either employ 
inappropriate, possibly superstitious, knowledge or must develop a more realistic 
model of the system. A supposed alternative to employing analogies is to provide a 
more realistic model of the system as part of the system image, rather than rely on 
users to form a more useful and realistic mental model after breakdowns in the 
analogy and analogical mapping. In this chapter a number of approaches to 
describing and thinking of mental models were reviewed. Some of these, it was 
suggested, are inappropriate for describing the knowledge needed to model aspects 
of the systems described in Chapter 2. Other approaches are found to be those which 
still also rely on metaphors for understanding of the device. The concept of mental 
models cannot be ignored, however, the important account of cognition provided by 
Holland et al. (1986), for example, defines analogies and metaphors as mappings 
between mental models, or as higher-order mental models in their Q-morphism 
descriptions of kno\vledge. 
Studies have demonstrated that providing users with a model of the system in terms 
of the internal components, their topology, and causal relationships between devices 
has usability advantages. If an attempt is made to model the knowledge that such 
information is intended to encourage the development of, it is found that breakdowns 
in the analogy employed in an existing system can be accounted for. These 
breakdowns, however, can only be accounted for if aspects of the state of the 
underlying computer system are referred to. This approach also suggests that 
because computation has a temporal duration, different models are needed to account 
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for the behaviour shown by the system in the model world in response to user 
actions, and for the computation that the user actions and system behaviour are 
intended to be analogues of. That different models are needed to account for the 
same phenomenon suggests that direct engagement cannot be assumed with on-
screen objects when certain performing tasks in a metaphor-based system. 
In the following chapter, we present a new user interface design. This system is 
intended to support tasks that are supported by the metaphor-based systems 
described in Chapter 2, and it attempts to provide the user with a realistic and useful 
model of itself. This system is also used to.:.explore the limits and requirements of 
systems where direct manipulation and engagement are to be supported. 
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Chapter 6 
The Medusa User Experience 
"The solid cannot be swept away as trivial and nor can trash be established as solid. 
[tjust does not happen." 
- Cornelius Cardew, words from paragraph 7 of "The Great Learning" (1968-
1971). 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown that while employing metaphor in user interface 
design is a powerful technique in attempting to produce usable interactive systems, 
interface metaphors can also be a source of users' difficulties. The previous chapter 
showed, though, that metaphor cannot be ignored as a source of understanding. This 
is the case whether one adopts the idea that understanding of interactive systems 
comes from mental models, or the idea in the Lakoff/lohnson theory of metaphor 
that understanding comes either directly in terms of patterns of interaction with the 
physical ,world or by metaphorical extension from these patterns. The remainder of 
this thesis will address the design of a number of new user interfaces collectively 
termed Medusa. The first Medusa system is described in this and the following 
chapters. The first Medusa system adopts the conclusions of traditional, comparison, 
theories of metaphor and the qualitative process theory (QPT) analyses of tasks in 
direct manipulation tasks. The second Medusa system assumes the LakofflJohnson 
theory of metaphor understanding in its design. This chapter sketches the intended 
user experience of the first Medusa system, Chapter 7 discusses the design rationale 
of the first Medusa system, and Chapter 8 presents the results of usability evaluation 
of the first Medusa system design. A revised Medusa system design, that assumes 
the LakofflJohnson theory of metaphor understanding, is discussed in Chapter 9. 
6.2 Basic Criteria that the Medusa System Should Satisfy 
The Medusa system is a user interface design that takes into account the criteria 
listed below: 
• Simple basic tasks, involving the functionality of a computer's operating system 
and file management system, which will be performed at some time by every user 
of the system, should be supported. 
• A conceptual model of the system should be glven to the user which can 
consistently support data file types which are not naturally supported by existing 
metaphors (for example, sound and video fragments). 
• A conceptual model of the system should be provided to the user which presents a 
low overhead when learning the system, yet provides the advantages of possessing 
mental models when performing novel tasks and understanding unfamiliar system 
behaviour,. 
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• It should be ensured that mental models of the system formed by users are 
consistent and that attention is paid to the consistency of the behaviour of on-
screen objects and the actions that may be performed on them. 
• It should be ensured that state feedback is timely and appropriate following an 
awareness of design solutions suggested by work on formal models of interactive 
systems. 
• It should be noted that metaphor and analogy play a major part in learning, 
understanding and interaction with the world and cannot be ignored. A design 
should take into account the role of metaphor and analogy in learning and using 
user interface software. A design should, however, be aware of the problems that 
metaphors and analogies in the model world cause the user as well as those that 
they solve. 
The details of the design rationale underlying the first Medusa system are provided 
in the following chapter. In this chapter a sketch of the intended user experience 
when using Medusa is provided. 
6.3 General Layout of the Medusa Display 
When starting the first Medusa system, its user interface is unlikely to present any 
initial surprises to a user familiar with common implementations of the DESKTOP 
metaphor, or WIMP interface style. The user will see a 2D windo\v that occupies the 
entire area of the display(s) connected to the central processing unit's graphics 
hardware. This window, the root window as it is termed in the X window system, or 
the desktop in the DESKTOP metaphor, is always the rear-most window, the user 
cannot place any windows behind it in the stack of windows that occlude others. As 
can be seen in Figure 6.1, though, the root window itself is much the same as other 
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WIMP systems, it serves as an area on which file icons may be placed by the user as 
reminders, or to be used in their immediate tasks. 
The major difference between Medusa and other WIMP interfaces that users will 
notice is the on-screen graphic which can be seen in the top-right hand corner of 
Figure 6.1. This graphic provides information about the status of the underlying 
computing system, of data structures relevant to the performance of the current and 
subsequent user tasks, and of additional devices to which the processing unit is 
connected. This graphic is also the source of " meta-obj ects " , meta-Ievel 
representations of on-screen objects that the user employs directly when performing 
tasks but which themselves lack any means of having their attributes and behaviour 
modified by the user. These meta-objects acknowledge what Dourish (2001) calls 
the inflexible obtrusiveness of most graphical user interfaces that makes invisibility 
an unobtainable goal of many interface designs. Instead Medusa adopts a design 
approach discussed by Thimbleby (1990: 229) which Karl Popper termed Berke/ey's 
Razorl • Berkeley's razor is the notion that" All entities are ruled out except those that 
are perceived." Any information, or mechanism, that is required to perform tasks in 
Medusa, or that becomes apparent at a point of breakdown of its usual behaviour is 
made apparent to the user. The meta-objects shown in Figure 6.1 and their behaviour 
are an attempt in the first version of Medusa to realise this notion. 
6.4 Performing Basic Tasks in Medusa 
The major source of input to Medusa generated by the user is via a pointing device 
capable of generating selection information. With existing common computing 
technologies, and with the technology assumed when considering prototypes of the 
Medusa system, this pointing device is likely to be a mouse. However what is 
1 Popper means this to be a "sharper" version of Occam's razor ("plurality is never to be posited 
without need "). Berkeley's razor is named after the philosopher Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753). 
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important to Medusa is the design space of the device (the range of data that it is 
capable of generating and how this maps into the underlying software's data 
structures) not the family of devices from which a particular device is chosen. Most 
tasks, as will be explained in further detail in the following chapter, are selection 
tasks. The data required from the user via an input device therefore need not include 
paths of points on the display, such as would be generated by polling, sampling, or 
logging events generated as a mouse, say, moves. This allows us to consider in the 
final chapter possible implementations of Medusa on small screen devices and 
personal digital assistants (PDAs). 
J~ 7'~----------------.J 
Figure 6.1 General layout of the Medusa display 
6.4.1 Using the Toolbar 
The first version of the Medusa system uses an object-message syntax for 
interaction. All but a very few on-screen objects respond to messages that affect the 
""-
attributes of objects. On-screen objects, however, will be members of very different 
categories (or classes) and will respond to different sets of operations that bring 
about changes in their states. A well-known problem that HeI addressed early in the 
design of graphical user interfaces was the problem of interaction modes, where 
systems respond in different ways to the same user input depending on the current 
state of the device. Alan Kay, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, is said to have devised 
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overlapping on-screen windows in part to resolve the problem of modes (Bardini, 
2(00). The difficulty of having to account for modes using (possibly overlapping or 
mixed) metaphors was discussed in Chapter 4. Thimbleby (1990) states that it is 
inaccurate to speak of mode less systems, for user input to be interpreted at all by the 
system it must possess at least one mode. Instead designers, Thimbleby argues, can 
strive for low-mode systems. This striving reflects what Bardini (2000) characterises 
as the Xerox PARC tradition in user interface design. By contrast, Engelbart's NLS 
system, according to Bardini (2000: 118), " ... multiplied ... discrete states or modes 
into so many exclusive conditions of the user's activity. To tap into the functionality 
of a given command, the user needed to establish a certain configuration of 
preliminary commands to put the system into a specific mode in which the needed 
command was available. In such a system, the user had to memorize where he or she 
was in the hierarchy of commands and modes. The interface was a kind of maze, 
often requiring backtracking to access new functions and commands." Douglas 
Engelbart intended that his NLS would be used by experts and knowledge workers. 
The chord keyboard required to navigate between modes proved, however, less 
usable by more casual and infrequent users (termed "human beings" in David 
Canfield Smith's somewhat mocking description1 of the comparative usability of the 
chord keypad and the use of the mouse in the Xerox Star). 
If different categories of on-screen object respond differently to similar user input, as 
they do in Medusa, then Medusa is modal. What Medusa does, however, is to make 
interaction with all on-screen objects simple and consistent so that the modes are not 
apparent, or are regarded as no more complex than menu-based interaction. A 
toolbar presents the options available in the current state that can be applied to an on-
screen object indicated by the user. The appearance of a toolbar in response to the 
2 Commentary to a video recording of the final demonstration of the Xerox Star held at Xerox PARCo 
July 1998. 
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user invoking it is shown in Figure 6.2. This illustration uses the storyboarding 
conventions of Katz (1991). When the toolbar is visible, the option that the user 
subsequently clicks on \vill be the option or command that is applied to the object. 
When the tool bar appears, it partially occludes the icon for which it was invoked. 
This is meant to reinforce association of the toolbar with the icon, and to indicate (as 
\vith the Magic Lens user interaction technique described in the next chapter) that the 
message passes through the tool bar to the icon behind it. 
Figure 6.2 Invoking the toolbar for an on-screen object 
6.4.2 Collections of Objects 
Computing systems of the sort surveyed in Chapter 2, and of which Medusa is 
intended to be one, usually provide facilities for organising data files produced by 
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application software into spaces from where they can be retrieved by users. Users 
often need to create collections of data files that share properties or which are 
required by users to perform their immediate tasks. In Chapter 9 some of the 
arguments over the need to archive and organise information are surveyed, and 
alternative user interface designs for file organisation are compared using the 
Lakoff/Johnson theory. In the first version of the Medusa system, however, a 
comparatively simple interface design is adopted which follows from the QPT 
analyses presented in the previous chapter. 
In the first version of Medusa, collections are of two possible types, long-lived, or 
short-lived. A long-lived collection, which would be formed from files and 
directories in command-based system file spaces, or from files and folders in the 
DESKTOP metaphor, is denoted in Medusa by a container. A container (shown in 
Figure 6.3) has a simple icon that shows relevant properties of the underlying 
implementation in the operating system's file system. Containers can be empty, or 
they can currently contain files and other containers. Users' notions of containment 
are particularly important for understanding user interfaces. The simple icon design 
makes the reliance on ideas of containment (which can be seen in the QPT models in 
the previous chapter) apparent. The file and folder method of organising data in the 
DESKTOP metaphor also relies upon ideas of containment, as will be discussed 
further below, but the metaphor is a weaker one than the "container is a container" 
idea employed in the first version of Medusa. 
Figure 6.3 Collections of objects - containers 
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Most collections of objects are long-lived, and are stored within the hierarchy that 
file systems usually allo\v the user to construct. Occasionally users, though, wish to 
construct short-lived collections. These collections usually comprise files that reside 
within the same windo\v, or that are all on the desktop. In most DESKTOP metaphor 
systems, two methods are supported by the interface to allow these collections to be 
constructed. One method is to allo\v the user to lasso a number of icons by pressing 
the mouse button while the pointer is in an empty region of window in which the 
icons lie and by dragging the pointer to another empty point in the window. While 
the pointer is moving, a rectangular bounding box (the lasso) is drawn and redrawn 
so that one corner of the box lies on the point at which the mouse button was 
pressed, and the corner opposite lies on the current location of the hotspot of the 
pointer. The second method is to select the first file by clicking on it, and then 
selecting subsequent choices by modifying the mouse button click, by using a 
different mouse button or by holding down the shift key on the keyboard while 
clicking on the additional files. 
These methods both follo\v from the idea the notion of the currently selected object. 
Medusa, for reasons explained in the following chapter, does not adopt this notion in 
its interaction style. Medusa instead allows short-lived collections to be constructed 
via the tool bar options Rdd to Group and Remoue from Group. This is 
shown in Figure 6.4. If the tool bar is invoked for a file when that file is currently 
member of a group then the tool bar's contents will be different. Rather than contain 
the operations that can be applied to the object itself, as would be the case for an 
individual object, the tool bar will instead contain the operations that are meaningful 
when the file is considered as a member of a group. The difficulty lies, as the 
following chapter explores, in ambiguity of reference and of deitic reference, 
determining which object the user meant when indicating an icon as the recipient of 
a message. Because the same region of on-screen space (the icon) can be interpreted 
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as either an individual or as a metonym for the group of which it is a part. the tool bar 
must display options that take into account both of these cases. The tool bar must 
allow the user to resolve the ambiguity. An example of the sort of tool bar that might 
appear when an icon is part of a group is shown in Figure 6.4. Chapter 8 considers 
more fully the alternative low-level sequences of user-generated events that might be 
adopted to support the basic Medusa interaction tasks. While the low-level tasks for 
interacting with groups described above are consistent with the Medusa interaction 
style. the lasso method can also be supported. as a synonym for repeatedly adding 
files to a group. This can only occur in implementations where the input device used 
can differentiate between PRESS and RELEASE events in deciding if an event is the 
beginning of a lasso task, or should be interpreted as invocation of the tool bar. 
I,.S ..... 
Figure 6.4 A Toolbar for a Group 
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6.4.3 Moving Files between Containers 
The QPT models developed in the prevIous chapter revealed a considerable 
mismatch between the behaviour of objects in the model world and the behaviour of 
the corresponding objects in the underlying software. This mismatch cannot be 
explained easily by mapping metaphorically between the domains, and it also reveals 
a breakdown in direct manipulation in the model world (Chapter 9 discusses 
Lakofrs definition of this term which is adopted instead of Shneiderman's definition 
in later thinking about the design of Medusa). Far from acting on the actual objects 
of interest, the implementation of the drag-and-drop interaction method for this task 
ends up with the interface, not in a state in which the underlying system is actually 
in, but a state in which the system is expected to catch up to - what you see is ,vhat 
you may eventually get. This interaction task can also give rise to semantic errors, 
the user can drag a file to a container into which it cannot actually be placed, perhaps 
because the disk volume it denotes is full or locked and read only. The Medusa 
action sequence for moving files between containers borrows more from the 
pragmatic implementation of the Xerox Star than the DESKTOP metaphor, and is 
storyboarded in Figure 6.5. 
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Ic:r == 
Figure 6.5 Placing a data file into a container 
6.4.4 Deleting Files 
The study of first-time users of the Macintosh described in Chapter 3 showed, 
confirming other reports, that the TRASHCAN metaphor is problematic. This was 
found to be the case even for the trashcan's first use as a mechanism for deleting 
files. The comments made by the subjects in the study reported in Chapter 3 are 
echoed in users' comments quoted other reports, for example: "See the recycle bin? 
Does someone come round and empty it?"3 The trashcan is not a file deletion 
mechanism in itself, it is instead a directory in which files can be stored while the 
user decides whether to delete its contents, or retrieve them. The file deletion task is 
made simpler by having an Empty Trash, or Empty Recycle Bin, command 
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available on the task bar at the top or bottom of the screen. The location from which 
the files are deleted is intended to be obvious, the trashcan. A failing of the 
TRASHCAN metaphor is that even when a real trashcan is emptied, its contents 
exist until incinerated or irretrievably lost to a land fill site or refuse tip. The 
TRASHCAN metaphor as implemented in existing computing systems offers no way 
of attempting to retrieve a deleted file. Rather than attempt to provide a retrieval 
mechanism within Medusa, instead, as with existing systems, a specialist application 
will be required to recover deleted files. As was shown in Chapter 5, though, some 
implementations of the trashcan might have far more complex behaviour than being 
a store of files, the store being simply the recipient of the Empty Trash message. 
As was seen in Chapter 3, the TRASHCAN metaphor does not seem to suggest, 
though, how files can be retrieved from the trashcan. Other metaphors for file 
deletion, such as the "black hole" in ARK are more complex than the trashcan \vhile 
being weaker metaphors for the actual deletion mechanism. The solution to allow 
files to be deleted from the Medusa file space is simply to have a Delete option 
appear on the tool bar associated with a file. Undeleting a deleted file is a task that 
can only be performed for a short period of time until the data blocks on the disk that 
it occupies are recycled by the operating system to store new files. There is nothing 
within the Medusa design to prevent a suitable recovery application to be used to 
retrieve data from the disk, but the design of such an application will not be 
considered further. While the data blocks making up the file have not been 
corrupted, it may be possible to undo the deletion operation. The issue of undo 
within Medusa is discussed further in Chapters 7, 9 and 10. 
3 Telephone call to a technical support help line, reported in The Editor, supplement to The Guardian 
newspaper (l3th April 2(02). 
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6.4.5 Interacting with the Root Window 
Many user interfaces employ a menu bar to allow commands to be performed. A 
menu bar is usually laid out across the top of the screen and contains a hierarchy of 
commands on pull- or drop-down menus. A menu bar is a permanent fixture on-
screen while the windowing system is running. Menu bars, though, enforce the idea 
of the currently selected object, and require the user to move the· mouse perhaps a 
considerable way to reach the command needed on its menu in the menu bar. 
Task bars are simpler menus that are located at the bottom of the screen (in the case 
of the Macintosh command strip, the Microsoft Windows 95 task bar, and the strip 
of large icons denoting commonly used applications placed along the bottom of the 
Macintosh OS X display). Task bars usually contain functions or links to 
applications that can be applied in any context without first selecting a file to apply 
them to. The user may still need to move the mouse some distance to reach the task 
bar. In Medusa the root window is not a desktop, it is just another active object and 
so a toolbar can be invoked which can send messages to the root window itself. The 
root window's toolbar can, for example, contain commands to end the user's 
interaction session, or shut down the workstation (exploiting the sorts of SPACE for 
TIME metaphors discussed in Chapter 9) and can also be used to invoke commonly 
used applications. A similar device can be seen on some WIMP systems which do 
not implement a strong version of the DESKTOP metaphor, but this is an additional 
interaction style that users must learn, and often do not predict or imagine, to the 
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traditional use of pull-down menus. In Medusa, having a toolbar apply to the root 
window is entirely consistent with the key interaction style. 
6.5 Breakdowns 
Where user interfaces, particularly those that are based upon interface metaphors, 
cause users considerable difficulties is at points of breakdown - where their 
behaviour suddenly differs from their normal, usual, or expected behaviour. 
6.5.1 Hardware Breakdowns 
Most hardware failures make a computing system inoperable. There are other 
failures, though, particularly of networked devices, that make tasks impossible to 
complete, or which give rise to unexpected system behaviour that the user must 
attempt to interpret and remedy. This can be difficult because networked devices 
may not be directly visible to the user. Even if a device is in the same room as the 
user, it may not be able to understand the source of the breakdown from a change in 
its outward appearance. The on-screen graphic shown in Figure 6.1 allows a number 
of breakdo\vns to be easily observed via colour coding and other feedback of the sort 
proposed by PoIson which were described in the previous chapter. Network failures 
between the central processing unit and devices such as printers or file servers can be 
indicated easily. Depicting the devices as icons on the root window makes it possible 
for the user to examine their state. For example, the user can easily determine if a 
printer is out of paper, or to judge how many other printing tasks must be completed 
before the user's document will be ready to be collected. There is nothing to prevent 
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background or ambient audio, such as the sort employed in ARKola, to also 
communicate this information, and the on-screen graphic shown in Figure 6.1 
provides a handle to indicate to the user the source of the sonic information. 
6.5.2 Buffers 
Breakdown from the expected, usual, system behaviour to unusual system behaviour 
can arise from the use of buffers. Buffers are data structures that store data for a 
short time until it can be processed by the application for which it is destined. 
Usually buffers are unnoticed by the user. The data that the user generates, such as 
characters typed at the keyboard, are processed seemingly instantaneously by the 
application in focus. If the system load increases, though, there may be a perceivable 
lag between the typing of characters and it appearing inside a text editor window, 
say. The user thus becomes aware of the existence of the buffer. The first version of 
the Medusa system deliberately sets out to make the user aware of the existence of 
buffers. Following a design proposed by Dix (1991) when characters remain in the 
buffer for a perceivably lengthy delay without being consumed by the application, a 
visualisation of the buffer, shown in Figure 6.6 appears. As the user types further 
characters, these appear appended to the end of the buffer's contents. Figure 6.6 
makes this appending of characters apparent even when the user presses the 
backspace key to delete a key pressed in error. The application will interpret the 
delete key in the way that the user expects, the buffer cannot. When the application 
processes characters, they are removed from the buffer. The common use of the 
work "consume" to describe an application processing a character removed from the 
buffer leads Dix to refer to this design as the munchman (aka Pac Man) buffer. The 
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Pac Man metaphor, however, possesses considerable conceptual baggage and is not 
fully adopted by the Medusa system. 
Figure 6.6 Visualising the Medusa keyboard buffer 
6.5.3 Predicting Breakdown 
The munchman buffer and the use of colour coding on the computer-computer 
schematic indicate points of breakdown, moments when the look and feel of the 
model world deviate from their usual behaviour. At such a moment the user is 
thrown into a state where they must consciously diagnose the system in order to 
predict the outcomes of further actions. In a literal user interface metaphor, the 
breakdown cannot be explained in terms of the metaphor, and the possibility that a 
breakdown is forthcoming cannot be made apparent to the user. In the previous 
chapter, the idea of the load on the processor as a source of breakdowns in the 
normal behaviour of on-screen objects was discussed. Early graphical user interfaces 
to Unix such as Sun Microsystems' OpenWindows provided a small utility program 
that could represent the current processor load as a dial display, or could plot the 
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recent history of this measure as a graph. A number of windows systems developed 
since have included this infonnation on-screen or have had similar utilities 
developed for them. Medusa too can display this infonnation, perhaps overlaid on 
the processor box image in the computer-computer schematic, or in a separate 
display elsewhere on-screen. A simple measure of the processor load, however, does 
not allow the user to predict all breakdowns, or to excuse them when they occur. 
The user's sense of spatiomimesis is that the on-screen pointer is an extension of 
themselves in the model world that exactly tracks the user's movement of the mouse. 
Breakdowns in spatiomimesis can be highly disruptive, the feedback process that 
underlies Fitts' law and allows users to move the on-screen pointer accurately to hit 
the (sometimes small) on-screen buttons is disrupted and users may inadvertently 
click on a target they did not mean to. Mouse-ahead facilities can also cease to 
behave as expected, it being unclear where on-screen the windows system records 
the pointer as being when a mouse button click event is generated. Most windows 
systems operate on a repeated "read next event from event queue - process event" 
cycle. If the processing of a mouse movement event, say, takes too long, then the 
next mouse movement event in the queue will not be processed until after the 
deadline of 50 milliseconds by which the display should have been updated in order 
to maintain the illusion of animation. The design of a revised version of Medusa 
called Medusa-"t, discussed in Chapter 10, is intended to overcome this problem by 
application of real-time programming methods following detailed specification of 
the temporal behaviour of the user interface. This approach is intended to remove, 
where possible, the problem. In Medusa, the intention. where possible is to explain 
the problem in order to account for breakdowns and to allow the user to plan 
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subsequent action in light of the system's deviation from its normal behaviour. 
Rather than use the approach of changing the pointer icon to a symbol that is a poor 
metaphor for its underlying simulated state of understanding (Pcrez-Quinones and 
Sibert, 1996) - the rationale for rejecting this common approach is presented in 
Section 7.2.9 - colour coding is used to indicate, via the pointer itself, the time 
taken to process the last event on the queue. For a single lengthy event, the problem 
of distracting the user should not be a considerable problem. Where the pointer icon 
changes to indicate a breakdo\vn in normal event processing, often designers choose 
to not change the pointer's shape when it would switch back and forth- bet\\'een 
different shapes too rapidly. A change in pointer shape at all other times indicates a 
change in mode, changing from a traditional pointer (~) to a double-headed arro\v 
(~), for example, indicates a point on the vertical edge of a window which can be 
used as a drag point to adjust the width of the window. Changing the pointer's shape 
in response to delays in event processing suggests that the mouse has changed mode. 
In fact the mechanism of the mouse event processing system is the same, but with 
different temporal behavior. Medusa should make relevant aspects of the mechanism 
and the conditions under which it is operating visible, not suggest that a different 
mechanism is at work. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has sketched the intended user experience that Medusa should offer. 
The details of the design rationale underlying the user experience are given in the 
following chapter. No \vorking prototype of Medusa exists but this does not prevent 
usability analysis from being undertaken. Usability evaluation of the first Medusa 
system using a low-cost usability inspection method is reported in Chapter 8. 
154 
Chapter 7 
The Medusa System Design Rationale 
"It's like the mozzarella cheese on a good slice of pizza. No matter how far you pull 
the slice away from your mouth it just gets thinner and longer but never snaps. Of 
course you could always just eat your pizza with a knife and fork, but I think this is 
clearly what's known as 'pushing the cheese analogy"'. 
- Jerry Seinfeld (1995) SeinLanguage, Bantam Books. 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the motivations behind the Medusa user interface design are 
discussed. It is judged that systems are needed that provide access for novices to the 
functionality provided by operating systems to support a range of tasks that 
overcome the difficulties with existing metaphorical model worlds, while allowing 
the user to develop a useful mental model of the system. It is hoped that the Medusa 
system will not be subject to breakdowns, erratic behaviour of on-screen objects, and 
users' misunderstandings, to the extent that existing metaphor-based user interface 
designs are. Details of the Medusa system design and the intended user experience 
were presented in the previous chapter. 
7.2 The Medusa System - Version One 
Having stated the criteria that the Medusa system is intended to satisfy, having 
introduced the means of modelling the system, having detailed some of the models 
that the system image should evoke, and having sketched the intended user 
experience, \ve no\v describe the Medusa system design rationale in some detail. 
7.2.1 The Workbench 
In the desktop metaphor, there exists a root window (as it is termed in the X \vindo\v 
system), a window that occupies the full area of the display(s) connected to the 
workstation, which cannot be resized or moved, and which always lies behind all 
other windows. This window is what is termed the DESKTOP in the desktop 
metaphor. The desktop is meant to be the analogue of its real-world counter point, an 
area upon which tools and documents may be placed while the office-worker carries 
out their tasks. The electronic desktop, as has been previously mentioned, differs in 
some important respects from its real-world counterpart. The trashcan, for example, 
sits on top of the desk rather than beside it, as do file storage containers such as filing 
cabinets. 
Donald A. Norman, for one, prefers to think of the root window as a workbench 
rather than an electronic desktop. The workbench is an area provided for planning 
and the storage of icons while sub-goals are suspended in favour of more immediate 
tasks that alter the state of the file system. In the DESKTOP metaphor, the root 
window creates difficulties that cannot be accounted for in terms of the metaphor. It 
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has been asked l • for example. what it means for an application program to be moved 
onto the desktop. In the first version of Medusa, as shall be discussed below, on-
screen objects are links to files, the workbench is treated in the same way as a 
directory or folder, links may be placed on the root window and moved within the 
window to suit the needs of the user. Medusa treats the root window as another 
rendering of a directory listing file, but one of fixed size that cannot be scrolled. It is 
hoped that this interaction style is clear from the discussion in the previous and 
following chapters. 
7.2.2 Objects in the Model World 
The first version of the Medusa system adopts the critique of existing metaphor-
based systems and models of systems arising from QPT modelling of the physical 
world as applied to user interfaces, as discussed in Chapter 5. Thus it is envisioned 
that the behaviour of the model world should be explicable in terms of simple 
processes acting on the on-screen objects and that these processes should also be 
applicable to the underlying software objects by a simple analogy. Medusa should 
therefore be unlike the situation in existing systems where often no mapping can be 
found between processes acting on on-screen objects and those acting on underlying 
software objects. This model of system design, the product-oriented view in the 
terminology of Andersen (1997), requires that analogies that follow from the 
underlying software be sought in the real world to describe the model world. The 
structure of a metaphor is therefore that of Laurel's (1993)description above, where 
the metaphor mediates between the model world and the underlying software. In 
such an approach - where the model world employs an existing work language, or 
1 lbis question was brought to my attention in a discussion with Professor AIan J. Dix in the winter 
of 1991. 
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resembles some aspect of the real world - , \ve acknowledge that the work language 
risks being imposed upon the user (Brock, 1996). 
Objects in the Medusa model world are members of classical categories. That is, 
membership of categories is detennined by the necessary and sufficient attributes 
possessed by objects to be a member of a particular category. Category membership 
determines the operations that may be performed upon on-screen objects. As the 
Medusa user interface is object-based, the categories of Medusa on-screen objects 
can be said to fonn a class hierarchy as some objects have more attributes than 
others yet are similar to members of other categories. This class hierarchy is depicted 
in Figure 7.1. 
Word-processed 
object 
Text file 
~ 
Still graphical 
image I )~:re~e 
"Static" object 
I 
Object 
I 
. /1'Dynamic.\.ec~ument with 
Sound file '\ embedded video 
Application program Video fragment 
Figure 7.1 The categories of Medusa system version one on-screen objects 
The principle distinction between categories defined in Medusa is between static 
objects and dynamic objects. Static objects are those that can change as the result of 
software tools being applied to them but which produce a file whose presentation 
does not change, such objects would include documents, text files, and still pictures. 
Dynamic objects are those whose presentation changes with time, such objects 
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would include video fragments. sound and music files. and multimedia documents 
with embedded sound and graphics. This distinction between dynamic and static 
objects is made so that the processes that alter or act on the different categories of 
objects are made apparent. I t makes no sense to try to print a dynamic object such as 
a video fragment for example. but by using a suitable software tool a static object. a 
still image consisting of one video frame. for example. can be produced which can 
be printed. This distinction was also made subsequently by Fitzmaurice. Ishii, and 
Buxton (1995). 
In many systems, icons are assigned to objects in a computer's file space according 
to the suffix placed at the end of the files' names. All files with a ".c" suffix, for 
example, can be depicted with the icon denoting a C programming language source 
code file or be assigned an icon denoting the application used to create the file. This 
approach has a number of drawbacks. Firstly. it may be misleading. For example 
some files saved in the GIF graphics interchange format may not be still images. but 
may be simple animations comprising a sequence of frames that are displayed in a 
loop. Some word processors. in addition, permit the creation of documents with 
video and sound fragments as elements of the page. Hence one might assume that a 
file might be printed by extension of one's previous experience of using files of that 
type, whereas it cannot actually be printed. The common depiction of files of a 
certain type presents additional problems including the perception of a limit to the 
uses of a file or to the number of software tools that may be applied to read and alter 
files. Opening a file will cause an application to run and load the file opened. the 
application run will typically be denoted by the file's icon although many other 
programs may also be capable of using and modifying the data contained in the file. 
The same can be said for icons within a typed file system. such as the Macintosh 
Finder, where an ontology of objects exists with associated (but possibly modifiable) 
icons, rather than where rules employing a filename's suffix are used to determine 
what icon design should denote a file. 
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The approach adopted in the design of icons that denote objects in the Medusa model 
world is one tenned self-representing (Treglown and O'Shea, 1993), a notion that 
mirrors, but which was developed without knowledge of, the notion of self-
identifying objects2 employed by Putnam (1981). A self-identifying object is one 
that evokes only a single concept or thought token when perceived. Self-representing 
objects are those that use, so far as practicable, the final form of the file in the 
generation of a suitable icon to denote the file. While not simply adopting icons 
denoting files of a particular category, it is hoped that category membership can be 
detennined from the icon's design. The notion of self-representing icons also adopts 
the product-oriented approach to metaphor (Andersen, 1997), in keeping with the 
Medusa system design where objects in the model world are designed according to 
some metaphor to account for features within the underlying computer system. 
Text Files 
The Medusa system is intended to make apparent to the user relevant aspects of the 
computing system The device topology and the nature and state of data structures 
will be visualised where such infonnation is required to provide a full account of the 
behaviour of the computing system. All files in a computer's file space consist of a 
sequence of bytes represented in the physical medium of the disk drives connected to 
the processor. The ways in which the bytes of infonnation are interpreted by the 
application tools used by the user are seemingly contrary to the idea of visibility. 
What is stressed in the on-screen depiction of files is the final form of the data and 
the ways in which the data may be manipulated rather than the structure of the data 
that make up the files. 
2 Putnam cites David Wiggins (1980) Sameness and Substance. Blackwell, Oxford, as the origin of 
the idea of the self-identifying object. 
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A simple text file is deemed to be a text file as the result of the file being interpreted 
by a suitable application program. The application program interprets each byte or 
word in the file, using an encoding standard such as ASCII, as an alphanumeric or a 
special control character. A depiction of a text file should ideally depict the final 
form of the data in a way that means most to the user. It, should also aid in the tasks 
of locating the file among the icons visible on-screen and of identifying a particular 
instance of a type or class of file among a number of files of a similar type. Where 
files created by an application are depicted by the same icon, or -where the icon is 
assigned by the window system according to the suffix on the file's name, one finds 
icons such as those shown in Figure 7.2. 
~ ..... ~ 
Note Pad file 
g 
o 
Sea n ne r Setti ngs 
Figure 7.2 Typical text file icons 
Such icons only depict category membership and additional information such as the 
file's name, yet perhaps its version history and additional comments (supplied 
possibly by another user) stored with the file, may be required by the user in order to 
uniquely identify the file. The design of icons may be improved in order to ease 
performance of location and identification tasks. Experimental studies (Ark, Dryer, 
Selker, and Zhai, 1998) show that ecological icons, those that closely resemble 
objects in the real world, can assist with location tasks. Ecological icons, however, 
by resembling real world objects, are more appropriate to systems based exactly on 
the metaphors adopted and on the use of metaphor questioned earlier that we shall 
eventually reject below. Instead icons less realistic than those termed ecological, but 
richer than the typical icons shown in Figure 7.2 are adopted. Instead of a still image, 
which denotes only a single page, or the presence of a number of pages in the text 
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file, motion icons, or InicOIlS, may be employed to provide a richer icon. In a micon 
(Br0ndmo and Davenport, 1989; Baecker, Small, and Mander, 1991) a sequence of 
small pictographic symbols is cycled through frame by frame, when the last frame is 
reached, the first frame is displayed again. Each frame of the micon is an icon. 
Br0ndmo and Davenport (1989) use micons to denote video fragments, a subset of 
frames from a piece of digital video where each frame is shrunk in to icon size, these 
fragments being links in a hypermedia network to other nodes containing relevant 
full-size video sequences with accompanying soundtrack. Baecker, Small, and 
Mander (1991) use micons to represent simple actions within application programs 
that denote how to bring about a simple change in state in another artefact produced 
using, or maintained by, the application. 
A micon depiction of a text file may therefore consist of a sequence of icon frames, 
where each frame is a page of the document shrunk to icon size. While unique 
identification of the text file is unlikely to be possible from the micon itself, clues 
may be obtained from the superficial structure of the document as to the document's 
identity and may distinguish it from other text files or previous versions of the file. 
Such a strategy for icon design is not without problems, however, and does pose 
questions that require investigation and answering from appropriate theory and 
experimental work. The size of a page, for example, meaning the number of lines of 
text that appear on the page in a simple text editor application can be a fixed integer., 
More often it is a function of the physical size of the paper currently selected in the 
printer and of the fonts and number of lines making up the text file. If the preferred 
configuration of the printer is changed, then the final appearance of the text file will 
change. , If changes to text file micons are propagated throughout the file space, then 
recognition of a file being sought will be confused as its appearance will have 
changed since the user last altered the file's contents. A solution to this problem, one 
often adopted, is for the preferred printer configuration to be an attribute of the 
document and not the printer. This contrasts with the photocopy metaphor employed 
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in the Xerox Star system, where one expects the size of the paper that the copy will 
appear on to be part of the photocopier's state. 
Documents 
Documents are seemingly similar to text files, but typically make greater use of more 
complex formatting facilities. The same principle of creating icons to represent text 
files can be applied to represent documents. Documents, however, may not solely be 
"static" objects in the Medusa on-screen object ontology depicted in Figure 7.1. 
Word processing applications often allow pages to contain, in addition to still 
graphical images, sound clips, video fragments, inclusive links to data created by 
other classes of application such as databases and spreadsheets. They can also 
include links to data in other documents where changes to the linked data will 
propagate to every document that includes it Where part of a page is a "dynamic" 
object, then what it means to print the document must be considered. 
The approach to generating icons denoting a document can be borrowed from that of 
the approach for depicting text files, where each page of the document is used to 
generate a frame of a micon. Where a page contains a video fragment, a micon will 
appear within the frames depicting these pages. Such micons within micons will 
only decrease the possibility of uniquely identifying a file from its icon, such will be 
the loss of information in further reducing the information contained in the video 
fragment Such micons will, though, aid the user in telling a micon from others of 
the same class of file. Again, other information is required in addition to an iconic 
depiction to uniquely identify a file, the form of this information will be considered 
further below. 
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Programming Language Source Files 
Computer program source files are often are depicted by icons similar to those that 
denote text files. While source files are text files, a sequence of alphanumeric 
characters, a question exists as to the most useful final form of the file's contents 
when it comes to choosing a suitable icon. When printed, similar results will be 
produced to that of performing the task of printing a typical text file. To the 
programmer however, splitting the file into pages, each page forming a frame of a 
micon, is less meaningful a level of granularity for abstracting the file's contents than 
others that could be suggested. When programming, moving between pages is a less 
frequent task than scrolling the text of the source file until the class, method, rule, 
variable declaration or procedure sought is found. Rather than cycle through pages of 
the file, a scrolling micon would be a better representation. The loss of information 
that occurs when a legible full-sized page is reduced to the size of a typical icon 
remains a problem. Considering Brooks' (1983) "beacons", indicators for the 
meaning of a computer program, it can be seen that prologue comments, variable 
structure and label names, interline comments, indentation or pretty-printing, and 
subroutine structure contribute greatly to interpreting an unknown program source 
file and deciding upon its functionality. Many of these beacons are likely to survive 
when fonning an icon, even though the size of the program text is reduced until the 
text itself becomes illegible. 
Picture Files 
It is already common for graphics application programs to allow a preview file to be 
created, which is an icon of the image created using the application. Seemingly a 
picture file, or still graphics image, this presents few problems. In the Medusa 
ontology it is a "static" object which can be easily printed and which is subject to 
tasks that alter its location within a file space in the same way as all on-screen 
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objects. The approach of assummg that all graphics files, irrespective of the 
encoding method used to interpret the bytes in the file space as an image, can be 
simply printed if a suitable printer is available to the system is however, false. A 
particular form of GIF file, employed by sites on the world-wide web, allows a GIF 
file to consist of a number of frames which tend to be interpreted by world-wide web 
browsers as micons, frames are cycled through in sequence while the image is 
visible through the browser's window. Such files would therefore be termed 
"dynamic" and single frames would have to be isolated from them before printing 
would be a task allowed by the system. 
Video Fragments 
Following Bn~ndmo and Davenport (1989), it is suggested that video fragments be 
depicted by micons within the Medusa system's model world. In Bnzmdmo and 
Davenport's Elastic Charles hypermedia system, the history and geography of the 
Charles river that separates Boston, Massachusetts from Cambridge, where the the 
MIT campus is located, can be explored. Micons are used to depict links to relevant 
video fragments within the overall hypermedia structure that provide additional 
information relevant to the concepts presented on the current page of information, 
image or video. Within Medusa micons are used in the same way to denote a digital 
video fragment, and to acts as handles to the data files that contain the encoded video 
data. A frame of the micon is a shrunken version of a frame of the video. The micon 
as a whole is made up of is made up of a number of frames of the video fragment 
reduced to icon size. The frames of the micon are then shown in a loop on the root 
window, after the last micon frame is shown, the animation returns to the first. 
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Sound files 
The notion of the final form of a data structure forming its on-screen iconic 
representation causes greater problems of distraction when considering sound files, 
than may arise from the movement of a micon at the edge of the user's visual field. If 
a sound file is looped and made audible whenever the attached visual icon is visible 
on-screen, as the number of audible sound files increases it will become harder for 
the user to distinguish the file sought from the background noise. The confusion of 
sound generated \vill also tend to annoy other users nearby. While users are able to 
distinguish the sound sought from a small number of simultaneous background 
sounds, an ability relied upon in the auditory browser system of Fernstrom and 
Bannon (1997), and while simultaneous sounds can be used to dra\v the user's 
attention to malfunctioning devices that are not visible, but which are audible 
(Gaver, Smith, and O'Shea, 1991), determining which icon acts as the handle for the 
sound recognised or wanted poses a considerable problem. A number of solutions to 
this problem can be found. An example is Kobayashi and Schmandt's (1997) 
Dynamic Soundscape which maps sound into a loop in an auditory field around the 
user's head, a speaker is heard moving around the loop wi th the speaker's topics 
being positioned in certain arc segments of the loop. The user may then, via a touch 
pad, indicate a particular topic to be replayed, or may jump around the loop, by 
indicating the position of the audio segment they wish replayed. This system, 
however, only allows a single audio file, albeit many segments of \vhich, to be 
replayed and accessed. Other systems which have multiple, different, sound sources 
playing from fixed positions in the audio space (for example, Schmandt and Mullins, 
1995) are limited in the number of sounds that can be located and differentiated. 
Alternatively they only play structured sounds which allow attention to be shifted to, 
or attention to be drawn to, a different sound source. Rather than have multiple 
sound sources playing at the same time (which would be the approach for sound files 
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following the notion of self-representation), with its obvious difficulties, a better 
solution is to easily pennit self-representation to be brought about, rather than make 
it the default behaviour of the model world. The viewing cone, introduced by 
Mander et al. (1992), pennits selected emphasis display of files. When activated over 
a file icon, a cone expands to reveal more of a file's contents and to provide 
sufficient additional views to further aid unique identification of the file, not just 
detennination of the file's category. By selecting the particular emphasis to show 
sound within the cone, as the cursor passes over sound files, the cone appears and 
the sound, the data making up which is stored in the file, is heard: To be consistent 
with the interaction style of Medusa, the tool bar, which is discussed further below, 
associated with categories of sound files includes the methods Play and stop 
playing. 
Hypertexts 
The application program Hypercard uses the icon shown in Figure 7.3 to denote a 
Hypercard stack. This clearly reflects the metaphor adopted in a number of hypertext 
systems, that each node in the graph is a card with a piece of text written on it. There 
are claims, though, that the Hypercard system is a compromise forced on its 
designers following legal action taken by the inventor of a system tenned Zoomracks 
which is based on a "card and rack" metaphor (Heckel, 1996). The Hypercard icon, 
and metaphor, provides no notion of the links that connect buttons, be they icons on 
a card or short strings of text, to other cards in the stack. Hypertext systems will 
often provide an overview of the entire hypertext which renders the entire graph to 
ease navigation and detennination of the user's current location, such an overview 
could fonn the icon generated to depict a particular hypertext. Again, such icons are 
unlikely to be sufficient to uniquely identify the hypertext, and if the graph is too 
large and the connections are too numerous to render without intolerable aliasing, a 
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standard icon denoting the category of on-screen object to which the file belongs 
might need to be employed. 
Figure 7.3 A Hypercard stack 
HTML source files 
HTML files, are an interesting exception to the class of hypertext files. Unlike many 
hypertexts, all the information and media fragments in the graph are unlikely to 
reside in the same filespace. A rendering of the entire graph is therefore impossible 
to construct in a \vay that would form a meaningful icon, again a compromise \vould 
be to adopt an icon denoting category membership. HTML files present a problem 
when interpreting the Open ••• command selected typically from a menu bar, or 
double clicking on the icon. Usually, as mentioned above, the application denoted by 
the icon, or an application associated with the icon using a soft\vare tool is run and 
the file loaded for the application to process or display. HTML files present the 
difficulty that while they are usually employed as documents to be displayed by a 
world-wide web browser, they are also computer programs which are interpreted by 
the browser to produce a rendering of a particular node in a hypermedia graph. 
Depending on the user's current tasks, they may wish to edit the HTML program 
using a text editor tool, or display it using a browser. Different action sequences, or 
methods, must therefore be familiar to the user, whereas a single interface 
mechanism which makes the membership of different categories of the file apparent 
to the user could be employed to overcome this difficulty. We shall discuss such a 
mechanism further below. 
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Discussion: Self-Representing Icons Versus Other Icon Designs 
Traditionally icons have been static representations of data structures, whether or not 
the underlying data structure is static or dynamic, in our distinction. Where 
appropriate, some self-representing icons use animation. According to Baecker, 
Small and Mander (1991: 1) animation in the user interface helps the user to answer 
the questions "what is this?", "where have I come from and gone to?", "where am 
I?", "what can 1 do now?", "what can I do with this?", "how do I do this?", "what is 
happening?", "what have 1 done?", "why did that happen?", and ,iwhat should I do 
now?" Icons that denote files typically help answer the question "What is this?" Self-
representing icons are intended to be richer (Houde and Salomon, 1993) than the 
simple class membership denotations criticised above, but are also intended not to 
invoke the unwanted concepts that ecological icons will, despite their ability to ease 
location tasks (Ark et al., 1998). Also, while self-representing icons may not prove 
to be the simplest icon form, the lengthened search time for more complex icon 
designs demonstrated in Byme's (1993) study only becomes pronounced in sets 
where the icon wanted is one of 12 or more displayed. Byme himself admits that 
visual search is not the only task performed on icon sets, and it is these other tasks 
that must also be supported by an interface. 
Animation in the user interface may also help answer the question "what can I do 
with this?" An interesting method of addressing this question is Henry and Hudson's 
(1990) multidimensional icon. In a multidimensional icon, shown in Figure 7.4, 
icons depicting different views of a file are texture-mapped to the faces of a cube. 
Combinations of mouse movements and mouse button clicks allow the cube to be 
rotated so that a different icon lies parallel to the plane of the screen. This icon then 
may be selected. The drawback of a multidimensional icon is that rather than just 
referring to the affordances of the file, it also refers to other distinct objects. The 
execution view of a C language file, shown in Figure 7.4(0, is a reference to a call to 
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execute a compiled object. This compiled object is a file distinct from the source file, 
and should compilation of the source file fail the execution will fail, hence semantic 
errors are still permitted by this approach. The means by which file affordanccs are 
treated in the Medusa system are described below. 
(a) 
~. . . • • 
(d) 
(a) The multidimensional icon. 
xkernl.c 
(b) 
(e) 
(b) - (f) Faces of the multidimensional icon cube shown in (a). 
(c) 
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Figure 7.4 A multidimensional icon denoting a C language file 
(Henry and Hudson, 1990: 134). 
7.2.3 What Are Files? 
We have sketched above how the contents of files may be depicted employing a 
method termed "self-representation" to give an on-screen depiction intended to aid 
location and identification of files. An issue that must be addressed by a product-
oriented view of metaphor is the problem of finding real-world counterparts to all 
types of notions employed in filing systems. Within the DESKTOP metaphor, some 
icons denote files and folders denote directories, but this is an example of a metaphor 
that breaks down. In the Unix filing system, to which a number of graphical user 
interfaces based on the DESKTOP metaphor have previously been developed, 
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directories are merely files that contain a list of data structures associating a text 
string, the file's name, to an inode. Inodes are special data types that index a number 
of blocks of data in the physical file space. Within a particular directory, what is 
listed as a file is just an instance of a text name being associated with an inode, files 
are not listed, instead these links are listed. This has consequences for the semantics 
of tasks performed in the model world. For example, while a user may think they are 
deleting a file, if another user entitled to use the system has a link (alias) to the file in 
one of their directories, the file itself will not be deleted, it will just be invisible to 
the user that deleted it In the Apple Macintosh system and in Microsoft Windows 
95, by contrast, aliases may be created inside folders which are links to files in other 
folders, opening an alias will have the same effect as opening the original file. The 
alias may be deleted without causing the original file to be deleted, but if the original 
file is deleted, opening an alias will cause an error message to be displayed, as the 
file that the alias links to no longer being present A physical metaphor simplifies the 
notion of deleting a file, but as files may be aliases and not files, other tasks, such as 
opening files, cannot be accounted for as easily in a physical metaphor. 
Vahalia (1996: 220) suggests that "the file abstraction acts as a container for data, 
and the file system allows user to organise, manipulate, and access different files." 
The notion of files as a container is subject, however, to problems in addition to the 
notion of a file as a single physical object. When copying a file into a folder, for 
example, on a volume on which there is insufficient physical space, one method to 
perform this task might be to employ an application package which can split the file 
into a number of pieces which are each small enough to be stored on small volumes 
such as floppy disks .. Another method might be to employ an application that can 
encode and compress the data in the file. Such tasks are more readily suggested by 
notions other than files being thought of as containers. The traditional Unix notion of 
files being a sequence of bytes suggests these tasks more readily, for example. 
Copying a file, if files are containers, will require duplicating the container, or 
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having a container for the duplicated data to be placed into. The container metaphor 
for files is again an example of a metaphor that breaks down quickly. 
7.2.4 An Ontology of Invisible Objects? 
Another issue that creates problems for the use of metaphors in supporting tasks that 
alter the state of file systems is the use in some operating systems of hidden files. 
These are links, files, or directory entries that exist within a file space bOut \vhich 
remain hidden from the user unless a special task is performed to make their iconic 
representations visible, or to reveal their name in a directory listing. Until an object 
becomes visible, or can be named, it cannot be acted upon. Therefore in Smith's 
(1987) terms, a magical feature is required of the user interface in order to make the 
hidden visible. In a system that attempts to implement a physical world metaphor to 
account for a file system that supports hidden objects, the metaphor must fail, and 
systems prototypically described as implementing the desktop metaphor are notable 
for not supporting hidden files in the file system. In systems \\'here hidden files are 
allowed, such systems are usually those where a graphical user interface is imposed 
upon a file system and existing disk operating system, interaction with which has 
previously been conducted using a command language. The need to support the 
magical feature needed to make hidden objects visible has consequences, as will be 
discussed below, for how groups of files are depicted, and on how directories are 
represented. 
7.2.5 Numbers of Objects - Directories and Containers 
As discussed above, file systems are made up of files and directories, which are 
stored on physical volumes (fixed or removable disks). In the DESKTOP metaphor, 
directories are depicted by folders, which may contain a number of files or 
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documents. Unlike physical folders, however, they may also contain folders, and so 
forth until the limit on regression determined by the maximum size of file names 
(normally a hard system-imposed limit) is reached. Again, the folder metaphor is an 
example of a metaphor that breaks down quickly. The view adopted in the QPf 
models presented in Chapter 5 is to claim that directories and disks, but not files, are 
containers. The container has advantages as a metaphor for directories in filing 
systems (though, as seen above they are less successful as an account of files), 
containers may be placed inside containers without the metaphor breaking. 
Containers have a capacity, so the user can know whether an attempt to move a file 
into a container will be successful. Unfortunately the capacity of a container can be 
hard to determine, or may not be fixed. Volumes, such as floppy and hard disks, 
have a capacity, namely the number of bytes available for the storage of data blocks. 
The capacity of a directory is not fixed, however, instead it is the result of the 
constraint equation shown in Figure 7.5. 
t 
potential free capacity of a directory = capacity of volume - ~ size_DJ _file(i) 
i .. l 
where t = the total number of files in the file system on the volume 
Figure 7.5 The potential capacity of a directory 
In many graphical user interfaces, if the user attempts to copy a file into a container 
which has insufficient capacity the system might allow the user to perform the 
actions that activate the copying process (clicking on the icon, moving the mouse 
until the pointer is over the destination folder's icon, then releasing the mouse 
button) but it will display an error message. Again, the physical world metaphor 
breaks down and the layers of description separating the model world from its 
underlying implementation, and the different processes at work in the model world 
and in the underlying implementation, as described in Chapter 5, become apparent to 
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the user. It is such system behaviour that underlies the claim that in direct 
manipulation interfaces, the user cannot make syntax errors in their dialogue 
structures, but they can make semantic errors. 
We are required to provide a means of interacting with the file system of a 
computing system to \vhich Medusa is intended to be a graphical user interface. T\vo 
options exist that fit the aims of the Medusa system and the notion of making visible 
those aspects of the underlying system necessary for understanding the system. One 
is the existing, popular, desktop, user interface, where opening a folder icon "reveals a 
window containing icons depicting the files contained in the directory that the folder 
denotes. Such a system supports the magical features needed to list potentially useful 
inf oImation about the files, their size, creation date, to list file names in al phabetical 
order so as to aid location of a file sought, and to make hidden files visible. The 
difficulties remain of accounting for such a solution within a basic physical \vorld 
metaphor, accounting for the mismatch between the representation and the 
underlying data structures, and deciding how the issue of positioning icons within 
the window should be managed, however. Such functionality reminds us of the 
original meaning of an icon as depicting a closed windo\v, and suggests that far from 
being physical objects in the electronic world, the folder is a window onto an 
application for managing files. 
As icons in some filing systems depict links, (entries in a data structure aSSOCiating 
text names with the actual file's location on the disk), opening a folder to reveal its 
contents is simply to read the file and list the entries in this data structure. Reading a 
file, the contents of which are links to files stored elsewhere in the file space, some 
of these files also contain a sequence of entries in a directory, is a task performed by 
a browser application such as Netscape Navigator. Thus attempts by some operating 
systems manufacturers to integrate browser applications more closely with the file 
management system are thus justified by the need to support file management tasks, 
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legal arguments not withstanding. One can see that as the directory file (that contains 
links to files in the file space) becomes more sophisticated in the way that links are 
rendered (using graphics and video fragments), and as the layout of the directory 
file's contents when rendered within a browser window becomes more flexible 
(perhaps user layout of links in the browser is allowed), a browser becomes 
indistinguishable from the folder graphical interface. Except that, in the case of the 
browser metaphor, fewer breakdowns between the user interface and the underlying 
data structures occur. 
Our first attempt at providing a user interface to a file management system then is a 
browser application run by opening a directory file. The design of suitable icons for 
these files remains to be determined, but these too can be accounted for using the 
notion of self-representation. The problem of file movement around the file space 
must also be addressed, the problems caused by the use of a physical world 
metaphor have been documented above, we postpone presentation of a solution to 
this problem until Section 7.2.7. 
7.2.6 The Computer-Computer Metaphor 
The use of a metaphor in the design of the first Medusa system that is wide in scope 
is made according to the idea of the computer being a metaphor for computing 
systems (Treglown and O'Shea, 1993). The notion of making the user aware of 
relevant aspects of the system necessary for understanding applies not only to file 
representations. Where information about the status of processor and memory usage, 
data structures common to applications such as input buffers, and devices connected 
to the workstation, is also required, it is provided on-screen. In (Treglown and 
O'Shea, 1993) it is proposed that a graphic such as that shown in Figure 7.6 appear 
on the root window. This may be examined using common interaction tasks to reveal 
the state of the device to explain its behaviour (for example, processor load and a list 
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of runnable processes), and the state of some parts of the system may be altered 
(current active process, destination printer, and so on). As this graphic does not 
allow the user to examine all the relevant parts of the system, as in Myer's (1988) 
Peridot visual programming system where it is necessary to be able to interrogate 
and alter the state of devices such as the mouse and pointer (attempting to taste one 
own's tongue is an analogy3 of the task to be performed in the model world), the 
decision to place the graphic in Figure 7.7 on the root \vindo\v is now adopted . 
... ,""'" . 
. , .. ,""'" ., 
." .. ,""'" .,' 
" .. ,""'" .v , .. ~~~~~~~~ ," 
Room 123 
Room 456 
Figure 7.6 The first design of device description in Medusa 
3 Attributed to the playwright and actor Ken Campbell in the Channel 4 television series 
"Brainspotting" . 
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Figure 7.7 The second design of device description in Medusa 
The graphic shown in Figure 7.7 allows the user to modify the presentation and 
behaviour of the Medusa system. Normally knowledge of preferences or control 
panel applications is required to modify the sorts of values that the Medusa system 
allows access to via the same interaction style as the rest of the system. 
7.2.7 Performing Tasks in Medusa 
While metaphor-based graphical user interfaces are termed direct manipulation, the 
conversation metaphor, whereby users are said to have a conversation with some 
unseen agent about a (normally unseen) task domain, also plays a part in interaction. 
While some variables can be directly manipulated, the issuing of commands to on-
screen objects by selecting commands from a menu bar common to many systems is 
based on an subject-object-verb syntax. The object of interest is made current, and 
the action to be performed on it is selected from a tool icon or menu bar. The idea of 
a current object introduces additional concepts that the user must be aware of if they 
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are to be able to conduct even basic interaction with a systenl. Phillips and Apperley 
(1991: 14) say that: 
"The Macintosh interface is based upon the desktop metaphor. The 
Finder manages objects hierarchically in the form of applications, 
documents, folders and disks on the desktop. 'Closed' objects, which 
are represented by icons can be selected (made current), and once 
current can be opened, moved, discarded, etc. The contents of 'open' 
objects are displayed in windows, which can be selected (made 
active), and moved, sized, scrolled, etc ... The interface is based on a 
single object-action model - that is, at any time there is a single 
current object or group of objects on which a specified action is 
carried out. " 
The study reported by Carroll and Mazur (1986), discussed in Chapter 4, found that 
even a task as basic as highlighting (making objects current) proved difficult for 
users. Analysis of the failings of many user interfaces that derive from the desktop 
metaphor has apparently found that the notion of the current application causes user 
problems. Where a number of overlapping open windows appear on-screen, each 
being employed by a separate application program, windows being obscured when a 
single window is made current reportedly causes users some confusion (Halfhilt 
1997). The problem of user input (from the mouse and keyboard) being directed by 
the window manager to application windows other than the one expected, the issue 
of focus, is already a well-known problem. 
Basic interaction tasks are sometimes described in terms of the input devices that can 
be used to support them, or in terms of virtual input devices, those that generate the 
types of input required. Phillips and Apperley (1991: 11) summarise basic 
interaction tasks, as shown in Table 7.1. 
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Equivalent 
Task User Action Virtual Device 
Position Indicate a position on the display Locator 
Orient Orient an entity in 2D or 3D space Locator 
Quantify Specify a value to quantify a measure Valuator 
Select Select from a set of alternatives Button, Pick 
Text Input text Keyboard 
Path Generate a path (series of positions) over time 
Table 7.1 Basic interaction tasks and virtual devices 
In their analysis of the Macintosh system, in particular the Finder, Phillips and 
Apperley find that all interaction tasks, including the complex dragging tasks that the 
user must understand and perform in order to create groups of icons, can be reduced 
to selection tasks. The generic get value task is an example that reduces to selection 
tasks, as shown in Figure 7.8. 
Direct * Repeated (Kleene star) 
Select value 
Get value 
Specify string" 
Indirect "Select value* 
Figure 7.8 Get-value sub-task (Phillips and Apperley, 1991; Page 15). 
Following Phillips and Apperley's analysis of interaction tasks. and following users' 
difficulties with the basic notion of current objects and windows, the approach to 
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interaction adopted in the first version of Medusa is an object-nlessage style of 
interaction. Instead of making the object on which an action should be performed 
current, termed existential reference by Lakoff (1987), deitic reference is preferred, 
\vhere reference is made to an object and commands are selected from a toolbar that 
appears alongside the object once it is clicked on. This tool bar is described in more 
detail below. 
A number of solutions to the problem of selecting commands to be applied to an on-
screen object exist. As described in Chapter 2, in ARK named buttons, tliat denote 
operations, are dropped onto the object to which the operation should be applied. 
This solution however still permits semantic errors to be made, where operations are 
applied, or messages sent, to objects that cannot respond in any meaningful way (the 
method is not part of the object's interface). In such a case the button faIls through 
the object, an action that is very magical and hard to account for. An interesting 
alternative is Muller's (1988) multi functional cursor. In the multifunctional cursor 
operations are loaded into slots in the cursor and applied to objects by traditional 
mouse button clicks, an unloaded cursor is shown in Figure 6.9. The muItifunctional 
cursor has drawbacks, however. For example, the number of operations that can be 
loaded into the cursor slots is limited to twice the number of physical mouse buttons 
available, neither are semantic errors prevented. In addition, while some appeal to 
stimUlus-response compatibility can be made in mapping cursor slots to actions, the 
icons in the slots must be interpreted in order to determine which actions will be 
performed. This task is made more difficult for the users of Muller's design by them 
having to employ the typical homonyms, abstract symbols, and puns found in UNIX 
icon sets, such icons being among the poorest scoring in icon recognition tests (for 
example, Rogers, 1986). Also of interest is the tool tray from which operations are 
loaded into slots in the multi functional cursor, this is a rectangular array of icons 
denoting the operations that can be loaded into the cursor. MuIler, however, does not 
address how the tool tray may be retained close to hand in multi-screen or 
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collaborative systems as the cursor migrates around a model world that may be 
larger than a single screen in size. 
Left-most mouse 
single click 
Left-most mouse button, 
single click 
Middle mouse button, 
double click 
Middle mouse button, 
Right-most mouse 
button, single click 
Right-most mouse 
button, double click 
Figure 7.9 An unloaded multifunction cursor for a 3-button mouse 
Most desktop metaphor systems, though not the Xerox Star, place a menu bar either 
at the top, bottom, or the side of the screen. The menu bar is not adopted in Medusa, 
it being required in systems that employ the active or current object notion, which 
Medusa does not All options are thus selected from the tool bar, shown in Figure 
7.10, a design that allows two-handed input (Bier et al., 1994) to be supported, if the 
user so wishes. Clicking on an object of interest causes a toolbar listing the 
operations that may be applied to the object to appear, from which an option may be 
selected. The list that appears in the toolbar depends on the affordances of the object 
and the operations that may be performed on instances of the class or category that 
the object belongs to. The list also depends on the application programs installed in 
the system that might be able to run using the object as data; and on the object's 
current state. In this way, semantic errors cannot arise as operations that are not 
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meaningful in the current system state are not offered to the user. The toolbar also 
overcomes the problem of having operations close at hand. The tool bar combined 
with the computer-computer metaphor, achieves much of the clustering of operations 
with their associated underlying computing functionality reported by Tullis (1985), 
but in a model world direct manipulation interface. The use of the object-message 
interaction style, and the use of micons and continual state feedback, combined \vith 
the use of the computer-computer metaphor for making the underlying system 
visible has similarities to, but was developed independently of, Maloney and Smith's 
(1995) Morphic system. 
run 
dele~~ 
" move to 
- duplicate 
about this oblect 
Figure 7.10 A sample toolbar 
7.2.8 Groups of Objects 
In order to reduce the time taken to perform simple tasks, a number of desktop-based 
user interfaces allow files to be grouped so that a single command may be issued to 
all files in the group at the same time. Making a number of icons current requires 
that the user performs a repeated <shift>+click action sequence, or drags a bounding 
box around the icons to be made current (lassos them). Phillips and Apperley (1991) 
show that the mouse-dragging action required to lasso icons also reduces to a 
selection task. To allo\v groups to be built, the Medusa toolbar provides Rdd to 
group and Remoue from group commands among others. Groups will be 
treated differently from individual files, and the toolbar will list only those 
182 
operations that can be applied to the group as a whole if the object clicked on is 
currently a member of a group. 
7.2.9 System Feedback 
After the user issues a command to any interactive system, according to Norman's 
(1984) model, they must first evaluate the system response in terms of their goals 
and then either issue commands that correct unexpected system responses, or they 
must issue further commands that take the user closer toward completion of their 
goals. Much of the motivation for the Medusa system is concerned with the need to 
address the fact that system feedback is often not immediate, and that the 
computation performed to complete a user-initiated action has an often perceivable 
temporal duration. As interactive systems are not implemented on infinitely fast 
hardware (Dix, 1987), the need to manage the flow of interaction in a system subject 
to delays, lags, and seemingly lengthy computation must be addressed. 
Buffers 
Where computation is lengthy, appropriate progress indication is required (Myers, 
1985). Like providing UNDO facilities, as will be discussed below, providing 
progress indication requires depicting seemingly intangible properties of the system 
such as the amount of computation performed, or the current state of an event queue. 
These attributes of the system have no corresponding concepts in the task domains 
that the systems described in Chapter 2 provide interfaces to. In the case of buffers, 
Dix (1991) provides a design solution in keeping with the ideas underlying Medusa. 
Dix's "munchman" buffer depicts keystrokes placed onto the event queue as a result 
of the user typing while the target application is too busy to process them. When the 
target application processes an event, the corresponding character is removed from 
the depiction of the buffer's contents. This on-screen object is not equal opportunity 
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(Runciman and Thimbleby, 1986) the user may only place items onto the buffer 
(including the delete character), the application is the only party that may remove 
items from the buffer. 
Progress Indication 
While user interfaces are event-driven systems, and the interface programmer must 
be concerned with giving semantics to events in terms of ho\v the display and 
underlying soft\vare changes, user interfaces and interaction with systems, -according 
to Dix and Abowd (1995) are also concerned with status. Unlike events, which for 
conceptual and mathematical convenience are assumed to be instantaneous, status 
describes aspects of an interface that have a constantly available value. Some events 
do not, or need not, change mappings between the status of the user interface and the 
status of the underlying software, some events, however, do and feedback is required 
as a status-status mapping is restored. 
In Medusa, such restorations of status-status mappings, and progress indication, are 
required if the user initiates file moving and copying operations. Copying, for 
example, implements semantics similar to the following (taken from Stevens, 1992: 
56): 
int main(void){ 
int n; 
} 
char buf[BUFSIZE]i 
while ( (n=read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, BUFFSIZE» > 0) 
if (write (STDOUT_FILENO, buf, n) 1= n) 
err sys ("write error"); 
if (n < 0) 
err_sys("read error"); 
exit(O)i 
A metaphor for the copying operation, based on the notion of visibility of relevant 
(otherwise hidden) system components, will therefore depict the buffer filling and 
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emptying. The effects on the file copied and the copy produced depend on depictions 
of the semantics of the read and write operating system calls that have yet to be fully 
resolved. The Medusa system's depiction of this semantics, it should be noted, 
differs from Dourish and Button's (1998) reflective account of the same operation. 
Reflection is described in more detail in Chapter 9. 
Mouse-ahead 
Typed characters may be placed in a buffer until the target application is able to 
process them, this being termed type-ahead. It is also possible for events generated 
by use of the mouse to be queued until they can be processed, this being termed 
mouse-ahead. Some treatments of mouse-ahead, for example by Dix (1991), limit 
the number of mouse events, in particular mouse clicks, to that required to complete 
a semantically meaningful subtask. If a larger event queue is maintained it is 
possible for semantic errors to occur once the queue is processed, events meaningful 
in a busy, frozen, model world are unlikely to be meaningful as objects are altered 
and move when events are eventually processed. Perez-Quinones and Sibert (1996) 
assume that direct manipulation interfaces must include a conversational component 
in dialogue, direct manipulation being a collaborative process between the user and 
the event processing system. If events cannot be processed in the current state then 
the user must be informed, so as to allow them to alter their behaviour if required. 
Perez-Quinones and Sibert's model has five "simulated states of understanding" 
(SSOU): ready, processing, reporting, busy-no-response, and busy-delayed-
response. These states are intended to reflect conversational behaviours in dialogues 
between people and in speech recognition systems. These states and transitions 
between them are shown in the Statechart-like system in Figure 7.11. In the internal 
loop, feedback denoting that the system is in the processing state can be omitted if 
processing can be completed in a short enough time that breakdowns in the system 
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behaviour do not occur. Transitions to busy states occur if processing will take, or is 
taking, some time. In the internal loop states are normally depicted by the 
conventional icon shape (pointer or hand), to denote busy states an alternative icon is 
required, Perez-Quinones and Sibert use a stop sign icon to denote busy-no-response 
and an hour glass icon to denote busy-delayed-response. In the Medusa system, 
because of the system architecture adopted, which is discussed below, we do not 
regard the system as a whole as being in a particular state, only that certain classes of 
object in the model world may be in a particular state. Thus a version of Perez-
Quinones and Sibert's SSOU model will be built into interaction with each ·on-screen 
object. Further \vork will examine alternative icon designs to denote busy states, 
while the hour glass is a reasonable metaphor for a busy-delayed-response state 
(although we can interrupt the task of boiling an egg, for example), the stop sign is a 
poorer metaphor for the state it denotes. 
7.2.10 Help 
Internal Loop 
Ready 
Processing 
Reporting 
Busy States 
Busy-no-
response 
Busy-delayed-
response 
Figure 7.11 SSOU feedback states 
(Perez-Quinones and Sibert, 1996: 318). 
The study of first-time users of the Macintosh, reported in Chapter 3, found that 
while on-line help facilities were used, the help they provided was limited and 
context-independent. It was proposed that help should, nevertheless, be provided and 
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should be object-based. When help about an on-screen object is requested, 
infonnation about the object, its current state, and the states it may enter by issuing 
of one of the currently applicable operations is provided. Help is an option available 
on the toolbar, its purpose is to give the user a semantics for commands applied to 
on-screen objects. Object-based help addresses the dialogue detennination problem, 
where options available to the user are detailed; but choice is simplified (Kirsh, 
1996). Help facilities are also used to detail the history of an object in order to 
provide infonnation which allows the user to uniquely identify the object pointed to 
by the icon link. Help assists the user where the icon's design alone does not meet 
this requirement, and it pennits the user to add whatever comments prove useful in 
aiding them and other users to detennine the data contained in the file. Filenames, as 
a result of the process by which they are developed, tend to be meaningful only to 
the user who named the object Medusa will also allow how the help system behaves 
to be modified, it being self-representing, the user should have access to, and the 
ability to modify, the help system. 
7.2.11 The File Manager 
Interaction with the underlying file system using the Medusa user interface has been 
partly detailed above. The depiction of directory listings was discussed, but the issue 
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of how files are moved around the file system was not detennined. The QPT-based 
analysis described in Chapter 5 showed that the processes that affect objects in the 
on-screen model world differ from those conjectured to affect objects in the 
underlying software. It was shown that tasks as seemingly simple as moving files by 
dragging them are subject to a considerable mismatch, the physical world metaphor 
cannot account for the behaviour of the system image. To make the process affecting 
the data structures apparent, and following the task analysis conducted by Phillips 
and Apperley (1991), moving a file around the file system requires that the user 
point to a file or group of files and select the Moue command from the tool bar. 
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The user must then specify a destination by pointing to a directory listings file, or 
\vithin its open \vindow. Following the structure of the QPT processes given in 
Chapter 5 and Appendix A, a path must exist between the volume on \vhich the 
source files are stored and the destination volume. The on-screen graphic shown in 
Figure 7.7 pennits the user to establish this path, or to check that a path is still in 
place. 
File deletion, at least in UNIX, is the process of removing a link from a directory 
entry listing file and freeing the list of blocks that the file uses for use by other, new, 
files. The data is not destroyed until the data blocks are reused. The Medusa system 
does not employ complex physical world metaphors such as the trashcan, or the 
black hole employed in some ARK simulations. Instead, deletion is just another 
option available on the tool bar of messages that can ,be sent to an object, in a way 
similar to dropping a physical delete button onto an ARK on-screen object removes 
the object from the model world. As directory entries are only links to files, the 
actual file persists until no more links to it exist. We address the possibility of 
undeleting files in Chapter 10. 
7.3 Implementing Medusa 
The first Medusa system has been described in some detail above, and while a 
usability analysis of the design is undertaken in the following chapter, a full 
appreciation of the pragmatics of interaction with a Medusa system \vould only be 
gained from a full implementation of the system. A secondary aim of the research 
programme begun and reported in this thesis is to understand more fully the nature 
and limitations of direct manipulation. We also seek to apply formal methods and 
models during the development of user interface features so that the intended 
behaviour of these features is known, verifiable and hopefully guaranteed. An 
implementation of version one of the Medusa system was begun, as was ongoing 
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work in the specification and refinement of interactive systems based on an object-
oriented formal notation. In this section, we describe below the work undertaken in 
this area as applied to the design and implementation of a Medusa system. 
7.3.1 Use of the Agent Notation and Language 
A trend in current user interface design views the system as being made up of a 
number of small, possibly interacting, modules. Approaches that follow this trend 
include PAC (Program, Abstraction, and Control) agents (Coutaz., 1987), and the 
MVC (Model, View, Control) paradigm of the Smalltalk-80 programming 
environment. The model adopted in the design of the Medusa systems is the agent 
model and notation (Abowd. 1990). The agent model views systems and their user 
interfaces as being composed of a number of inter-connected, communicating 
components. These components, termed agents, in turn, consist of three parts 
(depicted in Figure 7.12). These parts are a persistent internal state which changes as 
the internal operations are invoked as the agent receives event messages from other 
agents; a communication part that lists the one-way communication channels that 
connect agents together and names the event messages that may be sent or received 
along each channel~ and an external behaviour part that defines the sequences of 
event messages that the agent is prepared to engage in. This last part supports the 
interaction design, the interleaving of user input and system output so that tasks are 
supported by the system and the behaviour of the system is reasonable and 
comprehensible to the user. The external behaviour component also distinguishes the 
agent model from pure object-oriented models in which sequences of method calls 
are defined by the arrangement of objects into interconnected layers corresponding 
to the lexical, syntactical and semantic layers of a linguistic approach to user 
interface management (for example, Sibert, Hurley, and Bleser, 1986). 
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events 
Figure 7.12 An agent 
7.3.2 System Architecture 
The first version of the Medusa system, the one that has received most design effort, 
adopts the UMA architecture introduced by Took (1990a, 1990b) which is shown in 
Figure 7.13. Took (1990a), in addition to providing the architecture adopted, 
provides arguments as to why a user interface architecture should be adopted at all in 
preference to existing user interface services such as toolkits and user interface 
management systems. The most compelling arguments for adopting a user interface 
architecture, in terms of implementations of Medusa, are the drawbacks, paraphrased 
from (Took, 1990a) , listed in Table 7.2. In the UMA architecture, an interactive 
system is composed of three parts, the Application cOlnpOnent contains the 
functionality of the system and receives commands from the User cOlnpOnent and 
may send commands to the display Medium. The User component receives events 
generated by the user via input devices such as the mouse and keyboard and either 
forwards them to the Application or interprets them as commands to be issued 
directly to the display Medium. The display Medium, is a passive component, it 
serves only to maintain a display model, or implement a display operating system, 
which is altered by the component acting on commands received from the User and 
Application components, and rendering the display model to produce the screen 
contents. Adoption of a Medium also does not rule out future consideration of a 
collaborative version of the Medusa system, various present functions allow support 
for multiple displays, the implementation details, and appropriate screen sharing 
approaches (for example switchable workspaces, rooms, or Kansas-like 
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environments) have yet to be fully explored, however. The UMA architecture is 
depicted in Figure 7.13. 
Reasons for rejecting window managers 
• They only provide an incomplete data abstraction, 
• Applications are given no abstraction for the contents of windows. 
• All that is provided by a window manager is a set of low-level graphics 
primitives, or possibly also a confusing hierarchy of panes, panels and sub-
windows. 
Reasons for rejecting user interface management systems 
• The need to support interleaved dialogues, spatially-multiplexed tasks over 
different windows and applications, which are hard to model syntactically. 
• Semantic feedback, where engagement between on-screen objects and 
underlying semantic objects is expected, is hard to support if dialogue 
management is separated into a distinct component. 
• Dialogue abstraction is more suited to procedural applications, but not where 
the user has freedom of action. 
Reasons for rejecting user interface toolkits 
• Design by modification, new classes of object are hard to create, it is easier to 
modify an existing class. Designs are limited by the quality of the set of basic 
components. 
• Poor separation and high semantic seepage, no clear dividing line between 
application code and interface code. 
• Objects handle their own interaction, optimal updates and screen 
synchronisations require additional global superstructures. 
Table 7.2 Drawbacks of user interface services and reasons for adopting a user 
interface architecture. 
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Figure 7.13 The UMA user interface architecture 
The UMA architecture introduces the notion of surface interaction. Where events 
do not need to involve the Application they are handled by the surface, and so the 
display contents can be altered without semantic seepage, and without the typical 
program structure where code for the user interface is merged with code for 
managing the Application functionality. At the same time, the UMA architecture can 
support semantic feedback where the application semantics may need to directly 
alter the display contents without having to consult or inform intennediate dialogue 
manager components as is often found in user interface architectures that adopt a 
linguistic approach to dialogue management. The UMA architecture is captured by 
the following three process expressions given in the notation of Communicating 
Sequential Processes (CSP) which is employed in Abowd's (1990) agent model to 
define the external behaviour component of each agent. 
U = i:I -+ user!pick(i) -+ o:REPLY --. (user!c:COM -+ r:REPLY --. U 0 
report!(i,o) -+ (i', 0') -+ user!c:COM -+ r:REPLY -+ U) 
M = user?c:COM -+ r:REPLY -+ M I app?c:COM -+ r:REPLY -+ M 
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A = report?(i,o) - J!X· (app!c:COM - r:REPLY - X 0 (i',o') - A) 
I app!c:COM - r:REPLY - A 
Theo·concepts of surface interaction, and of distinguishing surface interaction from 
deep interaction, where events do require processing by the application, provide a 
separation of software components that allows clearer discussion of the components 
and their behaviour that make up some of the domains that our interface metaphors 
map between. The notions of surface and deep interaction also provide an alternative 
view to that adopted in (Dourish and Button, 1998) in identifying points of 
breakdown and failures of scope in metaphorical mappings in direct manipulation 
tasks, this shall be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
7.3.3 The Application 
The application component of the system described in this thesis, and in many of the 
systems described in Chapter 2, is a simple file manager. The file manager provides 
mechanisms for simple file maintenance, and provides functions for deleting and 
moving files and creating new directories within the file space. The file manager can 
be described by a single agent. The persistent state maintained and altered by the 
agent describes the graph structure of files and directories within the file store. This 
agent is based on a completion of the partial description of a file store agent given in 
Abowd (1991). This agent is, in turn, based on the formal specification of the UNIX 
filing system given by Morgan and Sufrin (1984) and the object~oriented UNIX 
filing system specification provided by Meira et al. (1994). The Medusa system is 
not, however, meant to be a direct manipulation interface to the UNIX file system, 
the usability failings of which have long been documented (Nonnan, 1981), and to 
which direct manipulation interfaces have already been constructed, for example by 
Borg (1990) and by Lundell and Anderson (1995). The functionality of the Common 
Desktop Environment front panel in Lundell and Anderson's design is subsumed by 
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the computer-computer metaphor. Medusa prototypes were, though, planned to run 
with the UNIX operating system and hence the UNIX filing system must be assumed 
in a specification at the level of detail captured by the Agent notation. The file 
manager agent, as implemented, merely provides an interface between the file 
maintenance functions invoked by user actions and the UNIX system, and is, as a 
result, a very small part of the whole system. The temporal behaviour of the file 
system agent is considered to be beyond the control of the Medusa system, as a 
result no temporal information is provided in the definition of the external behaviour 
component of the agent. Any user interface to the file manager is responsible for 
representing in a way meaningful to the user and overcoming these delays, where 
possible. 
7.3.4 A Partial Implementation 
An implementation of the Medusa system version one was begun, but remains 
incomplete. Source code is implemented in C and c++ written for the SunOS 
version 51Solaris 2.3 dialect of the UNIX operating system running on a Sun 
SPARCStation. To speed the implementation, the WIMP user intenace component 
of the system was to be implemented using the XView version 2.3 widget set built 
upon the X windows system release number 5. 
The file manager application component of the system has been implemented as a 
single class, which, \vith its associated methods, comprises approximately 200 lines 
of c++. The class methods reflect the operations penormed to alter an agent's state 
in response to receiving a message from agents that make up the user interface 
component. The application component makes up such a small percentage of the 
system code by making considerable use of high-level UNIX system calls. 
Implementation in a single class reflects that only a single agent is sufficient to 
specify the Application component. Much of the agent's state-changing operations 
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were derived from the specifications given by Morgan and Sufrin (1984), therefore 
the Application component is said to be a design specification, as it was known 
beforehand that a UNIX platform would be the target for a prototype 
implementation. 
In developing the graphical user interface, a far harder task was confronted. Bass and 
Coutaz (1991) discover, while attempting to refine a system specified using PAC 
agents (Coutaz, 1987) to the C language library interface (Xt) to the X window 
system, that refinement can only be progressed a certain numbe(of steps before the 
interaction style and code structure imposed by the window toolkit employed 
restricts the subsequent design choices that can be made. This problem was 
encountered in the partial development of a Medusa system, and in other 
applications of Abowd's agents in system design and development (Treglown, 1998). 
Principled and eventually, it is planned, automated methods for converting an agent-
based specification into code are still being developed, and were in a greater state of 
infancy when an implementation of Medusa was begun. 
Approximately 9,000 lines of code of an implementation of the Medusa version one 
user interface have been developed. This code serves a number of purposes, firstly to 
provide C++ with an object class which the language, unlike truly object-oriented 
languages such as Smalltalk-80 and Java, lacks. The object class is the most abstract 
and highest class in the hierarchy onto which the Medusa on-screen object ontology 
shown in Figure 7.1 is built. The code also begins to implement the UMA 
architecture on the target system. The code, however, was developed mostly to 
develop heuristics that would guide the development of semi-formal refinement 
rules, and eventually type-checking and compilation tools, to be used to help 
automate the process of generating code from an agent-based specification of the 
Medusa system. The code developed was also used to make clear the difficulties of 
attempting to implement on-screen objects that are required to exhibit behaviour that 
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is not already captured by the widgets provided by existing programming languages 
and user interface management systems. In addition, we seek to develop heuristics 
for converting specified agent behaviour into the interaction structure imposed by 
widgets provided by existing window systems. Simplifying the process of 
programming the external ( observable) behaviour of on-screen objects and \vidgets, 
and making it possible to easily modify this external behaviour is a problem that has 
yet to be solved sufficiently for a satisfactory and complete implementation of the 
Medusa system to be undertaken. As several man-years' \vorth of effort was invested 
in the design of the Xerox Star's icons alone (Bewley et aI., 1983), and as the Apple 
Lisa is said to be the result of 200 man-years of development effort, it is no surprise 
that a complete implementation of Medusa is not available. 
7.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter the design rationale of a new user interface design entitled Medusa 
was described and the criteria and requirements of user interfaces for novices that it 
is intended to meet were presented. While an implementation of this interface \vas 
begun, it remains unfinished and hence full usability testing cannot be undertaken. In 
the following chapter, we apply usability evaluation and inspection methods that 
may be employed even when a working prototype is not available and comment on 
whether the Medusa system meets the requirements placed upon it and overcomes 
the difficulties of existing metaphor-based systems. 
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Chapter 8 
A Critique of the Medusa System Design 
"After we gazed up at the glorious stained-glass windows and exquisite statuary, she 
led me inside the sanctuary and showed me the ornate carvings on the chairs where 
the choir customarily sat. At the bottom of one seat was a carving of a dinner scene. 
My friend told me to stick my hand underneath and feel the hidden surface. 
Incredibly, the craftsmen who had designed this furniture had actually carved the 
feet oJ the Jestive celebrants under the chairs, even though no one would ever see 
their loving artistry. They did it Jor the greater glory of God, because they wanted 
things exactly right. They wanted to make sure that their work was absolutely 
flawless. 
This briefly reminded me oJ the decision by the producers oJ Cannonball Run II to 
include a cameo appearance by Don Knotts in a film that already showcased Dom 
DeLuise, Ricardo Montalban, and Jamie Farr, but I quickly realised that this was an 
inappropriate analogy, and let it go." 
- Joe Queenan (1998) America, Picador. 
8.1 Introduction 
The Medusa system design presented in previous chapters is designed to not be 
subject to many of the failings of existing metaphor-based systems. In order to test 
this claim, some determination of the usability of the system design must be 
undertaken. Techniques for examining the usability of a system are classed either as 
usability evaluation techniques or usability inspection techniques. Usability 
evaluation techniques, such as traditional experiments, analysis of system use 
patterns, questionnaires and interviews, and error rate analysis (Howard arid Murray, 
1987) all rely on the system being implemented in an executable form, even if just a 
prototype. As no working prototype of the system exists, conventional usability 
testing and laboratory-based evaluation methods cannot be employed to judge the 
usability of the first Medusa system design. 
Usability inspection methods, surveyed in Nielsen and Mack (1994), are intended to 
serve as "low cost" alternatives to usability evaluation methods. Inspection methods 
can often be perfonned by evaluators alone, without the need for involving subjects 
who represent the user population that the system is intended for. Inspection methods 
also tend not to require a full implementation of the system, they can be performed 
on specifications and storyboards; and they can often be perfonned by soft\vare 
engineers who may not be skilled in user interface design. Inspection methods, 
however, can only find a large minority of the usability faults that laboratory testing 
can reveal (Desurvive, Kondziela and Atwood, 1992). With no implementation of 
Medusa available to test, we must employ a suitable inspection method. Below we 
describe and employ a usability inspection method tenned the cognitive walkthrough 
method in order to examine the usability of the first version of the Medusa system. 
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8.2 The Cognitive Walkthrough 
8.2.1 Interaction and The Cognitive Walkthrough 
The cognitive walkthrough is a usability inspection method derived from Poison and 
Lewis's (1990) CE+ model of learning by exploration. While differing in some 
aspects, this model can be illustrated with reference to Norman's (1984) seven-stage 
cycle of interaction, which is shown in Figure 8.1. In CE+, users' goal structures are 
similar to the hierarchical structures of GOMS. Goals are represented by 
propositions and are linked to other goals, background knowledge (also represented 
as propositions), propositions that represent objects seen in the environment and to 
propositions that denote actions (PoIson, Lewis, Rieman and Wharton, 1992). 
Activation flows from the topmost goal to representations of actions, when an action 
is sufficiently activated, it is executed. New propositions are created as the 
environment changes in response to the action performed. 
Intention 
to act 
~ 
Sequence 
of actions 
+ 
Execution 
of the action 
Evaluation of 
interpretations 
t 
Interpreting the 
perception 
t 
Perceiving the 
state Of the world 
The World 
Figure 8.1 Norman's Seven-Stage Model of Interaction 
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In order for an action to be executed, a chain of associative connections must exist 
between a goal and an action. "Label following" is onc such way in \vhich this chain 
can exist. In this strategy, used commonly by na"ive users, an action, such as pressing 
a button (using the example given in Poison, Lewis, Rieman and Wharton, 1992), is 
chosen because the button is labelled in such a way that it shares terms ,vith a 
currently active user goal. The cognitive walkthrough method seeks to identify 
points in an interface's design where the chain of associative connections is broken. 
These points include the label not sharing terms with the active user goal; the link 
between the label and the button to be pressed being unclear; buttons not being 
recognisable as buttons; and there being more than one label visible associated with 
the current user goal. 
The first Medusa system is designed to be used by novices, since the cognitive 
walkthrough method \vas designed as a tool to explore the usability of such systems, 
we are justified in using it. And while we would wish to conduct empirical testing 
(this is discussed further in the concluding chapter), the cognitive walkthrough 
method has been favourably compared with empirical testing and was judged likely 
to provide useful data as to the usability of Medusa (Karat, Campbell and Fiegel, 
1992). The cognitive walkthrough method did not compare favourably with another 
inspection method, heuristic evaluation in an evaluation of HP-VUE, a user interface 
to an operating system similar to Medusa, conducted by Jeffries, Miller, Wharton 
and Uyeda (1991). Their results, however, highlighted a known failing of heuristic 
evaluation (Nielsen, 1993), that the number of usability faults discovered by one 
evaluator will be very small. A larger number of usability faults will be found \vith 
three or more evaluators (five or six evaluators has been found to be the optimal 
number, more and the costs outweigh the additional usability problems found). With 
a single evaluator, the cognitive walkthrough method will find a similar number of 
faults to heuristic evaluation, perhaps even morc. 
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May (1993) complains that the cognitive walkthrough method can be regarded as a 
form of guidelines evaluation, and as such will compare badly with methods that 
employ larger numbers of guidelines, although this was not observed in the work 
undertaken by leffries et al. (1991). Instead, we are interested in exploiting a feature 
of the cognitive walkthrough that May also regards as a failing, the emphasis on 
formal structure and the "decomposition of a task sequence to emphasise the points 
of the design that should be checked." (May, 1993: 11). We are concerned, as will be 
explored further below, with aspects of the microstructure of certain human-
computer dialogue structures, the cognitive walkthrough is better suited to this 
analysis than other inspection methods. This concentration on the microstructure of 
interaction, as others have noted, risks high-level problems going unrecognised. We 
repeatedly acknowledge, however, that the usability of the Medusa system will not 
be known in considerable detail until a prototype can be developed and 
representative users involved in its testing. The cognitive walkthrough method, 
though, especially when more fully integrated with Norman's seven-stage model (it 
was simply used as an explanatory device above), offers a considerable advantage 
over other inspection methods in permitting greater analysis and discussion of the 
cognitive distances (Hutchins, Hollan and Norman, 1986) between intention and 
action, and feedback and users goals, that indicate the amount of human information 
processing involved in direct manipulation interaction (Rizzo, Marchigiani and 
Andreadis, 1997). 
8.2.2 Conducting the Walkthrough Method 
The cognitive walkthrough method comprises two phases of activity; a preparation 
phase, which is followed by the walkthrough itself. In the first phase, a set of task 
scenarios (which must be supported by the system under investigation) is created. 
For each task devised, an action sequence is created, this is a list of actions which, if 
201 
performed by users would result in the task being successfully carried out. Also for 
each task scenario, assumptions about the users' abilities and initial goals must be 
stated. For the second phase, the \valkthrough itself, for each of the actions in the 
action sequence defined for each task scenario, a number of questionnaire forms, 
provided in PoIson, Lewis, Rieman, and Wharton (1992) must be completed. The 
forms contain questions about the availability of operations and the observability and 
relevance of feedback in the display. In addition, the forms require the evaluator to 
describe how the current set of users' goals is revised as new goals are created and 
achieved as either the task is successfully performed, or in response to usability 
problems discovered. If the questions in the forms cannot be answered successfully, 
then a likely usability failing of the system will have been identified. Other sets of 
walkthrough questions have been provided, for example in (Wharton, Reiman, Lewis 
and Poison, 1994) and (John and Packer, 1995), but these articles seek to provide a 
more usable version of the method for those evaluators who are not necessarily 
skilled in He!. The set of questions given by Poison, Lewis, Rieman, and Wharton 
(1992) obtain the most information from a system, and so this set was employed. 
The cognitive walkthrough method was developed for evaluating the usability of 
"walk up and use" systems such as automated teller machines and information 
booths where the number of operations available at one time is limited, as are users' 
experience and prior knowledge of the tasks supported by the system. The 
walkthrough method has since, though, been shown to be of use in evaluating more 
complex graphical user interfaces, and has been shown to be capable of being 
learned without great difficulty by software designers who are not specifically 
trained in HeI (John and Packer, 1995). The greatest problem with applying the 
cognitive walkthrough method to systems such as Medusa, is the difficulty of only 
being able to step through one of possibly many action sequences that permit the 
task to be carried out. Where a choice of actions is accepted by the dialogue 
component of a system, and both actions make progress in the performance of the 
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task, only one of the available choices may be considered in detail. Solutions to this 
problem, and modifications to the cognitive walkthrough method which would 
permit choices of actions to be considered in detail will not be considered further 
here. 
8.3 A Cognitive Walkthrough of the Medusa System 
8.3.1 Preparation 
The first phase of the cognitive walkthrough method is the preparation phase. This 
phase is itself composed of a number of tasks that the system evaluator must 
conduct. The first task for the evaluator, as mentioned above, is to choose the tasks 
. to be analysed. These tasks must be resemble those that would be performed 
regularly using the final system, and must be tasks that are sufficiently supported by 
the system's. Normally a cognitive walkthrough does not consider tasks that must be 
performed using other applications in addition to the one under investigation. 
The second task to be performed during the first phase of the walkthrough is to 
provide a task description. This description is normally at a high level of abstraction, 
detailing the major task to be performed and the overall change in the system's state 
to be brought about by performance of the task. The third task is to determine the 
correct sequence of actions that the user must perform for each of the tasks 
employed to evaluate the system. Where a number of task sequences may be judged 
"correct" in that the task will be said to have been peIformed after the last action has 
been peIformed, careful choices as to the action sequence considered are required. It 
can be expected that the actions performed by users will not be optimal and error-
free, so a realistic action sequence must be listed. 
203 
The next task for the evaluator is to identify the intended user population of the final 
system. This is a task that is deliberately ignored in this case. Where the size of the 
intended user population of the system grows, it bccomes impossible to make all but 
very general statements about the visual capabilities, physical impainnents, 
education levels, cultural background and computing experience of the users. We 
therefore make no assumptions about potential users of the Medusa systems, apart 
from general population trends, and that they can be expected to have an 
understanding of cultures in Western industrialised societies, and can read the 
display contents and use a mouse without difficulty. 
The final task to be completed by the system evaluator during the preparation phase 
is to describe the user's initial goals. That is, the system state and the state of the 
wider task domain that they wish to bring about by perf onning the task. No 
consideration is made of the user's wider aspirations, attitudes towards \\'ork and 
technology, or the basic goals they are assumed to hold in common with all 
autonomous systems. 
8.3.2 Performing the Cognitive Walkthrough 
Once the preparation phase has been completed, the \valkthrough itself can be 
performed. The walkthrough is a repeated cycle of activity where for each action in 
the action sequence constructed during the preparation phase, the individual(s) 
conducting the walkthrough are required to complete the forms and answer the 
questions provided by PoIson et al. (1992) for each action. These forms are 
reproduced in Appendix B. The questions that system evaluators must answer ask 
whether each "correct" action may be successfully planned and performed, whether 
the resulting system feedback, if any, is interpreted appropriately and useful way by 
the user, and consider \vhether progress towards completion of the task is seen to be 
being made. 
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8.3.3 Task 1 . Running an Application 
The first task considered, for which a walkthrough is conducted is runmng an 
application program using the Medusa system. The Medusa system retains from 
other model world-based systems the categorisation of files into application 
programs and data files. In this task, the user wishes to run an application program 
without making use of any particular data file. It is assumed that the icon denoting 
the application is visible on-screen and has been located and recognised by the user. 
This first task is deliberately simplified in order to demonstrate the use of the 
cognitive walkthrough method. The correct action sequence for this task is given 
below: 
1. Move pointer to application icon. [Storyboarded in Figure 8.2] 
2. Press mouse button. [Figure 8.3] 
3. Move pointer over Run application option in tool bar menu. [Figure 8.4] 
4. Release mouse button. 
Figure 8.2 Moving the pointer over an icon 
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Figure 8.3 Revealing the tool bar for a file 
Figure 8.4 Moving the pointer over the "Run Application" tool bar option 
The resulting goal structure arising from conducting the \valkthrough is shown in 
Table 8.1 where the notation employed in Poison et al. (1992) is used. The 
walkthrough for the first task was completed in approximately two and half hours 
, 
written notes were taken and a verbal protocol of the author conducting the 
walkthrough was recorded on audio tape to allow the contemporaneous notes to be 
clarified and confirmed later if necessary. Protocol analysis of the recording was not 
required as the action sequence for the task is know and prescribed by the cognitive 
walkthrough method. 
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Run application 
Move pointer over application icon 
and-then Run indicated application 
and-then 
and-then 
Press mouse button 
Move pointer over run option 
Release mouse button 
Table 8.1 Goal structure for first walkthrough task . 
8.3.4 Task 2 - Moving a File 
The second task considered is the movement of files from one location to another in 
the Medusa file space. File spaces are abstractions over the arrangement of bytes of 
information stored on physical storage devices. In addition to the abstractions 
employed by the operating system, the location of files gives them an additional 
meaning in addition to their contents. The location of a file in the file space can 
denote its meaning in the user's working history, their past projects, their on-going 
work, and the resources they are employing in their immediate tasks. The task for 
which a walkthrough is conducted is the movement of a single file from one 
directory to another. The correct action sequence for this task is listed below: 
1. Move pointer over icon denoting file to be moved. 
2. Click mouse button. 
3. Move pointer over Moue to ... option on tool bar. [Figure 8.5] 
4. Click mouse button. 
5. Move pointer to icon denoting the intended destination container or window view 
onto a directory listing file. [Figure 8.6] 
6. Click mouse button. 
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Figure 8.5 Selecting the "Move to" tool bar option 
Figure 8.6 Indicating the destination container when moving a file 
For this task and the next one considered, we alter the basic level of interaction to 
use the cognitive \valkthrough to determine whether the structure of basic selection 
tasks that make up interaction with the Medusa system should be performed by the 
"press mouse button -. move pointer over option -. release mouse button" action 
sequence found in the Apple Macintosh desktop and environments for programming 
in Small talk-80, or by the "click mouse button -. move pointer over option -+ click 
mouse button" sequence found in Microsoft Windows and some X Windows 
tool ki ts. The goal structure eventually constructed for this task, defined using the 
notation of PoIson et al. (1992) is shown below in Table 8.2. 
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Move file of interest to intended location 
make tool bar visible 
option 
and-then 
and-then 
and-then 
move pointer to icon 
click mouse button 
select option from tool bar 
and-then 
specify destination 
and-then 
move pointer to Moue to .. 
click mouse button 
move pointer to destination 
click mouse button 
Table 8.2 Goal structure for second walkthrough task. 
The walkthrough for this task was completed in two hours, hand-written notes were 
taken during the walkthrough and a verbal protocol was recorded onto audio tape. 
8.3.5 Task 3 - Adding a Method to the Toolbar 
As described in Chapters 6 and 7, commands are directed towards on-screen objects 
via the tool bar. The options available on the tool bar at any point in time are 
determined by the category of object towards which the command is issued, the 
object'S current state, and the options selected by the user to be present on the tool bar 
in certain situations. The Medusa system, through the on-screen display described as 
being part of the computer-computer metaphor, allows the user to modify the 
behaviour of the tool bar. This should be contrasted with other menu-based systems 
where menu options can be used during interaction, but the user has no meta-
reference to menu options themselves, and is unable to modify them. The third task 
we consider is the addition of a previously unavailable option to the tool bar. This 
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option ,viII only appear on the tool bar when appropriate when interaction ,vith the 
tool bar, as opposed to the "meta-toolbar" is resumed. The action sequence for this 
task is given below: 
1. Move the pointer over the "meta-toolbar" in the on-screen computer-computer 
display. [Figure 8.7] 
2. Press mouse button. 
3. Move pointer to Rdd command option in the tool bar. [Figure 8.8] 
4. Click mouse button. 
5. Move pointer over Edit using leMt Tool option. [Figure 8.9] 
6. Click mouse button. 
Figure 8.7 Moving the pointer over the meta-toolbar 
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Figure 8.8 Selecting the" Add Command" tool bar option 
Figure 8.9 Selecting the "Edit using Text Tool" hierarchical tool bar option 
As with previous tasks, a goal structure for the task was constructed, experience 
gathered from conducting the second walkthrough allowed a structure that made 
greater use of hierarchy based around the smaller selection tasks that make up the 
larger task to be constructed. The goal structure constructed in the PoIson et al. 
(1992) notation is shown in Table 8.3. 
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Add option to tool bar 
and-then 
Command .• 
TeMt Tool option 
make toolbar visible (direct messages to meta-toolbar) 
move pointer to mcta-toolbar 
and-then 
add option to tool bar 
and-then 
and-then 
and-then 
click mouse button 
move pointer to Add 
click mouse button 
move pointer to Edit using-
click mouse button 
Table 8.3 Goal structure for third walkthrough task. 
8.4 Design Flaws in the Medusa System Version One 
While intended to overcome the usability difficulties of existing metaphor-based 
systems, the cognitive walkthroughs conducted on the first design of the Medusa 
system reveal that this system too suffers from some usability failings. Some of these 
failings reveal an interesting shortcoming of the principle of visibility underlying the 
system design, and reveal that even the notion we have described as letting the 
computer act as a metaphor for the target computing system may be subject to 
breakdown, and a failure in its scope. 
8.4.1 Basic Interaction 
Like other WIMP systems, the Medusa system assumes that the large part of 
interaction with the system will be accomplished by using an input device capable of 
generating location and selection information. A location, in the fonn of two-
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dimensional co-ordinates, can be generated by an input device such as a mouse or 
trackball, in the case of the Medusa version one system, the choice of devices is of 
no concern, only the design space (Macinlay, Card, and Robertson, 1990) is relevant. 
Selections are made using a single switch or button; in Medusa version one, most 
tasks are selection tasks, and no more complex form of input is required. 
Interaction with many objects in the Medusa model world is based on an object-
message notion, on-screen objects change their state in response to messages (often 
in the form of options on the tool bar) being sent to the object of interest. As 
explained in Chapter 7, the metaphor of highlighting is not adopted in the Medusa 
system due to the problems that it causes users. Instead clicking on an object is 
interpreted as a cue to present the tool bar listing the commands or messages that may 
be issued to that object in its current state. This mechanism permits the distinction 
between tracking and naming objects to be exploited within Medusa, the recognition 
that one need not identify an object in order to be aware of its presence or type in 
order to perform some tasks upon it (Smith, 1996). Medusa allows this distinction to 
be employed within the model world as it can in the real world. In order to rely on 
the association in the user's mind that the toolbar that appears refers to the object that 
the pointer was over when the mouse button was clicked, two explanations can be 
given. The first is a transfer of the notion of the current object (similar to the notion 
of focus, the client application to which subsequent events should be directed) by 
those users that understand the concept from their experience of using other window-
based systems. The second exploits the phenomenon, claimed by Jeannerod (1997) 
to have been first documented by Aristotle, that events arising from the same region 
of space in the visual field apply to the same object. 
This approach to interaction differs from interaction with the options listed on the 
toolbar and its associated menus. On the toolbar, an option becomes highlighted 
when the pointer's hots pot is over it. Two reasons are proposed for this difference. 
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One reason is pragmatic, deriving from a need to be aware of the applicability of 
Fitts' Law in HeI, the target of a toolbar option is small, as is the hots pot (the active 
region of the pointer, the location of which is taken to be the source of a mouse 
event), highlighting an option allows the user to confirm that the intended target of a 
movement of the pointer has actually been reached. The second reason is that we 
claim that the user selects tool bar options whereas objects in the model \vorld are not 
selected, there is no notion of a current object, only one which is the object to \vhich 
a message is sent. The first Medusa system thus employs an objecl-lnessage 
interaction style, rather than choosing between SVO, SOY or VSO· structures 
(Subject-Verb-Object, Subject-Object-Verb, and Verb-Subject-Object respectively) 
that categorise languages (Pinker, 1994), including direct manipulation user interface 
dialogue structures, thus removing the need to be aware of the culture into which the 
system is to be introduced. By avoiding the conversation paradigm, it is possible to 
consider further the continuum of model worlds from two dimensional model \\'orlds 
to augmented and virtual realities, this will be explored further in Chapter 9. Users 
must, however, learn the basic action sequences that make up selection tasks in 
Medusa. These action sequences may differ from the low-level motor sequences that 
users have mastered when using other systems, although they are also easily 
described using the dialogue modelling approach of Buxton (1990). 
One question, as mentioned above, that it was hoped that the walkthroughs would 
answer was which dialogue structure making up selection tasks in Medusa should be 
chosen. It would appear that neither choice makes much difference to the usability of 
these very basic tasks. The only problems that require further designer effort are 
those that arise when users familiar with one approach transfer the motor sequence to 
a system that uses the alternative approach. An approach to overcome this problem, 
one adopted by the Solaris desktop environment, is to support both alternatives 
within the state machine for processing mouse-generated events wherever possible. 
Different routes may therefore be taken to reach the same final (accepting) state of 
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the dialogue's state machine that is interpreted as a tool bar option selection task 
having been performed. 
8.4.2 Understanding the Computer-Computer Metaphor 
The cognitive walkthroughs revealed few usability problems that anse from 
interaction with the on-screen components whose design is motivated by the notion 
of the computer-computer metaphor. The problems that were revealed are ones of 
inelegance motivated by the requirements of consistency and visibility. The addition 
of methods to, or deletion of methods from, the tool bar in the third walkthrough 
requires that the user select methods from a complete list of all the methods to 
objects of all categories that may be encountered within the system. This arises 
because the "meta-object" in the computer-computer on-screen display is of no 
particular category (in the Medusa ontology it is simply an "object"), thus the list of 
methods from which selections can be made cannot be restricted to those applicable 
to a particular object category. While it might be possible to have the user select an 
object's category and then modify the tool bar, such a solution would require the task 
to be performed within a dialogue box. In this solution the object's category could be 
selected, and a choice from the subsequent list of associated methods made. The use 
of dialogue boxes, however, requires that sub-dialogues that cannot be interrupted be 
implemented. The user will not be able to complete other tasks or respond to urgent 
events or alarms until the task supported by the dialogue box has been satisfactorily 
completed. It is possible to refer to environments such as ARKola to show the 
advantages of the approach adopted there and also here in Medusa. 
8.4.3 Directly Manipulating the Intangible 
The first version of the Medusa system seeks to provide user interface components 
that represent important aspects of the underlying functionality sufficient for a more 
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complete understanding of the system to be obtained than can be obtained from other 
metaphors in the depiction of the model world. The results of the cognitive 
walkthroughs, however, suggest points \vhere even the scope of letting the computer 
act as a metaphor for the underlying computer system is limited, and where tasks are 
not easily supported by the Medusa user interface design. These points of breakdown 
arise from the need to provide on-screen representations of data structures that are 
not provided as part of the underlying operating system, but which are part of the 
interface itself. These representations depict data structures that do not describe a 
system state, but instead they describe the user's interaction \vith the system, often 
referring to past events, not the current state and states which might be achieved in 
the future. 
One problem arises from the basic means of interaction with the system. A task 
supported by many existing window-based systems is the use of a double click of the 
mouse button. The double click usually performs the "open" task, to \vhich the 
system responds by displaying the contents of a folder, running an application or 
restoring an icon depicting a running application to its full-sized window 
representation. The use of the double-click is ubiquitous, but problematic. A double-
click is an event invested with greater semantics by the system than the combination 
of two mouse button clicks separated by a short delay that makes it up. Olsen (1998) 
suggests that this difficulty of interpretation of events is resolved by the first 
button-down event being interpreted as selection of the object, and the second 
click as opening the object. The double click thus presents the Medusa system wi th a 
number of problems. Firstly, it presents the problem of depicting the notion of the 
currently selected object, which we seek to avoid entirely. Secondly it presents the 
problem of supporting the notion of "opening" a file which relics on a metaphor 
within the model world mapping to a very wide range of different system semantics. 
Due to the range of speeds with which users can, and prefer to, double-click the 
mouse button, interface features are often provided allowing the user to place an 
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upper limit on the delay between clicks below which the sequence of actions is to be 
interpreted as a double-click event. While representations allowing users to adjust 
this value can be devised, the delay between click events is a value which must be 
stored in a data structure that is introduced by the development of a user interface. 
The designer is not required to provide a user interface to an existing data structure, 
or to support the user's existing work practice, instead the must introduce new 
concepts that are not derived from either of these domains. 
Direct manipulation user interfaces, as has been noted above, are characterised by 
easily reversible actions. The lessons drawn by PoIson and Lewis (1990) from their 
CE+ model of interface learning include the need for systems to provide obvious 
ways for the effect of actions to be undone, if the system is to be easy to learn. Many 
other authors have made similar requirements of interactive systems. The first 
version of the Medusa system does not consider how undo facilities should be 
provided. The provision of an undo facility within the Medusa system causes greater 
problems than coping with the double-click as discussed above. 
Undo facilities cause particular problems for a metaphor-based system. Whereas a 
typical user interface metaphor presents icons in the model world that denote or 
depict aspects of the underlying data structures, or the functions that apply to these 
data structures, an undo facility is not usually a feature provided by the underlying 
operating system. The problem of providing an undo facility in a metaphor-based 
system is one of providing the facility in the first place in addition to providing a 
depiction and a behaviour of the depiction in the model world. The product-oriented 
view of metaphor is not one that can be adopted therefore. Providing an undo facility 
is complex because no clear data structure to which a metaphor is required exists, 
instead an undo facility must interact with a structure that represents and captures 
aspects of the user's dynamic pattern of interaction with the system. This structure is 
required to store the system state, methods for undoing those user operations that are 
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undoable, as well as the user's task and command history. This structure therefore 
does not fit in either with the process-oriented view of metaphor. The undo facility, 
while it may be guided by the user's current work practice, cannot be entirely 
specified and depicted from an analysis of the way in which the user's tasks are 
currently performed and from the language with which users describe their artefacts 
of work. We consider an undo facility for the Medusa system, and ho\v undo 
facilities in metaphor-based system may be developed in general, in the final 
chapter. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter a critique of the first Medusa system design was undertaken using the 
cognitive walkthrough method. Of concern to evaluators when employing any 
usability evaluation method are the number of usability errors revealed by 
application of the method, and the assumptions about systems, users, and interaction 
upon which the evaluation method is based. These assumptions determine the types 
of usability errors that can be revealed. The numbers and types of usability errors 
that can be revealed by the cognitive walkthrough method have been previously 
examined (Bell et al., 1991; leffries et al., 1991). This work demonstrates that the 
walkthroughs conducted examining the usability of the Medusa system reported on 
above are likely to only reveal a small majority of the system's usability errors and 
that some major usability problems may be missed. One means of increasing the 
number of usability errors detected, by making a number of those conducting the 
walkthroughs experts in the task domain supported by the software application is 
clearly not possible for the sort of system considered here where no particular real 
world task domain is supported. 
The cognitive walkthroughs conducted reveal no other usability problems, but we 
can predict aspects of the system that might give rise to difficulties in a full 
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implementation. The design principle of making relevant data structures visible will 
sometimes be in conflict with the concept of tangibility. Some on-screen objects will 
be sources of information only, they will not be equal opportunity (Runciman and 
Thimbleby, 1986) in allowing their state to be changed both by the system and the 
user. An example is the keyboard buffer which shows the text that has been typed by 
the user but which has not yet been processed by the target application. The effect of 
further typing (even of presses of the delete key) will serve only to add to the 
contents of the buffer, the semantics of keys such as the delete key must be provided 
by the application. It therefore makes no sense for cut, copy, and-paste tasks to apply 
to this display, even though it resembles user interface components that might 
support such tasks. The consistency of interaction sought will still hold though, 
being an on-screen object the buffer can still be sent messages, the set of messages 
will be smaller, however, than the user might expect. 
8.5.1 Is The Computer Metaphor Better Than Others? 
One question that needs to be answered is whether the computer-computer metaphor 
is an improvement over existing user interface metaphors. The methods employed 
here show that some tasks are no more difficult to perform in Medusa than in other 
systems, but that other tasks have more complex action sequences in order to be 
consistent with the design approach adopted. The consistent approach adopted 
however means that once a correct interaction sequence has been learned, it can be 
employed when interacting with all categories of on-screen objects. In the first 
Medusa system, our concern is that the semantics of operations can be easily learned 
by the user. The theoretical framework used to examine the system semantics is 
silent on how operations are invoked or performed, hence the system usability - in 
terms of putting intention into action - may be found lacking, although we found no 
serious difficulties from the testing conducted. In the other versions of the Medusa 
system described in Chapter 9, the nature of the actions needed to perform in order 
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to change the state of the system has received considerably more attention. Whether 
this attention results in improved usability is not yet determined. 
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Chapter 9 
Revised Versions of the Medusa System 
"As long as the software is nerdified. and major conceptual limitations are built 
right into the software at that level. then it cannot get far. This is a philosophical 
question: when people program - i.e. decide on which set of possible options they 
should make available - they express a philosophy about what operations are 
important in the world. If the philosophy they express is on anything like the level of 
breathtaking stupidity that the games they play and the internet conversations they 
have are. then we are completely sunk." 
- Brian Eno (1996) A Year with Swollen Appendices, Faber and Faber. 
In previous chapters, serious criticisms of the world view underlying the theories of 
metaphor assumed to be employed in user interface design and human-computer 
interaction were presented. This world view can only be assumed, however, as few 
design case studies or articles on metaphor in the human-computer interaction 
literature of which we are aware explicitly state the theory of metaphorical 
comprehension, extension, or mapping, employed in the design of a particular model 
world. Previous chapters also served to introduce a recent theory of metaphor (the 
Lakoff/Johnson "contemporary" theory) and to explicitly apply it to user interface 
designs. The case studies examined features of existing user interface designs that 
any theory must be able to explain given that these systems are used successfully by 
users, or which give rise to documented difficulties attributed to users' failures to 
recognise, comprehend. and make use of the metaphor. The Lakoff/Johnson theory 
was found to satisfy these requirements of a theory of metaphor when applied to 
graphical user interfaces. 
9.1 The Medusa System - Version T,,·o 
The first version of the Medusa system, described above, is one which uses the 
methods of analysis employed in Chapters 4 and 5 as the basis for describing objects 
in the model \vorld and designing tasks that change the state of these objects. The 
world view on which these means of analysis are based, however, is one that is 
rejected in Chapter 4. In addition to employing the Lakoff/lohnson theory of 
metaphor as a tool for analysing existing user interface designs, if it is to be judged 
worthy of further consideration, it should be employed as a means of generating user 
interface metaphors that can be more readily comprehended by the user. The design 
of a second, revised, version of the Medusa system is thus presented in this section. 
9.1.1 Direct Manipulation 
It is clear that in order for users to be able to manipulate on-screen objects, and 
perform operations on them, users must be able to recognise the on-screen arrays of 
pixels as distinct objects. The objects having attributes and functionality provided by 
the underlying software. Users must also be able to classify them so they suggest 
what actions may be performed on and using them. The action sequences that can be 
performed will come either from metaphorical extension from other graphical user 
interfaces, prior experience, or from some form of instruction or help in using the 
system. It is this aspect of the design of metaphorical model worlds that led to 
consideration of a contemporary theory of user interface metaphors after traditional 
views of categorisation were found subject to the same assumptions and problems of 
an Objectivist \vorld view. The modem view of categorisation is not adopted in the 
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Medusa version one moocl world, although subsequent versions of the Medusa 
system take this into account. 
As well as having to categorise on-screen objects to make use of them, it is 
necessary to be able to categorise events and actions in a mooel world. The most 
important category in learning and using an interactive system is that of causality. 
This is the perception of a user-initiated action causing feedback or a change in 
attributes of the object that the user directly interacts with, and in any objects and 
attributes that the user additionally interacts with indirectly during the course of their 
action. Lakoff (1987: 54-55) observes that: 
-Prototypical causation appears to be direct manipulation, which is 
characterized most typically by the following cluster of interaction 
properties: 
1. There is an agent that does something. 
2. There is a patient that undergoes a change to a new state. 
3. Properties 1 and 2 constitute a single event; they overlap in time 
and space; the agent comes in contact with the patient. 
4. Part of what the agent does (either the motion or the exercise of 
will) precedes the change in the patient. 
5. The agent is the energy source; the patient is the energy goal; there 
is a transfer of energy from agent to patient. 
6. There is a single definite agent and a single definite patient. 
7. The agent is human. 
8. a. The agent wills his action. 
b. The agent is in control of his action. 
c. The agent bears primary responsibility for both his action and 
the change. 
223 
9. The agent uses his hands, body, or some instrument. 
10. The agent is looking at the patient, the change in the patient is 
perceptible, and the agent perceives the change." 
In previous chapters aspects of behaviour of existing user interface designs that 
cannot be categorised as direct manipulation, and that could not be accounted for by 
a metaphorical mapping to the physical world were discussed. A criteria of the 
Medusa interface design is that such user interface behaviours should be avoided, 
and that it should be possible to categorise user actions as direct manipulation 
according to Lakofrs definition. The first version of the Medusa system above 
simplifies interaction mostly to selection tasks. While this design choice attempts to 
ensure consistency and to prevent breakdowns in the system image, methods of 
interaction and action sequences familiar to users from other flat model \\'orlds 
cannot be applied fully, but designs of Medusa interfaces cannot ignore transfer 
between systems. 
9.1.2 The Workbench 
The use of the root window in the second version of the Medusa system does not 
differ from its use in the first version, so little \vill be added in this section to that 
given in Section 7.2.1. The root window in this version of Medusa remains a 
workbench, an area for planning that allows the user to place objects and groups of 
objects in positions of their choice before using the objects in their tasks, or placing 
them in the intended final destination. Kirsh (1996) describes some ways in which 
the environment may be used in planning and perfonning tasks. An important use of 
space is to permit better choices of actions to be made, and to serve as a source of 
reminders, while tasks are being perfonned. By constraining the perceived action 
set, the actions seen as being possible at a particular moment in time, affordances 
may be simultaneously constrained and highlighted. The ways in which on-screen 
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objects can be positioned so as to aid planning and task perfOlmance are sometimes 
restricted by the user interface style. The use of windows and the restriction, by 
some systems, of icons to a fixed grid of locations physically limits the placement of 
icons on the 2D desktop. Kirsh (1996: 419) also suggests that simple linear 
arrangements of objects to be employed in a task sequence are too restrictive. He 
claims that even production line assembly plants do not employ strictly linear 
arrangements of objects to be manipulated, and that agents must usually rely on 
"known systems of arrangements, or on some design that makes sense relative to the 
subject matter. 11 Kirsch suggests that the DESKTOP metaphor encourages the 
placement of peripheral equipment such as printers and the wastebasket around the 
edges of the screen to reflect the traditional placement of office equipment around 
office walls. Such placement might not be best suited to the needs of the user in 
performing tasks involving on-screen objects. The location of objects also impacts 
upon the tasks of seeking wanted icons and determining their location. Kirsh (1996: 
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"Perhaps the most obvious way of simplifying perception is to 
arrange objects in space so they form equivalence classes, or 
partitions, that reflect preconditions, or properties that are useful to 
track, notice or exploit...The primary value of such external 
partitioning is that it makes it easier: 
• to keep track of where things are; 
• to notice their relevant affordances." 
9.1.3 Objects in the Model World 
On-screen objects in the model world of the first Medusa system are instances of 
categories of objects defined in a hierarchy following the notions of classical 
categories, that is, membership of a category (or class, in the implementation) is 
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determined by the objcct posscssing necessary and sufficient attributes. The Medusa 
object category structure shown in Figure 7.1 is artificial and imposed by the system 
design, although a similar approach to describing the world may be found in the 
ontology of Douglas Lcnat's eye system, as described by Sowa (1995). Barsalou 
(1995: 168) states that: 
" ... clearly, the purpose of categorization is not to know an entity's 
category. Instead, the purpose of categorization is to identify 
information in memory that provides useful inferences. Upon 
accessing a category for an entity, a tremendous amount of 
knowledge becomes available that is useful in a variety of ways. This 
knowledge may specify the origins of the entity, its physical structure, 
its possible behaviour, its implications for the pcrccivcr's goals, or 
actions for interacting with it successfully. Accessing a category is 
not an end in itself but instead the gateway to knowledge for 
understanding an entity, and interacting with it properly." 
The first version of Medusa imposes a classical category structure on objects in its 
model world, as do most, if not all, object-based interfaces. The classical theory of 
categories has been questioned, however, for at least five decades, and the first 
Medusa system ignores the fact that category structures can be created to meet the 
needs of performing immediate tasks and to achieve short-term goals (Barsalou, 
1995), Many of these novel categories are based around prototypes (clear cases and 
best examples of category membership), in accordance with the modern theory of 
categorisation (Rosch, 1973, 1978) employed and described by Lakoff (1987). It 
remains a matter of further study as to what role category structures play in 
understanding and interacting with graphical model worlds. The example of GIF 
format files "'as aiscussed above as problematic in that most are still images, but 
some, as web-page programmers know and take advantage of, make up small 
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animations. It would be interesting to know if a radial category structure, of the sort 
employed by Lakoff (1987), based around prototypical still and animated files forms 
any part of users'. or perhaps only web programmers'. understanding of file systems. 
The second version of Medusa seeks to acknowledge the modem theory of 
categorisation. Previous attempts to accommodate prototypes in this theory with 
object-based and object-oriented user interface design have been unsatisfactory, 
however. as object-oriented design adopts the classical theory in the categories that 
make up class hierarchies. A better approach to the implementation of the second 
Medusa system is to make use of programming languages with a PROTOTYPE-
INSTANCE object structure rather than the traditional CLASS-INSTANCE 
approach. In this way the user can more easily impose a category structure on objects 
in the model world than they can in the first version of the Medusa system. 
9.1.4 File Management - Piles or Objects 
The file management facilities provided by the first version of the Medusa system 
were developed to resolve failings in implementations of the desktop metaphor. In 
particular they address the DESKTOP metaphor's use of files and folder analogies as 
a means of accounting for the structure of the file space and the tasks that alter the 
state of the file space. The folder is only one form of possible file organisation, 
however. Despite argument to the contrary (Fertig. Freeman, and Gelertner, 1996), 
the conclusion reached by Nardi and Barreau (Barreau and Nardi, 1995; Nardi and 
Barreau, 1997) is that users prefer location-based search of files, and that locations 
of files serve as reminders of tasks to be performed. They also state that most users 
archive relatively little information and avoid elaborate filing schemes. Their 
proposed requirements for filing systems and filing tasks are thus not satisfied, and 
indeed are made more difficult. by the traditional notion of the desktop metaphor. 
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Malone's (1983) study of how documents and information resources are arranged in 
the physical office differentiates between files and piles. In Malonc's terminology 
files are defined as units where the elements (such as individual folders) are 
explicitly titled and arranged in a systematic ordcr (such as alphabetical or' 
chronological). Groups7 such as drawers in filing cabinel~7 nlay also be explicitly 
titled and systematically arranged7 but they need not be. In piles, though, the 
individual elements (papers7 folders, and so on) arc not necessarily titled, and thcy 
are not generally ordered in a particular way. Table 9.1 summarises differences 
bet\veen files and piles. 
Elements 
titled 
Elements 
ordered 
Groups 
titled 
Groups 
ordcred 
Files 
Piles 
Yes 
? 
Yes 
No 
? 
No 
Table 9.1 Units of desk organization (Malonc, 1983: 106) 
? 
? 
File management in the second version of the Medusa system is intended to satisfy 
the following criteria7 or to take account of the following observations: 
1. Categories are often devised to suit the needs of tasks and such categories are 
often based around prototypes. 
2. Objects can be placed and grouped in locations so aC) to distinguish them from 
other objects, to highlight their affordances, and to aid in the pcrformance of 
users'tasks. 
3. The folder metaphor restricts the placement of objects and is prone to 
breakdowns. 
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4. The Lakoffllohnson theory of metaphor comprehension claims that meaning is 
structured and grounded in image schema that capture our repeated and common 
experiences of interacting with the external world. 
The second version of the Medusa system therefore adopts a means of organising 
files based on piles. and tasks to interact with piles are grounded in image schema to 
obtain their meaning. A file organisation system based on a pile metaphor has 
already been devised (Mander. Salomon. and Wong. 1992). In this implementation 
of a pile metaphor. the folder metaphor is not adopted. instead files are arranged in 
pile structures. these piles can be casually organised on the root window. Electronic 
piles can be either system-created or user-created. System-created piles are stacked 
neatly, implying a set of rules behind how the pile was created. User-created piles 
have a dishevelled appearance, items are added to the pile by being "dropped" onto 
it Piles may be labelled (to indicate categories. possibly relevant to the user's current 
tasks). When a file is dropped onto a pile a dialogue box is presented asking whether 
the file should be simply added to the pile. or whether the user wishes to modify the 
script that was employed when constructing the pile. Over time the criteria by which 
it is appropriate for a file to be placed on the pile may change. hence the need to 
change the script may change. At its simplest. a file may be placed on the pile 
because the file contains particular keywords. Other. more complex. placement 
strategies require that the user is able to write scripting language programs that 
determine how piles are constructed. 
The pile metaphor devised by Mander and his colleagues adopts the product-oriented 
approach to metaphor-based design. The piles do not depict existing data structures 
within the operating system's functionality (as in the case of the treatment of files. 
links and directories in the first version of the Medusa system). instead the piles 
depict data structures added to the desktop's functionality. These data structures are 
not necessarily based on the user's work language and task processes, they are only 
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based on the broad results of the need to support casual structuring of files noted by 
Malone (1983). The resulting design process adopted by Mander and his colleagues 
was to construct runnable prototypes of paper-based designs using Macromedia 
Director which were then examined by users. 
The testing undertaken of the prototype piles addressed the piling models, the 
methods for initiating browsing, viewing cone representations and how items are 
found \\'ithin a pile. An issue that will be addressed further below is the piling 
model, \\'hether piles are "document-centred" or "pile-centred". In the document-
centred approach, the pile is represented as a collection of individual items, each 
document is depicted by a rectangle, a pile being created whenever a single 
document on the desktop has another placed on top of it. Items on the pile may be 
removed by clicking on any visible region of the item of interest and drJgging it 
away from the pile. The pile as a whole, however, cannot be moved to a ne\v 
location on the desktop. In the pile-centred approach, a pile acts like a Macintosh 
folder. If a dragged file passes over a file on the desktop, the occluded file is 
highlighted (like a folder) to indicate that it is a potential target and that a pile would 
be formed if the user \\'ere then to drop the held file onto the file belo\v. Clicking on 
any part of the pile and dragging the pointer moves the entire pile around the 
desktop. 
In user testing, Mander and his colleagues (1992) found that while individual users 
displayed a preference for one or other of the pile creation methods, neither \vas 
judged to be superior. A number of problems were, however, revealed. In the pile-
centred approach, users appreciated being able to add objects to the pile easily, and 
being able to move the pile as a whole, but noted the problem of selecting an 
individual item from within the pile. The opposite is true of the document-centred 
approach where users \\'ere unclear as to how to move the pile as a whole, but users 
appreciated being able to easily select an individual item from within the pile. In 
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both cases users had the difficulty of knowing whether a file dropped onto a folder 
sitting on the desktop would be placed inside the folder, or whether a pile would be 
created. Experience of the Macintosh interface was found to lead most users to 
believe that the file would be placed inside the folder. As Mander, Salomon, and 
Wong (1992) note, the design of piles and user's expectations cause questions to be 
raised about how well the pile metaphor fits into the desktop metaphor. 
Another important issue, which will be addressed further below, is the issue of 
interaction with piles. This concerns how Mander and his colleagues solve the 
difficulties of emulating interaction with complex fragile 3D structures in the real 
physical world, in an environment where interaction is limited to gestures that can be 
generated using a mouse or touch screen. Testing compared two approaches, 
between double clicking and a horizontal gesture (shown in Figure 9.1) to spread out 
the pile's contents, and between double-clicking and a vertical gesture (shown in 
Figure 9.2) to browse the pile's contents within the viewing cone. 
(a) Mouse gesture 
1-~.I 
t 
(b) Spread-out contents of pile 
Figure 9.1 Spreading out a pile's contents by a horizontal gesture 
(Mander. Salomon. and Wong. 1992: 630). 
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(a) Gesture to generate (b) Viewing cone showing (c) Document selected and 
viewing cone a page of the document 
under the pointer 
removed from the pile 
Figure 9.2 Gestures to browse the contents of piles 
The results of the testing undertaken found that 9 out of 10 users preferred double 
clicking on piles over the use of gestures, subjects finding the gestures non-intuitive 
and ambiguous. In general, users stated that they would employ the "spreading out" 
approach to viewing the contents of piles, this approach better supporting 
comparison and recognition tasks. 
Failings of the Pile Metaphor 
To understand the failings and successes of the pile metaphor requires completion of 
a larger exercise, an exercise one can describe as an effort to understand the fabric of 
meta-realityl. Meta-reality, a term coined by Smith (1986) and depicted in Figure 
9.3, is the space in ARK in which the hand resides and in which objects removed 
from ARK alternate realities reside until replaced into a possibly different alternate 
reality. A similar space can be found in each of the interfaces described in Chapter 2. 
It is the space that the pointer (or hand) resides and moves within. The pointer is an 
1 So termed by analogy with David Deutsch's om) The Fabric of Reality. Penguin, London. 
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on-screen object that only needs to exhibit spatiomimesis, and that can be subject to 
breakdowns in spatiomimesis due to temporal uncertainties in the underlying 
hardware and software. The reality (or desktop, or room network, and so on) beneath 
the meta-reality must display a larger repertoire of behaviour, and is subject to a 
wider range of breakdowns. The pile metaphor is another metaphor subject to 
breakdowns, for example. objects dropped onto electronic piles do not bounce off 
and fall to the table. and electronic piles are stable no matter how high they are built 
and do not topple over. The pile metaphor. perhaps more than other 2.5D model 
worlds. reveals that an account of understanding of such user interfaces must account 
for a reality/meta-reality split. We observe that the design space of the mouse used to 
position the pointer is a 2D plane. but the reality beneath is 2.5 or 3D, for example. 
no matter how -high- electronic piles grow, the pointer never collides with them. 
User 
within 
!he COInC)uIef 
r-:-:ta Reality i buntln. 
ra~~t 
~ 
.... --obiects 
1 
+ i + 
Alte rnate Ftealities 
Figure 9.3 Reality. alternate reality. and meta-reality (Smith, 1986). 
Both folders (called files by Malone) and piles pose additional problems that are not 
part of the metaphors that are used to understand them, but which must be solved to 
allow tasks to be performed on them._ The principle concern in this thesis is to 
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provide facilities that allow objects in the on-screen model \\'orld to be arranged to 
aid users in the performance of their immediate tasks. The user should be able to 
arrange information resources (files in traditional computing terms) to aid rcminding 
and to constrain and suggest actions. Malonc's study rcveals that piles, in 
themselves, do not aid with identifying the priority of tasks. Malone suggests that the 
colour of items on the electronic desktop could denote their priority, a system feature 
that can be found in recent versions of the Macintosh Finder running \vith colour 
display hardware. Malone suggests an alternative means of denoting priority is the 
size of icons, this suggestion is hard to integrate into a system such as Medusa where 
the physics of the model \vorld is intended to be plausible and suggest grounding in 
image schemata familiar from interaction with the real \\'orld. A mapping of 
LARGER ++ HIGHER PRIORITY has less meaning than mappings such as 
HIGHER PITCH ++ MORE (the familiar UP is MORE schema) mentioned above. 
The other alternatives that Malone suggests to indicate priority are the location of 
items, a criteria that the second version of Medusa is designed to support, and 
frequency-based reminding, a task best delegated to an assistant. 
9.1.5 Performing Tasks in Medusa Version Two 
The first version of Medusa, described above, adopts the convention of the folder 
metaphor for file organisation, which has the advantage of allowing hierarchical 
categorisation and organisation, but the failings of the folder convention and 
difficulties in understanding the concept of files were addressed and hopefully 
resolved. The folder convention was found lacking in the need to support ad hoc 
categorisation of on-screen objects to perform tasks, and in the association of 
category with physical location that the second version of Medusa was designed to 
support. An obvious user interface design that supports these facilities (one assumed 
in the second version of Medusa) is the pile. This is the second approach to file 
organisation in information-rich work identified by Malone (1983) and which has 
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already been prototypcd and subjected to some user testing (Mander, Salomon, and 
Wong, 1992). 
Unfortunately, as is revealed by the analysis of interaction with piles presented in 
Appendix e, the image schemata that ground users' understanding of folders (in the 
terms of the Lakoffllohnson theory) are the same that ground understanding of 
interaction with piles. A consequence, of recognising that understanding and 
interaction with both piles and folders are grounded in the same schemata via 
metaphors with similar mappings (FOLDER is CONTAINER, and PILE is 
CONTAINER) are that interaction with piles in Medusa version two is similar to 
interaction with folders in Medusa version one. This is especially the case as actions 
can only be expressed via the narrow channel of the mouse in our current designs. 
Piles in Medusa Version Two 
The design of the second version of Medusa adopts the pile metaphor as its file 
organisation mechanism in the pile-centred form. The folder metaphor is not adopted 
in this system design. The folder metaphor is part of the wider OFACE metaphor 
and has the difficulties described above in supporting multimedia file types. 
Adopting the pile metaphor also resolves the problem of ambiguity as to whether a 
pile, or a folder on top of a pile, is the target for a file being moved, without the need 
for more complex mouse gestures or multimodal input. In a pile-oriented version of 
Medusa, a pile could be created explicitly by informing a file that is not currently a 
member of another pile or too close to other files on the workbench that it is the first 
element of a new pile. A toolbar option that would implement this is shown in Figure 
9.4. 
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Figure 9.4 Starting a new pile 
In a class-instance view of how categories of objects are realised, making a file the 
first element of a pile \\'ould suggest that the file would now multiply inherit 
properties and tool bar actions from a second pile category. In a prototype-centred 
view, new attributes and methods are simply dynamically added to the file's 
interface. Once a pile has been started, other files can be added to it. Drag and drop 
operations such as moving files into folders, or placing a file onto the top of a pile in 
Mander, Salomon, and Wong's (1992) prototype, risk semantic errors being made. 
The toolbar interaction style of Medusa is meant to prevent this possibility. A toolbar 
option that allows files to be added to an existing pile can be seen in Figure 9.5. 
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Figure 9.S Adding a file to an existing pile 
In a Mander, Salomon, and Wong's pile-centred system, the viewing cone is used to 
scan through the contents of a pile, in a pile-oriented version of Medusa a Spread 
out contents option would be placed on the toolbar but would only appear when 
the pointer is over a file that is a member of a pile. The pile is assumed to be the 
object towards which messages from the toolbar are directed, files must be removed 
from the pile if they are to be the focus of action, in keeping with everyday 
experience of piles of objects, and the containment schema underlying understanding 
of the pile. Spreading out the contents of a pile in a pile-oriented version of Medusa 
is storyboarded in Figure 9.6. 
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Figure 9.6 Spreading out a pile in a revised version of Medusa 
How Many Piles c an a File be in? 
A pile is a depiction of all the files that meet the conditions of category membership 
that the pile denotes. Using the Lakoff/lohnson theory, it is claimed that 
understanding of the pile is based upon a PILE is CONTAINER metaphor, currently 
there is no formulation of machine support for pile creation in Medusa version two. 
In subsequent work, however, to provide such machine support, the risk of falling 
into the same trap as Lifestreams and the Semantic File System, described below, 
must be noted and avoided. Adopting the Aristotelean CATEGORY is 
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CONTAINER metaphor underlying the classical theory of category membership, 
according to Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987), must be avoided. Even without 
machine support to construct piles. the problem of determining which pile a file 
should be in remains. It is possible to argue that a file can be placed in many piles at 
the same time. In the folder metaphor this is achieved either by means of aliases or a 
filename-inode link. both of which were examined above. In the second version of 
Medusa there is only one copy of an object unless the file is explicitly duplicated by 
the user, reflecting experience of files in the physical world. our concern being to 
support direct manipulation as described by Lakoff (1987). If a file' is duplicated, the 
problem of version control must be addressed. simple replication of a file's contents 
raises the problem of not only having to remember a file's location, but also the 
location of the version wanted, as can be seen in the protocols quoted in Appendix 
C. 
Piles Across Volumes 
The computer-computer metaphor makes explicit the presence of additional storage 
volumes connected to the workstation. The root window displays the piles supported 
by the internal hard disk, there is also, however, the problem of depicting the files 
stored on other volumes. In the folder metaphor and in the container concept of 
Medusa version one, the external volume is just another container and the interaction 
design of allowing dragging within directories and moving across directory and 
volume boundaries is adopted. There are no directories within a volume in the 
second version of Medusa hence allowing direct manipulation to occur. The design 
of existing operating systems makes the design of Medusa-style interfaces to this 
problem difficult. 
For example, in UNIX file systems (each physical disk may store up to seven file 
systems) can be mounted into, and un-mounted from, an overall file space. Hiding 
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the implementation of filespaces is achieved in UNIX by forbidding links that cross 
file systems, the data and the links to it (what appears in a directory listing) must 
exist in the same file system. If a file system is un-mounted then its contents are 
invisible to both the user and system until remounted. In the Macintosh system, by 
contrast, aliases may cross volume boundaries and, as in UNIX, an un-mounted 
volume only becomes apparent by its absence, the volume's icon does not appear on-
screen, and double-clicking on an alias's icon will cause an error message to be 
displayed. While neither the UNIX link nor the Macintosh alias owe their design to 
the LINK schema (Johnson, 1987: 117-119), the UNIX link is more in keeping \vith 
it, in that links between objects (filename/inode and datablocks in the case of UNIX) 
are typically "spatially contiguous within our perceptual field." Links between more 
than t\VO objects and spatially and temporally discontinuous entities (action at a 
distance) are less typical. We have repeatedly stated that the difficulty with links 
arises at points of breakdo\vn, either in breaking of the link itself, or in direct 
manipulation in the model world. In the second version of Medusa, physical \\'orld 
notions are adopted to improve understanding of the model world. For this reason 
links are not employed in the second version of Medusa, instead each icon depicts an 
instance of a file, if a file needs to be present in a number of piles then it must be 
duplicated. The problem that must then be confronted is that of version control, 
knowing and determining the state of an object in the model world. 
A related problem, one also related to the problem of version control, is managing 
file organisation on volumes that are only occasionally connected to the workstation, 
such volumes including floppy disks, ZIP drives and equivalent removable disk 
technologies, and personal digital assistants with some storage capacity. The need to 
take such technologies into account means that it is not possible for Medusa to adopt 
a solution to managing the piles on the root window similar to that in the Kansas 
environment (Maloney and Smith, 1995). In Kansas, the root window is very large, 
and only a small user-selectable region of it can be seen at anyone time. The 
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advantages of Kansas's being a synchronous shared workbench designed as a 
collaborative environment (although subject to the drawbacks inherited from the 
Alternate Reality Kit) are also lost in Medusa. 
The same interaction style as in Medusa version one is employed in the second 
version of Medusa to implement copying files across volumes, copying being the 
default operation across the data path shown in the computer-computer metaphor. 
The toolbar contains Moue and Copy operations and the user must specify one of 
the external volumes in the computer-computer metaphor on-screen schematic as the 
destination for the file or pile to be transferred. Dourish and Button (1998: 421), 
considering file copying in a system based on the folder metaphor, note: 
•... the abstraction that has been offered by the system - the folder 
- hides the details on which ... understandings could be based. The 
differences between local and remote folders, the difference in the 
operation of local and remote copy operations, and the consequences 
of these differences are hidden from view. 
Furthermore, it is not sufficient simply to offer two different kinds of 
folders providing a distinction between local and remote ... Actions 
and accounts are situated within the specific circumstances of their 
production, not within abstract characterisations of them. In other 
words, what is important here is not the differences between two 
abstract types of copying (local copying and remote copying), but the 
specifics of this or that copying operation. There are far too many 
different features of the occasion (including distance, available 
network bandwidth, other people's activities, the types of files 
involved, and even the type of network infrastructure) for designers 
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or users to be able to distinguish among then1 in the abstract model 
that the system offers." 
The second versIon of the Medusa system does not have local copying, only 
movement across the workbench. The problem of depicting remote copying remains, 
however. Dourish and Button, rather than "trying to provide different abstractions 
for all the different circumstances in which copying may take place", propose 
providing an aCCOU1lt of copying, "a metaphorical frame drawn from the 
ethnomethodological perspective on the organisation of action." Dolirish and 
Button's account of file copying is a schematic, shown in Figure 9.7, depicting data 
buckets and connections between them which is claimed to have some explanatory 
power in cases of breakdown. 
Name Name 
Figure 9.7 An account of file copying (Dourish and Button, 1998: 423) 
Accounts are related to Dourish's (1995) notion of reflection in computing systems2• 
A reflective computing system is one in which a program has access to its own 
representation and execution environment, and is able to understand how a particular 
state came about and can alter its own subsequent execution. While notions similar 
to that of reflection fonn the Medusa system design, including object-based help and 
visibility and tangibility, Medusa is limited in the degree to which the end-user (and 
the system itself) can modify and re-program it. What Dourish and Button do not 
2 The idea of reflective computing systems is due to Brian Cantwell Smith, full details may be fOlUld 
in (Smith. 1996). 
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provide, it should be noted, is an appreciation or analysis of the metaphors 
underlying their account of file copying, and the functionality hidden, as well as that 
revealed, by their metaphors. It was stated in Chapter 6 that the computer-computer 
metaphor-inspired depiction of the copying process differs from Dourish and 
Button's account of copying. The relationship between the ideas underlying Medusa 
and reflective systems remains a topic requiring further consideration. 
Versions 
The ability to duplicate files, and to copy files onto disk volumes or PDAs that may 
belong to other users, raises the problem of version control and the depiction of 
different versions within both Medusa system designs. The problem is more acute, 
however, in the second Medusa system. There are a number of ways of managing 
versions of a particular file that the user may modify. One approach is to allow 
complete independence of objects, any modification produces a new version within 
the same pile or region of workbench as other previous versions. While possibly 
useful for some users, this approach pennits the phenomenon quoted in Appendix C 
where the user may lose track of the location of the draft sought. Many operating 
systems limit the number of versions in the same container to the current draft and 
the most recent version prior to modification. The computer-computer metaphor 
schematic allows a change of version strategy to be included as part of the system 
behaviour that the user may control. Where duplicates of a file exist in a number of 
piles another version strategy that the user may adopt is for each copy to be a 
manifestation of the same most recent draft3• Two existing designs implement this 
functionality without the drawbacks of links and aliases. The first is the publish-and-
3 An analogy may be found in particle physics. one answer offered to the question of why all 
observed and studied electrons have the same properties is that there is only one electron, but it moves 
around quickly. 
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subscribe model from the Macintosh operating system (described in Olsen, 1998, 
Chapter 13). In this model the user selects some information and informs the 
application that they \vish to publish it. An edition file containing the published 
information is then created and the user must then create a subscription in the 
destination file. Any changes to the edition file cause corresponding changes in the 
sUbscription. Such a mechanism is compatible with the user determining how many 
past versions of a file are placed in a pile. 
The publish and subscribe model is compatible with file movement across volume 
boundaries, and has advantages over the other mechanism for file synchronisation 
Olsen (1998) also describes, the moniker, found in Microsoft's OLE architecture. 
The first part of a moniker is an absolute pathname in which the linked information 
is stored, the second part are identifiers that reference the linked data within the 
duplicated file. In thc moniker approach, the link may break and identifiers may also 
be deleted from the file during editing, making duplication and synchronisation even 
more difficult across distributed disk volumes. If a file is to appear in a number of 
piles, possibly on different disk volumes, a publish-and-subscribe mechanism will be 
required. Following Dix, Rodden, and Sommervillc (1996), howcver, it is known 
that in a collaborative version of Medusa, with multiple disk volumes and 
occasionally attached PDArs, the notion of "the current version" of a file is almost 
meaningless, and that the Medusa system will need to reflect this. I t is believed that 
little needs to be added to the Medusa system design to make this apparent, however. 
Versjons and Synchronisation in a Revised Medusa Design 
File version and synchronisation mechanisms based on the idea of links, as described 
above, are prone to difficulties and the metaphor breaks down quickly. On PalmPilot 
devices, synchronisation of data when the palmtop device and the personal computer 
on which a duplicate of the data on the palmtop ,vas once created (copies on either or 
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both machines may have since been modified) is performed by a conduit. In the 
Palm operating system. this term means a form of dynamic library that dynamically 
and temporarily extends the facilities offered by the personal computer's operating 
system in order to allow the synchronisation to occur. It is possible to investigate 
whether the use of the term ·conduit· is more than just a case of designers needing to 
select or coin a term to name a particular type of computer program. Reddy (1993) 
proposes that our ideas of communication. and the language used to talk about 
language itself, are grounded in the CONDUIT metaphor. The components of this 
metaphor being: 
.(1) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily 
from one person to another; 
(2) in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in 
the words; 
(3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or 
feelings and conveying them to others; and 
(4) in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings 
once again from the words.· (Reddy. 1993: 170) 
10hnson's (1987: 59) list of the parts that make up the CONDUIT metaphor is more 
useful for considering the design of a file synchronisation mechanism that assumes 
his and Lakofrs theory of metaphor. 10hnson's list of parts is: 
• 1. Ideas or thoughts are objects. 
2. Words and sentences are containers for these objects. 
3. Communication consists in finding the right word-container for 
your idea-object. sending this filled container along a conduit or 
through space to the hearer, who must then take the idea-object out 
of the word-container.· 
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In the Lakoff/Johnson theory, metaphors are grounded in terms of image schemata. 
The CONDUIT metaphor is, in Johnson's description, grounded in a number of 
schemata. One of these is the COMPULSION schema (shown in Figure 9.8) in 
which a force has a magnitude, moves along a path and has a direction. In Figure 
9.8, the solid line denotes an actual force vector, the broken line denotes a potential 
foce vector or trajectory. In the CONDUIT metaphor, the COMPULSION schema 
captures the illocutionary force of an utterance. 
~1"""""""""~~·············11'. 
Figure 9.8 The COMPULSION schema (Johnson, 1987: 58) 
The other schemata that ground the CONDUIT metaphor are BLOCKAGE, 
REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT, DIVERSION. and COUNTERFORCE. The 
suggestion made in Appendix C is that the schemata that ground an interface 
metaphor possess entailments that must be addresses by attributes or actions 
provided to the user \vho must understand the metaphor and perform actions in 
keeping \vith the metaphor that change the state of on-screen objects. In a revised 
version of Medusa, the toolbar for the root window might contain the option 
Create a CondUit, as other object-based interfaces must allow the user to create 
new instances of objects, or must allow instances of them to be fetched from a 
convenient store. The issue of ho\v a conduit object can be rendered will be ignored 
and will be left as a topic for further graphic design and usability testing effort. 
When a conduit object is created and becomes part of the Medusa model \vorld. 
According to the Medusa design principles, it should be possible to interact with the 
conduit, it should possess an associated toolbar that will contain options that follow 
from the entailments of the schemata that ground the CONDUIT metaphor. A first 
list of suitable options can be seen in Figure 9.9. ~urther options might be added, but 
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they should, where possible, be entailments of the schemata that ground the 
CONDUIT metaphor. 
Rdd file to synchronise .. 
Remoue file .. 
Synchronise direction .. 
Check: settings 
Set transfer speed .. 
Synch clash settings .. 
Removal of BLOCKAGE 
Create BLOCKA GE 
COMPULSION 
REMOV AL OF RESTRAINT 
COMPULSION 
COUNTERFORCE 
Figure 9.9 Toolbar options for a conduit 
9.1.6 Other File Organization Solutions 
Piles and folders are two important approaches to information organisation within 
interactive computing environments, important because they are prompted by 
existing practice of those engaged in tasks drawing on other information resources. 
Many have said, however, that the computer is not merely a tool, but also a system 
that can support new ways of working that are not merely imitated (or used as source 
domains) in user interface designs. Other user interface solutions to the problem of 
file organisation have been suggested, these are briefly surveyed below in order to 
determine whether other interface designs have advantages that suggest that any 
subsequent versions of the Medusa system should adopt these designs. 
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The Spatial Data l\llanal:ement System 
While the Spatial Data Management System (SDMS) was first developed by 
Nicholas Negroponte, Richard Bolt, and their collaborators, in the 1970's, and 
examples such as Bolt's "Put that there" are well-known historical artefacts, the 
SDMS project can be claimed to be on-going as display and rendering technology 
advances. As Medusa is currently tied to the desktop, we are most interested in the 
early versions of SDMS, more recent versions being closer to notions of virtual 
reality environments. The first SDMS employed a wall-sized display upon \\'hich on-
screen objects denoting items of interest could be placed and moved to meaningful 
locations. The SMDS system is claimed as being a major influence on the computer 
desktop, but computer desktops are smaller than real desktops, requiring additional 
metaphors such as Rooms or mechanisms such as Sun Microsystems' workspace 
switch in their Common Desktop Environment. SDMS, in particular in "Put That 
There", however suffer from some of the same problems that folders, piles, and 
environments in which both can be found, give rise to. While speech recognition and 
pointing de-referencing allow deitic reference to objects to be made ("put that 
there"), ambiguities such as that found by Mander, SaIomon, and Wong (1992) still 
require resolution. If a folder is on top of a pile and an additional file is to be added 
to the pile, is the pile or folder the target? Section 6.4.5 addressed resolving this 
ambiguity of reference. 
Dynamic Queries and the Semantic File System 
An issue that is essentially at the heart of file organisation and interaction with 
information resources is category construction, "finding" information where file 
placement facilities support "reminding". Dynamic queries, an approach developed 
by Ben Shneiderman and his colleagues at the University of Maryland, of which 
FilmFinder is a representative system, combines direct manipulation \vith database 
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visualisation to allow users to filter information through the use of features such as 
buttons and sliders. Records in the database may be reduced to a manageable set by 
adjusting the range of values between which field values may lie using interface 
components that directly manipulate these ranges of values. While the user can 
quickly find records they are interested in, the dynamic query approach does not 
address how the records are described and indexed, categories (such as "thrillers" 
and "action movies"), and members of the categories are defined by those who build 
the database. For the user of a system in which they create many of the objects to be 
indexed and retrieved, and define categories to suit their tasks, dynamic queries offer 
little. 
The semantic file system (Gifford, Jouvelot, Sheldon, and O'Toole, 1991) addresses 
tasks performed prior to those supported by dynamic queries. It constructs sets of 
potentially useful files, by giving additional semantics to files as well as providing 
associative access to a file system via virtual directories. Using familiar UNIX 
directory commands such as Is and cd, associative queries are interpreted to 
produce file listings that are more meaningful than the basic hierarchical directories 
that the semantic file system adds to. Transducers are devices added to the basic file 
system that associate additional attributes with each file extension (the filename's 
suffix such as ".C" which normally denotes the file's type). The mail transducer, for 
example, would associate the field-attribute pairs "from:". "to:". "subject:" and 
"text:" with each file with the suffix ".txt". It is recognised that a similar mechanism 
to the transducer is needed in an implementation of the Medusa systems in order to 
"register" new file types so that suitable icons can be constructed, among other 
functions. These attributes can be used in queries that resemble conventional 
commands to generate more meaningful lists of files. A query such as "Is -F 
/sfs/owner: /smith" described by Gifford et al. (1991) lists all the files owned 
by a user with the system name "smith" stored in the directory /sfs. 
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While adding much to basic file y terns, the u er interface to the emantic file 
ystem adds little to the UNIX command-based u er interface, the failing of which 
have long been documented (Norman, 1981). Again the pr blem f command-ba ed 
y tern, forcing the u er to have a conver ation with an un een agent ab ut an 
un een ta k domain, arise. While adding additional emantic t the file y tern, the 
extra attributes are hidden, as are the commands u ed t di c v r them, in addition 
the attributes depend on the person who con truct tran ducer . Thi per n i n t 
the user in existing implementations of the emantic file y tern. The type f bject 
that can exist within the file sy tern are al 0 still limited to the et f fil nam 
suffixes. As Medusarequires a form of object type regi tration mechani m, it can be 
hopefully seen that some of the more u eful idea intr duced by the emantic file 
ystem can be adopted and improved upon. 
Lifestreams 
Lifestreams is prompted by a number of objection t the de kt p metaph r, 
including an objection to the notion of the need to upp rt I cati n-ba ed earch 
mecharusms. Fertig, Freeman, and Gelemter (1996) note that Barreau and Nardi' 
(1995) studies of users of the Macintosh and a number of PC-ba ed op rating 
systems show the following similarities between u er : 
"1. A preference for location-based search for finding file (in 
contrast to logical, text-based search); 
2. The use of file placement as a critical reminding fun [ion; 
3. The use of three types of information: ephemeral, working and 
archived~ 
4. The 'lack of importance' of archiving files. tI 
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Fertig et al. claim that imilaritie 1, 2, and 4 are artefacts of the computing systems 
studied rather than tatements of the way users actually acquire, organise, and 
maintain information. Fertig, Freeman, and Gelemter's Lifestreams system propose 
a new metaphor that replace traditional files and directories. Lifestreams, shown in 
Figure 9.10, i claimed to be based upon the metaphor of a time-ordered stream of 
document . E ery document created i tored in the lifestream, the tail of the stream 
is the past, in the future the tream contains documents that the user will need , such 
as reminder , "to do" li ts, and meeting chedules. In the present, the stream contains 
items such a work in progre and recently anived e-mail. The claims made for 
Lifestream include that the y tern supports reminding and archiving inherently in 
the model , and al 0 that it aids in locating information. One way in which 
Lifestreams does thi is by ephemeral and working information typically being 
located in the pre ent part of the stream. The other is by allowing the easy creation 
and destruction of ub tream by filtering the stream as a whole according to 
appropriate cri teria. 
. ~e..:'.'Iid __ BT 
... 
Figure 9.10 A Life tream (taken from a video presented at CHI'964). 
4 http://www.acm.orgl ig / igchi/cbi961proceedings/videos/Fertigletf.htm 
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As can be seen in Figure 9.10, the Lifestream of documents forms a diagonal line 
across the display. Documents in the present are shown in the bottom right-hand 
corner of the screen, documents are stacked so that the rear-most document in the top 
left-hand corner of the display is the oldest one rendered. After a period of time, 
documents "fall off" the edge of the screen and are automatically archived. A 
scrollbar allo\vs the time parameter to be altered affecting the documents that are 
shown in the region of the display where "present" documents are displayed. In order 
to move into the future, however, so that reminders may be introduced, the 
Lifestreams system "clock" must be altered by a function reached from -a menu 
option. Lifestreams is proposed as an alternative to the desktop metaphor, one that 
has the "organisational metaphor" of a time-ordered stream of documents. It is 
possible, however, to employ the Lakoffllohnson theory to critique Lifestreams. The 
frequent use of the \vord "stream" to describe the Lifestreams interface is to employ 
an appealing metaphor. In terms of Lakoff and Johnson's (1999, Chapter 10) analysis 
of the metaphors that describe understanding of time, however, Lifestreams suffers 
from problems, and it may not differ considerably from the systems it seeks to 
replace. 
While Lifestreams adopts a metaphor in which the passage of time maps onto the 
position and motion of objects, Lifestreams does not adopt the MOVING TIME 
metaphor, \vhich based on the following schema: 
"There is a lone, stationary observer facing in a fixed direction. There 
is an indefinitely long sequence of objects moving past the observer 
from front to back. The moving objects are conceptualised as having 
fronts in their direction of motion." (Lakoff and 10hnson, 1999: 141) 
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This schema combines with a TIME ORIENTATION metaphor, the mappings of 
which are shown in Table 9.2, to produce a set of composite mappings shown in 
Table 9.3. 
The Location of the Observer 
The Space in Front of the Observer 
The Space Behind the Observer 
-
-
-
The Present 
The Future 
The Past 
Table 9.2 Mappings for the Time Orientation metaphor 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 140). 
The Location of the Observer 
-
The Present 
The Space in Front of the Observer 
-
The Future 
The Space Behind the Observer 
-
The Past 
Objects 
-
Times 
The Motion of Objects Past the Observer 
-
The "Passage" of Time 
Table 9.3 Mappings for the Composite Moving Time metaphor 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 142). 
It should not be concluded that the Lifestreams interface metaphor is not grounded in 
a pattern of interaction that people can understand easily, only that the schema that 
grounds the Lifestream concept is one unfamiliar to many people. To speakers of the 
Aymara language used in Chile (described by Lakoff and lohnson, 1999: 141) the 
metaphor ·THE PAST is IN FRONT" is grounded by the notion of being able to see 
the results of what you have just done in front of you. Thus while Lifestreams may 
have an acceptable level of usability, its design conflicts with the culture and 
everyday experience of embodied interaction with the world of most of its intended 
user population. 
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One can also question whether Lifestreams is as radical an alternative to electronic 
support for the notions of piles and folders as it is claimed to be. The analysis of 
piles and folders presented in Appendix C shows that both these forms of file 
organisation can be understood in terms of the same image schemata and metaphors 
with similar mappings. Similar claims can be made for ho\v Lifestreams is 
understood. The MOVING TIME metaphor that underlies Lifestreams (albeit 
combined with a mostly unfamiliar TIME ORIENTATION), , and the MOVING 
OBSERVER metaphor (the other mutually exclusive metaphor used in descriptions 
of temporal events in most languages) are both extensions of an EVENT-FaR-TIME 
metonymy (Lakoff and 10hnson, 1999: 154). The example "The Kronos Quartet 
concert is approaching" given by Lakoff and lohnson (1999: 154) obtains its 
meaning by the event of the concert standing for the time of the concert, and the time 
is conceptualised as approaching. In the EVENT-FOR-TIME metonymy: 
"Times are then conceptualised as locations or bounded regions in 
space or as objects or substances that move. Events are then located 
with respect to those locations in space or objects that move." (Lakoff 
and 10hnson, 1999: 155) 
Thus within Lifestreams, newly edited or created documents and reminders are 
located with respect to locations or bounded regions in the part of the display 
denoting the stream. We could therefore undertake an analysis similar to that in 
Appendix C of how present, ephemeral, and sub-streamed documents are referred to 
and find that manipulation of items within the categories formed in these regions of 
time is reasoned about in the same way as a pile or folder. It is noticeable that, like 
the second version of Medusa, Lifestreams resolves the problem of ambiguity 
introduced by trying to integrate folders with the overall organisation structure of the 
user interface by not having a folder interface feature at all. Also noticeable are the 
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commands provided by Lifestrcams to manipulate documents and streams, new, 
clone, transfer, find, and summary, most of which either have the same 
semantics as the generic commands, or those of class instance creation in object-
oriented programming languages. 
While Lifestreams may not be as radical an alternative to piles and folders as its 
creators believe, and relies for understanding on schemata that are unfamiliar to 
many users, the Lifestreams system does address a number of important problems. 
The most serious problems are the related issues of archiving and- scalability. The 
pile metaphor does not address archiving, information is used only for comparatively 
short periods of time and then disposed of, suiting the habits of knowledge workers. 
Scalability is not a problem that needs to be addressed if the information to be 
employed in tasks or the creation of new files is ephemeral, but where archiving is 
employed the number of files in an information space may grow to be large. In 
Lifestreams, files that are pushed off the edge of the display are automatically 
archived. The user must scroll back into the past in order to enter the region of time 
where the (now invisible) files may be found, although most of the depiction of each 
file will be hidden by the more recent files. The user may also use the find facility, 
but this function serves to create a substream. It is worth investigation to determine 
whether time-based search (when did I create that file?) is as prone to the difficulties 
of location-based search (where did I leave that file?), especially in terms of the 
consequences mentioned above of conceptualisations arising from the EVENT-FOR-
TIME metonymy. 
Data Mountain 
Data Mountain (Robertson et al., 1998) is a relatively simple means for storing and 
retrieving web documents. The Data Mountain, shown in Figure 9.11, is a texture-
mapped rectangular plane segment angled at 60° to the horizontal plane extending 
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away from the viewer and rendered in perspective. The Data Mountain is intended to 
replace the "favourites" or "bookmarks" mechanism of world-wide web browsers as 
a means of noting and returning later to web pages of interest to the user. Thumbnail 
icons, reductions of a \veb page to icon size, may be placed on the mountain in 
locations meaningful to the user and icons may occlude others. If icons are placed at 
the top of the mountain the act of rendering them in perspective will make them 
appear smaller than icons placed at the foot of the mountain. 
Figure 9.11 Data Mountain for web page favourites 
(Robertson et al., 1998: 153). 
Data Mountain, it should be noted, is, like the Spatial Data Management System and 
Perspective Wall, a spatial metaphor (Jones and Dumais, 1986), not a spatialization 
metaphor (Demasco, Newell, and Arnott, 1994; Regier, 1996) of the sort grounded 
in UP, IN, OUT, and so forth, schemas, discussed above. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
report that the mountain is a poor concept to ground in the body. Only reference to 
"the foot of the mountain", as we made in the last paragraph. is meaningful, and 
leads others (Bederson et al., 1996) to claim that the MOUNTAIN is BODY 
metaphor is a dead metaphor. Data Mountain is however interesting in allowing 
casual arrangement of icons collected together in space allowing ad hoc 
categorisation, and allowing spatial memory to aid in locating web pages sought. 
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This ability is very effective in the Data Mountain system (Czerwinski et al., 1999) 
even when the thumbnail images are removed leaving only blank icons, although 
. mouse-over text giving the page's title for each icon is found to be required to 
maintain retrieval ability over long periods of time. There remain, however, 
unanswered questions as to the scalability of this design in domains other than web 
page bookmarks. , In a web favourites system the number of bookmarks is likely to 
be small and there is likely to be a fast turnover of those links that become redundant 
quickly (it is claimed that between 2 and 9% of any web search engine's indexed 
collection of links will be out of date at any time). 
Alternative Interface Physics 
The metaphor-based interfaces to file organisation systems considered so far have 
mostly been flat model worlds (ARK, the desktop, Rooms), or augmented real-world 
environments (OigitalOesk, metaDESK, and wearable computers). In these systems 
the image size is fixed and the user's viewpoint is changed, either by manipulating a 
set of 2.50 windows, moving to another Room, shifting the radar view, or by motion 
of the head. A recent alternative solution is to adopt a different physics in which the 
size of the workbench is fixed, often a screen-size in area, but the workbench can be 
deformed to bring regions of interest into the region of attention. According to 
Carpendale, Cowperthwaite, and Fracchia (1995: 219) this concept" ... provides a 
useful metaphor for the actions performed to create the distortions. Pulling a section 
towards oneself to see it better, or ... magnify it, appears to be a natural response." 
A system that implements alternative interface physics is the Perspective Wall 
(Mackinlay, Robertson, and Card, 1991). The Perspective Wall is a pliable flat sheet 
on which icons denoting documents are placed. The central region of the wall is 
placed closest to the observer's point of view, parallel to the plane of the screen, and 
contains most information in greatest detail. The portions of the wall either side of 
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the central region bend away from the observer and are rendered in perspective. If 
the user clicks on an icon on a portion of the wall outside of the central region, the 
wall scrolls and distorts until the icon lies within the central region and the portions 
of \vall either side of the icon outside of the central region increase or decrease 
appropriately. 
The Perspective Wall exploits computer animation technology, metaphors from 
pliable surface interfaces, and metaphors to the relative acuity of vision across the 
surface of the retina, but is still limited in the numbers and types of files it can 
provide access to. The version of the Perspective Wall described by Mackinlay, 
Robertson, and Card (1991) arranges icons by advancing creation date from the 
oldest to the youngest from the left of the wall to the right. The wall maps the file's 
type, drawn from a fixed set of categories, to the vertical dimension of the wall. 
The PAD++ environment (Bederson et al., 1996) has a more pliable surface than the 
Perspective Wall. It may be deformed by the semantic zooming process on a more 
local scale within the central region, which in the case of PAD++ occupies the entire 
screen. The regions outside the central region can be brought into view using links 
and portals to other parts of the model world. PAD++ has been employed as a 
framework in which a number of familiar types of systems have been implemented, 
these include a \vorld-wide \veb browser and a file directory browser. The browser 
uses thumbnail icons of \veb pages, as in the Data Mountain, to depict particular 
pages. These icons can be enlarged by zooming to better detennine the identity of 
the web document, or completely enlarged until the document is rendered full-size 
and as the focus of the user's attention. The directory browser is similar to the 
PAD++ web browser, but files are only depicted as coloured squares, the colour 
denoting category membership, until zoomed to the maximum magnification 
possible where the file's contents become visible. 
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Further Developments of the Pile Metaphor 
The initial work on the pile metaphor undertaken by Mander, Salomon, and Wong 
(1992) was based upon prototypes built using Macromedia Director. These 
prototypes, however, were shallow, in that most proposed user interface features 
were implemented but not linked to any underlying functionality. Subsequent 
prototypes employed clustering techniques to support both piles and documents in 
the same information space and both direct manipulation and automatic sorting 
tasks. Using clustering to collect together seemingly related files allows the task of 
subpiling to be delegated to an electronic assistant. How the 'agent' that performs this 
task can be comprehended as part of a desktop metaphor (viewing it as part of a 
wider OFFICE TASKS metaphor raises the problems encountered with Ed discussed 
in Chapter 4) is not explained though. Unfortunately work (Rose et al., 1993) that 
might have continued on employing clustering techniques to widen the sorts of 
categories of objects that piles contain; to allow user-defined categories to be 
automatically constructed from more complex file attributes; and to resolve 
remaining pile user interface's inconsistencies, was abandoned (Rose, 1998) when 
Apple's Advanced Technology Group was disbanded. It is clear, however, that work 
picking up where on piles left off should be added to the topics for further study if 
the scalability problem of managing files in user interfaces to organisation 
mechanisms is to be addressed. 
9.2 Medusa-"t: A System Addressing Temporal Problems 
In their view of design, taking into account long-standing criticisms of the 
Objectivist tradition underlying classical views of metaphor, Winograd and Rores 
(1986: 178) state: 
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"Computers have a particularly powerful impact, because they are 
machines for acting in a language. In using them \ve engage in a 
discourse generated \vithin the distinctions set down by their 
programmers. The objects, properties, and acts we can distinguish and 
perform are organised according to a particular background and pre-
understanding. In most cases this pre-understanding reflects the 
rationalistic tradition we have criticised ... It includes biases about 
objectivity, about the nature of 'facts' (or 'data' or 'information') and 
their origin and about the role of the individual interacting with the 
computer. 
We have argued that tools based on this pre-understanding will lead 
to important kinds of breakdown in their use." 
It has already been discussed above how the mismatch between the objects and 
objects' attributes, and tasks that objects' behaviours support, provided in a model 
world and what is suggested by the metaphorical source domain can cause 
breakdowns in user interfaces. Delays and lags are other causes of breakdown in 
metaphors and analogies in model worlds. The tradition that informs Winograd and 
Aores suggests that breakdowns force the user into a state of having to account for 
the breakdown, a true state of being in the (model) world is denied them. Rather than 
being able to naturally perform their work in the task domain, additional effort must 
be expended to model the system. In addition to the sources of breakdown caused by 
failure of metaphors, breakdowns also occur due to the unpredictable temporal 
behaviour of computing systems (Dix, 1987). 
Two approaches may be found to solve the problem of temporal behaviour of 
systems that users may find troublesome. One approach is a design solution, the 
temporal behaviour of the system may be examined, modelled and understood (both 
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from a system and the users' perspective} and the user interface may be designed to 
incorporate features which explain the temporal behaviour within the system's 
conceptual model. This approach is adopted in the design of the first two Medusa 
systems. Another approach is a technological approach. The system may be designed 
and implemented so that the temporal behaviour of the system is controlled and 
guaranteed. An example is the attempt to guarantee the instantaneous response to 
typed input in a commercial word processor by only updating the line on which the 
cursor currently lies, and updating the layout of the remainder of the document 
visible on-screen when the user pauses typing (reported in Dix, 1991). 
The Medusa-'t system is based upon the Medusa system, and assumes the same task 
domain as the Medusa system. The concern of the Medusa-'t system is to guarantee, 
where possible, the temporal behaviour of the system so that feedback of the system 
state and updating of the diagrammatic display depicting parts of the system image 
are appropriate and immediate. This approach simplifies the conceptual model and 
the interface design, the details of software design, however, as well as the 
implementation details, become more complicated. The issues of software 
architecture, implementation, operating system design and treatment and modelling 
of concurency and real-time system development require considerable attention if 
the Medusa-'t system is to be successfully implemented. 
Some authors doubt that the real-time behaviour of systems needs to be considered. 
Took (1990a: 126), for example, claims that: 
" ... timing is much less critical in general user interface systems than 
in process control applications, for example, because human users are 
more tolerant of delays or variations in timing than machines." 
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Hill (1992) states his hope that the complexities of real-time programming can be 
avoided in user interface design. The need to consider temporal issues in user 
interface design is becoming more widely recognised (Johnson and Gray, 1995), 
however. When polled as to their requirements, users state that they prefer fast 
system responses, and data exist on the optimum rates for displaying text, for 
example. Feedback can, however, be too immediate, if information flow is from the 
system to the user, there are maximum rates at which information may be presented 
if users are to be able to obtain information from the display (Card, Moran, and 
Newell, 1983). 
Where the effects of actions and operators on the state of the user interface must be 
interpreted or learned for later use, reinforcement in the learner's mind that a 
particular action helps bring about a desired system state is reduced if the system 
feedback, and subsequent reinforcement is delayed (Kaelbling, 1993). Effects of 
system response time on the strategy users employ when interacting with user 
interfaces have also been noted. With increasing delays between user input and 
system response, users avoid actions which may cause errors and do not request 
output to confirm the system state, actions are increasingly planned and 
experimentation avoided (Grossberg et al., 1976). Where system delays are shorter 
than the many seconds in Orossberg's et al. (1976) experiment, but also vary, 
changes in user strategy have been observed by Teal and Rudnicky (1992) (although 
not as clearly in the replication of Teal and Rudnicky's experiments performed by 
O'Donnell and Draper, 1995). Their experiment considered user input to an 
unbuffered system where delays between user input and system feedback varied, and 
users were unable to enter further input until feedback was received. Where delays 
exceed 1.75 seconds, users are said to adopt a monitoring strategy, waiting for 
system feedback before continuing. Between delays of 0.75 seconds and 1.75 
seconds users are seen to adopt a pacing strategy, entering input to the system 
without waiting for feedback, judging delays between input and adjusting the delay 
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in response to errors where the judged delay is shorter than the actual system delay. 
Where delays are shorter than 0.75 seconds the user is able to adopt a strategy of 
automatic performance, latencies between keystrokes due to cognition and the 
human motor system are longer than system delays. 
As well as long delays between user input and system feedback causing users to alter 
their behaviour to compensate, and the learning of systems being complicated, a 
number of other arguments for addressing the temporal behaviour of user interface 
software have been proposed. The seven stage model of interaction with interactive 
systems proposed by Norman (1984), for example, relies on there being no 
perceivable delays between the execution of user actions and system feedback for 
the loop of interaction to be maintained. 
9.2.1 Implementing Medusa-,; 
Work has progressed on the refinement and implementation of systems described in 
the Agent notation (Treglown, 1998), and we have now a complete formal 
operational semantics and heuristics for converting the required external behaviour 
of agents into Java code (but not a full set of refinement laws). Methods for 
converting a timed Agent model, developed for the task of describing systems such 
as Medusa-"t into a suitable language running on a suitable combination of hardware 
and operating system, remain to be completed. 
9.3 Conclusions 
The first version of the Medusa system, the version that has received most design 
effort, while attempting to overcome known difficulties in the application of 
metaphors in the design of the model world is based in the Objectivist tradition 
rejected in the last chapter. In this chapter, two revised versions of the Medusa 
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system, one taking into account the Lakoff/lohnson theory of metaphor 
understanding, another recognising breakdowns introduced by the temporal 
behaviour of interactive systems, were discussed. In the following chapter, the 
contributions of the Medusa systems to HCI, and suggestions for further work, arc 
presented, as are conclusions drawn from the work presented above. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions and Further Work 
What keeps you awake at night? 
Trying to finish the phrase 'A bad simile is like a ... I 
- Mark Lamarr, questionnaire column, The Guardian, 5/9/98. 
10.1 Summary of the Thesis 
In this chapter we summarise the work undertaken, suggest the contribution of the 
work to HeI theory and to user interface design, indicate further work immediately 
arising from the work reported on here, and introduce on-going work to resolve 
unfinished problems. The work undertaken and reported in this thesis can be 
summarised as follows: 
• a survey of interface styles and design methods revealed the problem of choice in 
the user interface design process, and resulted in the role of metaphor and analogy 
in user interfaces and in user interface design being considered for investigation, 
• a survey of a number of important and influential systems that are based on explicit 
metaphors in their model worlds revealed the important concepts, interaction 
styles, and widgets that these systems introduce, 
• a literature review showed the limitations of employing metaphors and analogies in 
previous user interface designs, 
• a small-scale study of first-time Apple Macintosh users supported findings of a 
previous similar study and identified problematic features for which improved user 
interface designs were judged to be needed, 
• a literature review sought to examine where metaphors fit into the wider context of 
users' mental models of interactive systems and the pervasive nature of metaphor in 
these models \vas discussed, 
• an analysis and model-building exercise of current systems applied the QPf 
method of describing mental models which is not usually employed in HCI. These 
models revealed inherent flaws in some metaphor-based systems, and revealed that 
some reconsideration was required of the domains between which metaphorical 
mappings are thought to be made. This consideration supported Laurel's (1993) 
previously proposed analysis of domains and mapping in interface metaphors, 
• an examination of current system design showed the failings of existing user 
interface metaphors and of the existing theories of metaphor understanding, 
• an application of a contemporary theory of metaphor due to Lakoff and 10hnson to 
user interface design was made by recognising the need to be aware of results in 
formal semantics that question the nature of metaphorical understanding previously 
assumed in HCI, 
• a number of case studies extended the limited use to which the Lakoffllohnson 
account of metaphor understanding has previously been put in analysing user 
interface designs, and which further demonstrated the usefulness of this approach, 
• a new system design named Medusa based on the guidelines and the QPT models 
discussed in Chapter 5 was designed, 
• revision of the first Medusa system design were presented based on the results of 
usability testing, and based on the results of applying the theory introduced in 
Chapter 8 as a generative source of novel user interface designs, 
• a comparison between the second, revised, design and recent user interface designs 
for the same task domain showed the comparability of these designs and suggested 
optimism for the usability of an implementation of the revised system design. 
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10.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
Bannon and B~dker (1991) identify two approaches to design within HCI, a task 
analysis approach, which they criticise and reject in favour of an artifact approach. 
The task analysis approach informs the development of the first Medusa system. 
This approach is characterised by the assumptions underlying cognitive science and 
psychology, and the use of task analysis methods and programmable user models in 
design. In this approach, the computing system is programmed from an analysis and 
structured description of the tasks currently performed by eventual users of the new 
system, or from an analysis of the cognitive resources and knowledge structures 
needed to perform the task. 
The artifact approach, by contrast, assumes that tools (hence also computing 
systems) are only fully revealed and understood in use, where "in use" has a far 
wider meaning than studying systems in the laboratory with representative users as 
subjects. While the second version of Medusa cannot claim to be informed by the 
artefact approach, it is based on assumptions that criticise some of the assumptions 
underlying the first Medusa system. Below we discuss the contributions of the two 
Medusa systems in terms of the two approaches to HC! design, and also in terms of 
one set of suggestions for key HCI issues that should be addressed. 
10.2.1 Medusa in a Cognitivist Framework 
The first Medusa system, described in Chapter 6 and evaluated in Chapter 7, is 
grounded in the traditional cognitivist framework that is rejected in the methods of 
analysis used in the design of the second Medusa system. The use of the Qualitative 
Process Theory in Chapter 5 to describe mental models of model worlds based on 
physical world metaphors, and to provide a semantics to user operations in order to 
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explain changes to objects in the Medusa model world assumes an Objectivist world 
view. The work on Medusa version one makes two contributions. Firstly, Laurel's 
(1993) notion of user interface similes is strengthened as identifying the important 
domains between which mappings should be made in user interface metaphors. 
Secondly, mismatches between the on-screen model world and the underlying 
functionality are identified as a key source of user difficulties in understanding the 
system. 
In addition, the way of viewing software that this contribution employs has also been 
acknowledged l as being an influence on the design of the Ontological Sketch Model 
(Blandford and Green, 1997) for modelling user interfaces and identifying usability 
faults. The Ontological Sketch Model (OSM), as its name suggests, requires the 
system designer or analyst to construct an ontology of interface objects and the 
actions that can be performed on them. The analyst lists the things that the user must 
know about in the interface, their attributes, accessibility, relevance to either the 
application domain or the device domain, whether the object is visible and whether 
or not it has a meaningful name or symbol. OSM, being more of a system 
engineering approach, captures aspects of the model world that QPT does not, QPT 
not being initially devised for use in He!. OSM and QPT are comparable, however, 
in the number of aspects of system described in models of user-initiated actions and 
the effects that these actions have on interface objects. QPT describes these effects in 
a more formal way, however, and more tools exist that currently do for OSM to 
make predictions of the outcomes of effects. A section of an OSM description of a 
drawing package (taken from Blandford and Green, 1997) can be seen in Table 10.1. 
1 Thomas Green (personal communication) 14th November 1997. seminar at the Knowledge Media 
Institute. The Open University. Milton Keynes. 
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Action Object Effect Context Notes 
click drawing area lay down a discrete mode 
point for a 
sketchy-line 
drag drawing area lay down continuous speed of 
shape for a mode dragging 
sketchy-line affects 
sketchiness 
Table 10.1 Part of an OSM table for a drawing package 
10.2.2 Medusa in a Cognitive Semantics Framework 
The second version of Medusa adopts the LakofflJohnson contemporary theory of 
metaphor in order to account for how some interactive computing systems can be 
understood. While the application of this theory to interactive computing systems is 
not unique. our application of it began independently of Rohrer's work (1995). The 
contribution of the work contained in Chapters 8 and 9 and in (Treglown, 1999) is to 
demonstrate the applicability of the Lakoff/Johnson theory to describe a wider range 
of interactive systems than it has been attempted to describe before. This work also 
promotes the Lakoff/Johnson contemporary theory as a candidate theory applicable 
to the design and evaluation of computing systems. The comparative analysis 
presented in Chapter 9 and Appendix C shows the value of applying the 
contemporary theory of metaphor as a predictive and analytical tool to reason about 
modem metaphor-based software technology. Benyon and Imaz (1999) demonstrate 
their recent adoption of the approach to design suggested by employing the 
Lakoff/Johnson theory in HCI and show that the contemporary theory is gaining the 
attention of other members of the HCI community. 
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10.3 Does the Work Address Key Issues in HeI? 
Shneiderman (1986) identifies seven key issues that HeI should address, in this 
section we examine whether the work conducted and reported in this thesis is 
appropriate in terms of work that is deemed valuable and necessary, and whether the 
\vork addresses any of Shneiderman's challenges to researchers. According to 
Shneiderman's (1989) more recent, but less finely delineated, identification of 
important future directions in HeI research, we can claim that the work undertaken 
addresses the need to cater for office practice and the inclusion of more complex 
documents (containing media other than just text) in the model world. We can also 
claim that the Medusa systems contribute to understanding the temporal behaviour of 
interactive systems. Below we consider in further detail the contributions of the work 
in terms of Shneiderman's (1986) classification. While the detailed challenges he sets 
the HeI community are presented in tenns of the prevailing technologies of the era 
in which his paper was published, the delineation of research problems is still 
valuable. 
10.3.1 Interaction Styles - What is Natural? 
In Shneiderman's analysis, natural interaction is said to be strongly related to the 
notion of directness, irrespective of the modality of interaction. Frolich (1993) 
observes that the meaning of directness has altered from Shneidennan's original 
meaning of the "first personness of interaction through manipulation" to Hutchins, 
Hollan, and Norman's (1986) meaning of it being a combination of distance and 
engagement. Engagement refers to first personness, the sense that the on-screen 
objects are the actual objects being manipulated. The term distance is employed in 
Hutchins' et al. conception of direct manipulation systems to refer to the complexity 
of mapping goals to actions meaningful to the computer at the interface. Systems 
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termed direct are designed so that this distance is minimised. Frolich notes that it is 
legitimate to apply the notion of directness to both conversational and manipulative 
systems and that the trend towards interfaces exclusively based upon manipulative 
interaction is an accident of history and is a trend that he states should be halted. For 
tasks such as information retrieval, mail handling, time handling, and programming, 
conversational and mixed mode systems are said to be more appropriate and more 
direct than action-based systems. 
Frolich also claims that the historical association of directness with model world 
interfaces leads to an assumption that the use of real world metaphors improves 
directness. He suggests instead that it is also possible to conceive of direct 
conversational systems which do not employ metaphorical devices to reduce 
psychological distance. and also that the traditional historical association diverts 
attention away from supporting action-based interaction by using non-metaphorical 
icons to represent abstract computational structures. While we agree with another of 
Frolich's observations, that some real-world metaphors can result in indirect systems 
that do not enhance the user's experience of using the system, we offer different 
views to Frolich's. In the light of modem theories of metaphor examined and 
employed in this thesis we disagree with Frolich's central claim that designers should 
be encouraged to be sceptical about choosing action-based solutions to design 
problems. We also disagree with the suggestion that visual formalisms (that are 
claimed to rely less on metaphor for their semantics) and that language-based or 
mixed language/action-based forms of interaction should be used. 
The contemporary theory of metaphor suggests that language cannot be as free of 
metaphor as Frolich believes, and that metaphor is central to cognition and 
semantics. Neither is it clear that. in the light of the contemporary theory, that visual 
formalisms, as described by Nardi and Zarmer (1993), are entirely free of metaphor 
in their semantics, as has been suggested. Graphs (x-y plots of data), for example, 
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are often mentioned as examples of visual formalisms, but, as is employed in some 
audio representations of data values using varying pitch (Buxton et al., 1985), 
underlying the semantics of the representation is an up is lnore metaphor. In other 
visual formalisms, for example graphs (nodes and links) such as Petri nets, quantities 
such as time may be grounded in terms of physical location in the diagram. Where 
visual formalisms are also dynamic and interactive, with further investigation it may 
prove that metaphors, in the terms that we now think of them, may be relied upon 
more for understanding of the formalism. than claimed. 
In contrast to Frolich, we claim that while some metaphors can produce indirect 
systems, the key to directness is not necessarily to employ language-based or 
collaborative manipulation interfaces (described below). Instead we claim that 
directness is a product of the type and complexity of image schemata that ground a 
metaphorical mapping. We have shown that a feature found in an implementation of 
the desktop user interface breaks the invariance principle and is hard to account for. 
It also fails to suggest suitable actions that would allow tasks to be performed. The 
schemas that ground interaction \vith the second version of the Medusa system are 
simple. The resulting interaction with the system would appear to be direct. A claim 
that we tentatively propose, and shall investigate as further work, is that directness is 
a concept related to Lakofrs invariance principle, and that collaborative 
manipulation systems should be adopted only when the schemata that ground 
metaphors and actions become complex or the invariance principle is broken. The 
Medusa systems, and the approaches adopted to understand them, do, at least, seem 
to provide a framework in which directness can be consistently discussed. 
10.3.2 Input Techniques - Putting Intention into Action 
The choice and use of particular input devices with an interactive system is a topic 
related to the issue of naturalness of interaction. It remains a topic of ongoing \vork 
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as to how the amount of distance and directness between user intention and system 
terminology is changed by the use of different input devices. Application of results 
reported in leannerod (1997) suggests that a number of recent and novel input 
devices can be very direct if used in physical world metaphors. The mouse, however, 
despite its prevalence as an input device in direct manipulation interfaces, presents a 
number of problems. We cannot yet detail the image schemata underlying 
spatiomimesis and mouse-based interaction in general, and account for the reduced 
directness that the mouse seems to give rise to. Work to fully provide a rigorous 
grounding of mouse-based interaction in terms of image schemas and metaphor is 
ongoing. This work is likely to draw on results discussed in Lakoff and lohnson 
(1999). This work demonstrates that where Regier (1996) shows how the linguistic 
and pre-linguistic spatial concepts that form many of the image schemata that we 
have employed in the analyses of user interfaces above can be acquired from 
prototypical examples, these spatial concepts can also be used to suggest and 
generate suitable motor skills to perform tasks (Bailey, Feldman, Narayanan, and 
Lakoff, 1997; Narayanan, 1997). 
10.3.3 Output Organisation 
Concern for visibility and tangibility ensures Shneiderman's recommendation to 
enforce consistency in the model world. The use of either the browser metaphor or 
pile metaphor for file organisation reflects the user's need for organisation (either 
messy or tidy) and classification of objects according to the immediate needs of their 
tasks and their category structures, according to the version of Medusa being used. 
The more focused concerns under this issue, such as the fonts and colours used, 
remain design options to be addressed if a full implementation of the system is 
developed. 
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10.3.4 Response Time 
The need to account for the temporal behaviour of the Medusa systems was 
mentioned above alongside descriptions of the user interface features in Medusa that 
are intended to aid the user in forming a useful and accurate mental model of the 
system. We have suggested throughout the thesis that the designs of both versions of 
Medusa, and the design of Medusa-"t, are motivated in part by the need to address the 
issue of system response time, and to account for a system's temporal behaviour. The 
Medusa systems and Medusa-"t adopt two different strategies in their -design, 
respectively providing the user of an account of the cause of temporal breakdowns, 
and attempting to ensure that breakdowns do not occur. 
10.3.5 Error Handling - Preventing User Errors 
It is normally assumed that in "extreme" direct manipulation interfaces, i.e. those 
that implement physical world metaphors, it is not possible to make errors, as 
commonly understood. Alternatively it is assumed that only semantic errors can be 
made, where the user is not prevented from performing erroneous physical actions 
that have little sensible meaning in the machine's terms. In the first version of the 
Medusa system, the object-message style of interaction limits the number of errors 
that can be made; messages that cannot be sent to an object in its current state do not 
appear on the toolbar. In the second version of Medusa tasks that might cause errors 
to arise, particularly file movement tasks, are less likely to occur as the semantic 
distance between the on-screen world and the system semantics is reduced. Users 
may still perform tasks that they may not actually have wanted to perform, however, 
and will require undo and recovery facilities. 
As noted in Chapter 7, the first Medusa system makes no explicit provision for undo 
and recovery facilities within the model world and in the support of users' tasks. 
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Undo (the provision of a feature that allows a previous system state to be returned 
to), and recovery (the ability to return to a previous state and to rerun history issuing 
a different set of commands), present particular difficulties in the design of an 
interactive system. Neither facility is product-oriented (task analysis cannot fully 
reveal the ways in which recovery might be conducted using a facility yet to be 
introduced). Rather the true usability of such features will be revealed in system use, 
the tool itself will be changed by the introduction of an undo facility, and so the true 
nature of interaction with a system that supports undo cannot be fully predicted. An 
analysis of the schema that might underlie potential metaphors for undoing 
commands remains to be conducted. This is despite the need to provide one for the 
Medusa system identified in Chapter 7, and the recognised need to understand the 
limits and possibilities of undo in metaphor-based user interfaces in general 
(Tognazzini, 1992: Chapter 10). 
10.3.6 Individual Differences 
The differences of gender, age, ethnic background, cultural heritage, and so on, that 
Shneiderman judges must be accounted for by design guidelines are not considered 
in any detail in this research. The intended user population of the Medusa systems is 
all users of the systems who perform tasks supported by the operating system 
through necessity not choice. Therefore, it should be possible to perform all tasks 
supported by Medusa with little expertise. The issue of cultural diversity and 
metaphor understanding in interactive system design is briefly discussed in Section 
10.4.2. 
A topic that Marcus (1993) discusses, that is also deserving of further investigation 
continuing the work begun and reported in this thesis, is the need to be aware of 
cultural diversity in the design of computing systems. In Marcus' analysis, the types 
of metaphor that he considers important in forming the basis for a user interface 
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design, and the types of metaphor that he feels help the designer to design a product 
for an international audience, are metaphors that are broad in scope and that are 
meant to encourage understanding of a large part of the system's functionality. These 
metaphors are subject to the problems described in Chapter 3 and by 10hnson (1994). 
The use of metaphor in the second version of Medusa described in Chapter 9 
recognises the centrality of metaphor in cognition and understanding claimed by the 
Lakoffllohnson theory of metaphor understanding. In the contemporary theory, 
cultures define the categories that people possess, their conceptual structures, and the 
prototypical effects in category usage that will arise from the categories and 
conceptual structures. One conclusion that the contemporary theory allows us to 
reach is that since cultural effects are demonstrated even in the very basic image 
schemata that underlie people's understanding of the world, the strictly action-based 
Medusa version two system, or any other direct manipUlation interface, can never be 
an "interface for all." Lakofrs (1987) survey claims, for example, that even FRONT-
BACK schemata (very basic and common patterns of interaction with the external 
world) differ across cultures. However there exists within Medusa considerable 
scope for exploring further limits to the comprehensibility and usability of direct 
manipulation interfaces where metaphor is employed in their meaning and 
understanding. 
10.3.7 Explanatory and Predictive Theories 
Shneiderman's (1986) most firmly stated demand is for HCI to develop robust 
theoretical foundations, theories forming a basis for research, design guidelines, and 
teaching. The complaint underlying the research reported here is that while metaphor 
is thought to be central to understanding the world (and user interfaces), and while 
theories of metaphor and metaphor understanding exist, few applications of specific 
theories of metaphor as applied to HeI seem to exist. The work reported here has 
sought to remedy this, and as such can be said to address one of the issues that 
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Shneiderman judges important. The work undertaken to date has not invalidated the 
notion that the Lakoffllohnson contemporary theory is a promising candidate theory 
capable of accounting for much of metaphorical understanding of interfaces, and 
understanding of metaphor-based systems. A continued investigation of how 
successful and useful a predictive tool the contemporary theory can be in user 
interface design is ongoing, and some discussion of this work can be found below. In 
some views of the process of scientific endeavour, a theory is of worth if it is, in 
principle, falsifiable. Further work using the LakofflJohnson theory should therefore 
address criticisms of it (for example Vervaeke and Green, 1997). 
10.4 Suggestions for Further Work 
10.4.1 Full Implementation of the Medusa Systems 
As discussed in Chapter 7, usability evaluation methods are based upon assumptions 
about the nature of learning and using interactive systems. These assumptions 
determine the types of usability errors revealed. Usability evaluation methods also 
differ in the number of usability errors that they reveal. The cognitive walkthrough 
method employed in Chapter 7 reveals only a small number of usability errors, this 
number would be increased if the number of system evaluators were increased. The 
use of a usability inspection method was required due to the lack of a working 
prototype of the Medusa system described in Chapter 6. 
The Medusa systems are grounded on particular models and theories, and a partial 
implementation of the first version was based on an (again partial) formal 
specification using the Agent notation (Abowd, 1990). The aims of the research 
include examining the possibility of specifying aspects of direct manipulation. The 
research aims also include examining the possibility of being able to formally 
describe system features which can maintain metaphors that do not suffer from the 
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breakdowns common to existing metaphors. However, even if a full specification 
had been completed, and principles of usability, such as those provided by Dix 
(1991), had been applied to the specification and the specification verified, it is 
unlikely that all usability errors would have been revealed. Work by Harrison, Roast, 
and Wright (1989) and Wright, Merriam, and Fields (1998) shows that the abstract 
model of a system cannot reveal all usability problems; testing involving a 
completed system and human subjects is required to reveal the true range of usability 
problems. Given the more complex model of metaphor and cognition assumed in the 
design of the second version of the Medusa system, the need for user testing is even 
greater than for the first Medusa system. The "scientific" model of usability analysis 
presented by Wright, Merriam, and Fields (1998) is of particular interest. For 
example, the testing of claims made by formal models by usability testing allows 
formal models to be refined and made more useful. The empirical study reported in 
Chapter 4, and the issues surrounding metaphor, action, and categorisation 
demonstrated by recent models and theories show that data obtained from people is 
the most valuable source of data when seeking to understand the user's 
understanding of an interactive system. Progress toward identifying useful interface 
metaphors and the schemata that structure them can be made by investigating 
existing systems and tasks in detail. Given a suitable corpus of interaction data, 
existing metaphor-based design methods seek to determine the verbs and nouns 
making up the task domain. In our approach, demonstrated in Appendix C, we 
attempt to identify the spatialisation, and other, metaphors that the task domain is 
understood in terms of. It is these larger metaphors that we will use in future to 
generate better visual representations and interaction sequences. 
10.4.2 Implementing Agents 
The formal notation explored as a means of specifying the Medusa systems, as 
mentioned, was Abowd's (1990) Agent model and language. While work has 
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continued on applying this model to the specification of interactive systems, and the 
problem of refining the specification into code (Treglown, 1998), refinement into all 
programming languages suitable for interactive user interfaces is not yet possible. 
Also, the additional theory developed, while permitting refinement of the external, 
dynamic, behaviour of agents, relies on transformation by hand~ tools to automate 
the refinement process remain a topic for further work. The agent model is, however, 
unsuitable for specifying some classes of systems that work in user interface 
metaphor must address. The model of concurrency adopted by the external 
behaviour of all the agent models that we have employed to date in this work cannot 
capture truly concurrent events. This problem will need further attention if the 
problem of designing a collaborative and shared Medusa environment is considered. 
The first step in this process is to continue work reported in (Treglown, 1998), and to 
generate a semantic equivalence between agent specifications and modules of code 
in a suitable programming language. This should be done instead of continuing to 
translate a transition system compiled from the external behaviour components of the 
agents making up a system into high-level language code in a principled, but 
informal way. 
10.5 The Future of Metaphors and Direct Manipulation 
10.S.1 Classes of Metaphor and Understanding Directness 
The types, or paradigms, of interaction that the user might have with a computing 
system are defined by Hutchins (1989) who refers to these types of interaction as 
interaction metaphors. The definitions employed in this thesis are Hutchins', but we 
have avoided referring to them as metaphors to reduce confusion. The types of 
systems we considered in this work were said to be based on the model world 
paradigm, in contrast with the conversation paradigm. Hutchins defines two other 
interaction metaphors, however, and some consideration should be paid to these, 
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especially if they should become increasingly relevant, and prevalent, in future 
systems. The declaration metaphor is based on ideas from speech act theory where 
utterances are sufficient to change the state of the \vorld (for example, "I pronounce 
you man and wife"). A declarative interface differs from the conversation paradigm 
in that utterances have a "causal force" in the world. The declaration metaphor is a 
poor metaphor, however, as \vhen the user issues an ungrammatical expression, no 
change in the world occurs. Thus if the user issues an expression with no causal 
force, or one that cannot bring about a change in the state of the world, there is no 
way to filter ol:lt or report objections to these expressions. Interaction witli such a 
system would eventually prove frustrating, not least because many expressions, 
notably those involving deictic reference, cannot be acted upon. 
The final interaction metaphor defined by Hutchins ( 1989) is collaborative 
manipulation, which is depicted in Figure 10.1. In this interaction metaphor, 
Hutchins states that the computer should be an actor in the setting in which it is 
employed and thus should behave as a human does in human-human interaction and 
should support conversational interaction. The model world metaphor, the 
interaction style that has been the subject of this thesis, is based on the assumption 
that people are skilled at manipulating objects in the environment. Because work is 
often conducted in a social world, and in a collaborative manner, this implies that 
user interfaces should consist of both a model world and an intelligent agent. Both 
the user and the agent should have equal ability to alter the system's state, but the 
agent can automate those tasks that are tedious for the user to perform. 
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Figure 10.1 The collaborative manipulation metaphor (Hutchins, 1989: 25). 
The notion that the collaborative manipulation metaphor represents the future of 
direct manipulation is one advocated by Frolich (1993). Shneiderman's 
(Shneiderman and Maes, 1997) antagonism towards agents, by contrast, means that 
he feels that the user should be the sole party in control of the system and that 
improving information visualisation should be the aim of the designer. Frolich 
(1993), building on recognised limitations of direct manipulation systems; and Maes 
(Shneiderman and Maes, 1997), arguing from the observation that file storage 
systems are no longer restricted to a small number of volumes on a local area 
network); both conclude that software agents and virtual partners are required. While 
the Medusa system designs do not exclude the possible inclusion of an agent as an 
application consistent with the model world, the file space model assumed by the 
first Medusa system better permits repetitive tasks and searching of the world-wide 
web to be conducted. These tasks use the same data structures that the user must 
understand and interact with in the local file space. The second version of the 
Medusa system, because it considers the grounding of metaphors in physical 
experience and because it is based on physical world metaphors, requires that any 
agent will be less consistent with the local model world. The agent's representation 
of the wider file space will be inconsistent with the user's, and it will be harder for 
the user to state their intentions so that the agent can act on them. By contrast, 
discussion of the local model world is easier. If the assumption that the image 
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schemata that the Medusa model world metaphors are grounded upon are common to 
the experience of the users is correct, then we possess a means for an agent and the 
user to discuss tasks and changes in the system's state. We also possess a basis for 
the same meaning of their respective utterances, irrespective of modality, to be 
inferred. 
10.5.2 Metaphors for Future Computing Systems 
In Chapter 2 a short review was undertaken of interesting computing systems of the 
sort described as antisedentary beigeless computing (ABC) by Underkoffler (1997) 
in which clear use of metaphor in their user interface is made. Marcus (1993) 
provides one analysis of the use of metaphor in ABC systems. In contrast to Frolich, 
Marcus is a proponent of the use of metaphors in user interfaces, and in future user 
interfaces. The principal type of ABC system that Marcus (1993) addresses are those 
termed personal digital assistants (PDAs). This class of ABC system is subject to 
the same criticisms of existing desk-bound systems that motivated the design of the 
Medusa systems. 
Unlike Norman's (1998) information appliances, which are typically computing 
systems dedicated to a single information-based task with the ability to share this 
infonnation with other information appliances, PDAs provide several application 
software packages that typically support office-based tasks in a single device. The 
PDA, therefore, must provide user interfaces to each of these applications within the 
capabilities provided by the PDA as a whole. Marcus' (1993) analysis provides 
metaphors (such as the Rolodex, the "to do" list, calendars, assistance, search, and 
selection) that a PDA must support. A basic PDA therefore presents the same 
problems in terms of its use of metaphor as those described in depth in Chapter 3. 
Where some PDAs differ from simply being a pocket-sized implementation of the 
desktop, however, is in preferentially supporting the verbs over the nouns that 
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describe users' tasks in the design of the user interface metaphors. The data objects 
which the applications manipulate are hidden or bound with the application's state 
rather than denoted as on-screen objects in their own right. One can see a key reason 
for this if the physical size of a typical PDA screen is compared with the screen real 
estate needed to implement a folders and files, or pile-based, data retrieval and 
storage mechanism. A focus of further work will be to examine how a Medusa-like 
system might be implemented for a PDA. Our experience of living with a PalmPilot2 
PDA for some time has demonstrated that support for classification and dynamic 
reclassification of events and data files, a topic addressed in detail in Chapter 9, is 
often in conflict in existing PDAs with support required to model the conceptual 
structures used to describe the model world. 
10.5.3 Metaphor-based Design 
Above, a number of new interface designs were presented, but although attempts 
were made to justify particular design decisions, very little was said about the 
impact, if any, of the development of Medusa on design practice. As with many 
other activities, analogy plays a part in design (Maclean et al., 1991), but we have, so 
far, not devoted much attention to how design of metaphor-based systems is, or 
should be, conducted. A small number of design methodologies for metaphor-based 
systems have been devised, and while they differ in the number of steps in the design 
process, many of the steps are common to the different methodologies. Marx (1994), 
Madsen (1994), and Carroll, Mack, and Kellog (1988) agree that design is a four-
step process. Firstly, potential metaphors, from the user's point of view, are 
identified. Matches between these metaphors and underlying software are then 
identified with respect to representative task scenarios that the system must support. 
2 PalmPilot is a registered trademark of 3COM corporation. 
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Likely mismatches and their implications are also identified. Finally, design 
strategies to help users manage mismatches must be identified. 
For Smyth et al. (1995) design of metaphor-based systems is based upon a far 
simpler model of metaphor understanding than those described in Chapters 3 and 8, 
and comprises six stages. Firstly the system functionality is defined, next potential 
vehicles (source domains) are generated and described. Vehicle-system (target 
domain) pairings are then analysed to identify mismatches, including conceptual 
baggage - user's assumptions arising from the metaphor that cannot be applied in 
the electronic domain. Implementation of the metaphor eventually chosen requires 
that the issues of representation, realism and consistency must be considered. The 
next step in Smyth's et al. design process is to examine and choose suitable 
evaluation techniques, finally, lessons learned while undertaking the design of a 
metaphor-based system are used to adjust the details of how process steps are 
performed in future design tasks. 
Moll-Carrillo et al. (1995) adopt the same steps as Smyth's et al. design process. For 
Tscheligi and Vaananen-Vainio-Mattila (1998), design of metaphor-based systems 
consists of the following steps; firstly analysis of the task domain is undertaken, then 
mappings between sources and the target are generated. Visualisations of the sources 
in suitable graphical representations are then generated, the final step is to conduct 
evaluations of the mappings and their graphical representations. Tscheligi and 
Vaananen-Vainio-Mattila's work is interesting in that they, unlike others who have 
proposed metaphor-based design methodologies, have developed a design support 
environment to aid the development of metaphor-based interfaces. This tool, called 
ShareME, is limited, however, in that it addresses only the analysis problem -
finding suitable metaphors for a task domain - and only organisational metaphors 
such as houses and libraries for navigation tasks are stored in its metaphor library. If 
tools are to be more useful they must address more steps in the design process, and 
284 
they must havc access to a widcr range of possible source domains. Marcus (1994: 
42-43) suggests that: 
"What we shall see is not only the phenomenon of massive doses of 
ever changing news, sports, fashion, and tools delivered wirelessly 24 
hours per day, but also constantly fluctuating 'artifacts' or 'vehicles' 
for the delivery of the content. User interfaces will become 
publications themselves ... As new metaphors emerge, older ones will 
disappear. The constant will be change. Imagine what it would be like 
if the Macintosh GUI were announced one week with world-wide 
flare and were gone in three months to be replaced by another variant. 
Welcome to the future.· 
Donald A. Norman3 promises, or perhaps threatens, that "there will always be new 
metaphors" for user interfaces to information systems. The theories and analysis 
methods described above will give us ways of determining which of these new 
metaphors, irrespective of an overall design methodology devised, and the design 
support tools eventually employed to create them, can be understood by users. 
These methods also give us ways of suggesting consistent ways of interacting with 
these new systems. 
3 Personal commWlication at book signing of (Nonnan, 1998), London, 26th October 1998. This 
remark, however, contradicts sections of (Norman, 1998), see pages 180-181, which were discussed 
in Section 5.1. 
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Appendix A 
Qualitative Process Theory Notation and Models of 
Generic Processes 
"One day, J had a saucepanjull of water on the gas ring. Just as it was about to boil, 
I was suddenly called away. When J came back, 20 minutes later, the saucepan was 
quite empty. Now I had locked the door; the window was closed, and the room was 
empty except for the cat. So obviously it was the cat who drank the water. " 
- Erik Satie (1866-1925), from sleeve notes, Piano Music, EMI Records. 
This appendix summanses the Qualitative Process Theory notation due to Forbus 
(1984) employed in this thesis. Possible QPT models of the generic commands that 
may be applied to files (Rosenberg & Moran, 1985) are also presented. 
A.1 Qualitative Process Theory Notation Employed in the 
Thesis 
Quantity-type 
Has-Quantity 
Individuals 
Preconditions 
Declaration of an object attribute. 
Declaration of an attribute possessed by a 
particular object type. 
The objects involved in, and affected by a process. 
Conditions which lie outside process definitions, 
usually suggesting some human intervention. 
Quanti tyCondi tions Conditions of values of attributes that must apply 
Relations 
Influences 
A[ ••• ] 
Am[ ••• ] 
1+( ••• ) 
1- ( ••• ) 
(T ••• ) 
OCQ+ 
before a process becomes acti vc. 
Relations between values of attributes of object. 
Values are directly influenced by other values 
while a process is active. 
The amount (value) of some attribute of an object. 
The magnitude of a value (sign is ignored). 
Value is directly influenced by other values. The 
value increases while the process is active. 
Decreasing direct influence. 
The proposition~ or condition~ is TRUE. 
A value is qualitatively proportional to another. 
The value increases while the process is active, 
but the relationship is not as well defined as with a 
direct influence. 
A value is inversely proportional to another. 
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A.2 QPT Models of Generic Commands 
A.2.1 Moving a file 
Process move-file 
Individuals: 
source-file an object, Has-Quantity(source-file, size) 
dest-file an object 
source-dir a directory 
dest-dir a directory, 
Has-Quantity(dest-dir, free-space) -
path a data-path, 
Connection(data-path,source-dir, dest-dir) 
Preconditions: 
(T task-is-move-file) 
Aligned(path) 
QuantityConditions: 
A[free-space{dest-folder)] > A[size(source-file)] 
A[size{source-file)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
Let move-rate be a quantity 
A[move-rate] > ZERO 
move-rate ocQ+ device-speed (dest-folder) 
move-rate ocQ_ system-load 
Influences: 
1- (size{source-file), A[move-rate]) 
1+ (size{dest-file), A[move-rate]) 
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A.2.2 Copying (or duplicating) a file 
Process copy-file 
Individuals: 
source-file an object, Has-Quantity(source-file, size) 
duplicate-file an object 
source-dir a directory 
dest-dir a directory, 
Has-Quantity(dest-dir, free-space) 
path a data-path, 
Connection(data-path,source-dir, dest-dir) 
Preconditions: 
(T task-is-move-file) 
Aligned{path) 
QuantityConditions: 
A[free-space(dest-dir)] > A[size{source-file)] 
A[size(source-file)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
Let copy-rate be a quantity 
A[Copy-rate] > ZERO 
copy-rate ~Q+ device-speed(dest-folder) 
copy-rate ~Q_ system-load 
Influences: 
1+ (size{duplicate-file), A[copy-rate]) 
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A.2.3 Deleting a file 
Process delete-file 
Individuals: 
file an object, Has-Quantity(file, size) 
Preconditions: 
(T task-is-delete-file) 
QuantityConditions: 
A[size(file)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
Let delete-rate be a quantity 
A[delete-rate] > ZERO 
delete-rate ocO- system-load 
delete-rate ocO+ device-speed 
Influences: 
I- (size(file), A[delete-rate]) 
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A.2.4 Printing a file 
Quantity-Type (pages-to-print) 
Quantity-Type (document-type) 
Quantity-Type (paper) 
Quantity-Type (printer-model) 
Quantity-Type(pages) 
process print-file 
Individuals: 
doc a document, 
Has-Quantity(doc, document-type), 
Has-Quantity(doc, pages) 
myprinter a printer, 
Has-Quantity (myprinter, pages-to-print), 
Has-Quantity (myprinter , printer-model), 
Has-Quantity (myprinter, paper) 
network a datapath, Connected (doc, myprinter, 
network) 
Preconditions: 
Aligned (network) 
(T task-is-print-file) 
QuantityConditions: 
A[paper(myprinter)] > ZERO 
A[pages-to-print(doc)] > ZERO 
Relations: 
Let print-rate be a quantity 
A[print-rate] > ZERO 
print rate ~Q printer-model(myprinter) 
printrate ~Q document-type(doc) 
Influences: 
I-(pages-to-print(doc), print-rate) 
I-(paper(myprinter), print-rate) 
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Appendix B 
Forms used to Conduct Cognitive Walkthroughs 
Chemist: Ah, certainly. Walk this way please. 
Man: If I could walk that way, I wouldn't need aftershave. 
- Chapman et al., Monty Python's Flying Circus: Just the Words Vol.}, Methuen. 
B.I Forms Completed During a Walkthrough 
During the second phase of a walkthrough, the walkthrough itself, a number of 
questions must be answered and forms completed by the individual(s) conducting the 
walkthrough for each action in the action sequence prepared which, if performed, 
would result in the successful completion of the task.. The forms for the full version 
of cognitive walkthrough undertaken and reported above are taken from Poison, 
Lewis, Rieman and Wharton (1992) and reproduced below. 
B.1.1 Section One of Phase Two of a Walkthrough 
Cognitive Walkthrough For A Step 
Task _____________ Action # ________ _ 
1. Goal structure for this step 
1.1 Correct goals. What are the appropriate goals for this point in the 
interaction? Describe as for initial goals. 
1.2 Mismatch with likely goals. What percentage of users will not have these 
goals, based on the analysis at the end of the previous step? Check each goal in 
this structure against your analysis at the end of the previous step. Based on that 
analysis, will all users have the goal at this point, or may some users have 
dropped it or failed to fonn it? Also check the analysis at the end of the previous 
step to see if there are unwanted goals, not appropriate for this step, that will be 
fonned or retained by some users. (% 0255075 100) 
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B.1.2 Section Two of Phase Two of a Walkthrough 
2. Choosing and executing the action. 
Correct action at this step: ____________ _ 
2.1 Availability. Is it obvious that the correct action is a possible choice here? If 
not, what percentage of users might miss it? (% 0255075 100) 
2.2 Label. What label or description is associated with the correct action? 
2.3 Link of label to action. If there is a label or description associated with the 
correct action, is it obvious, and is it clearly linked with this action? If not, what 
percentage of users might have trouble? (% 0255075 100) 
2.4 Link of label to goal. If there is a label or description associated the correct 
action, is it obviously connected with one of the current goals for this step? 
How? If not, what percentage of users might have trouble? Assume all users 
have the appropriate goals listed in Section 1. (% 0 2550 75100) 
2.5 No label. If there is no label associated with the correct action, how will 
users relate this action to a current goal? What percentage might have trouble 
doing so? (% 0 25 50 75 100) 
2.6 Wrong choices. Are there other actions that might seem appropriate to some 
current goal? If so, what are they and what percentage of users might choose 
one of these? (% 0 255075100) 
2.7 Time-out. If there is a time-out in the interface at this step does it allow time 
for the user to select the appropriate action? How many users might have 
trouble? (% 0 25 50 75 100) 
2.8 Hard to do. Is there an)1hing physically tricky about executing the action? 
If so, what percentage of users will have trouble? (% 02550 75 100) 
. 
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B.l.3 Section 3 of Phase Two of a Walkthrough 
3. Modification of goal structure 
Assume the correct action has been taken. What is the system's response? 
3.1 Quit or backup. Will users see that they have made progress towards some 
current goal? What will indicate this too them? What percentage of users will 
not see progress and try to quit or backup? (% 0 255075 100) 
3.2 Accomplished goals. List all current goals that have been accomplished. Is 
it obvious from the system response that each has been accomplished? If not, 
indicate for each how many users will not realise it is complete. 
3.3 Incomplete goals that look accomplished. Are there are any current goals 
that have not been accomplished, but might appear to have been based on the 
system response? What might indicate this? List any such goals and the 
percentage of users \vill (sic) think they have actually been accomplished. 
3.4 "And-then It structures. Is there an "and-then" structure, and does one of its 
subgoals appear to be complete? If the subgoal is similar to the supergoal, 
estimate how many users may prematurely terminate the "and-then" structure. 
3.5 New goals in response to prompts. Does the system response contain a 
prompt or cue that suggests any new goal or goals? If so, describe the goals. If 
the prompt is unclear, indicate the percentage of users \vho will not form these 
goals. 
3.6 Other nelV goals. Are there any other ne\v goals that users will form given 
their current goals, the state of the interface and their background knowledge? 
Why? If so, describe the goals, and indicate how many users \vill form them. 
NOTE that these goals mayor may not be appropriate, so forming them may be 
bad or good. 
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Appendix C 
Metaphors We Stack By 
"PeT IBak] has an appealing visual analogy faT a system at the critical state: a sand 
pile. " 
- Roger Lewin (1993) Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos, J. M. Dent. 
C.I Introduction 
The second version of the Medusa system, discussed in Chapter 9 above, is designed 
to make use of a version of the pile metaphor to support casual organisation of the 
user's work and to support ad hoc categorisation to aid performance of the user's 
immediate tasks. In this appendix an analysis is undertaken using the 
Lakoff/Johnson theol)' to attempt to ground the metaphorical language used to 
describe user's work and organisation of information. This analysis also seeks to 
define the aspects of the second Medusa user interface that support file organisation 
tasks. As we have not yet undertaken a study of users' existing pile-related tasks ( 
the analysis below is based upon the study undertaken by Malone (1983), who 
provides considerable data from the users that he studied. We quote considerably 
from Malone's (1983) paper below and use his text as the corpus to be analysed. The 
need to conduct a study of our own similar to Malone's is prompted by the analysis 
presented below, and would help to identify further issues and task scenarios that a 
computer-based pile system may need to support. 
C.2 Users' Construction and Use of Piles 
Malone classifies the construction and use of piles into two types, neat and messy. 
These categories reflect a user's job type and status in addition to their need for, and 
use of, information resources. This distinction is maintained below in collecting 
meaningful passages describing pile organisation from Malone's study in case a 
number of metaphors are found to be needed to describe piles and their use. 
e.2.1 A Neat Office 
In Malone's study, 'Michael' is said to have a neat office. Malone describes Michael's 
office and information usage saying: 
"As a purchasing agent, Michael's' \vork is based primarily on a set of 
standard forms. The arrangement of his office reflects the flow of 
these forms, and the description will focus on this flow. There are 
different piles and files in the office for different kinds of forms and 
for forms in various stages of processing. Michael summarised one 
aspect of this as follo\vs: 
The good stuff is all out on the table. The paperwork flow is 
always out. I don't put paperwork - other than the stuff that is in 
the suspense file - in a drawer. (M.P., 10/27/81) 
According to Michael's description, purchase requisitions enter his 
office in his in-basket (top of tray A) and he sorts them into two 
groups awaiting processing in pile B. Some requisitions can be 
processed immediately and put in the out-basket (bottom of tray A); 
others are kept in the 'hold' tray (middle of tray A) until further 
infonnation can be collected (usually by telephone). Each morning, 
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Michael sorts the processed forms from the out-basket (bottom of 
tray A) into folders in tray D for distribution. 
When his copy of a purchase order returns to Michael's in-basket, he 
files it in the suspense file (F) of open orders according to the date 
when the merchandise is supposed to be delivered. When forms 
confirming delivery ('receivers') amve from the receiving 
department. they are temporarily placed in pile H and then matched 
with the purpose orders on file ... Pile C contains purchase oroers from 
file F that require some special action as a result of someone calling 
to check on them or change them. 
The bookshelf contains primarily books and catalogues. loosely 
arranged. The bottom drawer of file F contains information on freight 
and commodities. arranged by subject. Information to be files here is 
also stacked in pile I and tray E. The desk file drawer includes more 
product information, administrative memos. and blank forms - again 
arranged by subject. Michael sometimes uses his blackboard to list 
important things to remember to do. and he has a bulletin board that 
contains some telephone numbers and address lists." (Malone, 1983: 
101-102) 
C.2.2. A Messy Office 
Malone offers as an example of a messy office that of 'Kenneth', saying: 
"As a research scientist. Kenneth has very little routine paper flow. 
Most of the information in his office consists of books, papers, 
magazines. personal notes, and computer listings. In contrast to 
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Michael's fairly neat and narrowly defined piles, Kenneth's office is 
filled with loosely stacked piles of mixed content. For example, here 
is how Kenneth describes the contents of piles A, B, C, D and E. 
Kenneth: Beside my terminal [piles A and B] are basically piles 
of stuff about what I need in hacking in the recent past. The 
deeper you go, the further back it is. Off to the right [gestures to 
piles C, D, and E] is stuff that I've shoved to the right when the 
pile beside my terminal got too high. But I've periodically 
pruned it so it's no longer useful; it's just a pile of junk .... 
Interviewer: ... But these things [gestures to piles A and B] - you 
know pretty well what's in these piles? 
Kenneth: Vh .. there's probably one or two copies of the paper 
David and I have been working on, piles of notes on [two 
projects], and there's probably some other random things -
documentation for computers ... Here's [pulls document out of 
pile B and reads its ,title]. Actually I have a ne\ver one 'sitting in 
the - I know there's a newer one sitting in the pile [looks through 
the pile A]..and I don't know where it is. Ah! here's a good one -
the new one. 
A similar lack of clear organisation prevails on the desk as well: 
Kenneth: The desk is sort of random. It's sort of mostly recent 
stuff, because I periodically do clean off my desk. For about 30 
seconds it's clean. I usually separate it into piles that have to be 
instantly answered, should be answered in a week, or whatever 
has appropriate places. That pile there is mostly stuff that should 
be dealt with in a \veek .. And it's been sitting for months. 
The desk mostly has right now sort of - I get infinite junk mail, 
subscribe to too many magazines. So a lot of that is magazine 
reading I haven't caught up on. And there's a few piles of critical 
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stuff in there. I don't know . .I'm sure when I find them. 
somebody will be mad at me for not answering their letter. I 
have a letter from Baker hidden someplace in here complaining 
about one of my papers. It's been here for a year and a half and I 
haven't answered it. (K. H. 10/16/81) 
The rest of the office has other piles of books and papers on the floor 
as well as on tables and shelves. The bookshelves include binders of 
computer documentation. technical reports. and back -issues of 
journals. some of which are filed with cardboard dividers. There are 
two bulletin boards containing assorted items such as letters. phone 
messages. research notes. and a raffle ticket The blackboard 
contains. among other things. remnants of several conversations and 
two partially redundant lists of things to do." (Malone. 1983: 103-
104) 
The two case studies that Malone details. which are quoted from above. differ in 
their use of piles .• In both cases. though. the exact roles of piles in the temporal 
order and time scales in which tasks must be performed (and in the success with 
which deadlines are met) are similar. Also similar are the language and metaphors 
used by Malone. 'Kenneth'. and 'Michael' to describe interaction with piles. These 
metaphors will be examined in the following section. 
C.3 A Logic of Piling 
A fundamental image schema that describes much bodily experience. 10 the 
Lakoffllohnson view, is the CONTAINER schema. lohnson (1987) observes that 
human beings constantly experience their bodies as containers and as things in 
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containers (for example, rooms). The notion of containment, as is captured in an 
image schema, is depicted in Figure C.l. 
o 
Figure e.l A containment schema (Johnson, 1987: 23) 
The container schema, in Lakofrs (1987) description has the structural elements of 
an interior, a boundary and an exterior, and like many image schemas its internal 
structure yields a basic "logic". This logic is described by Lakoff (1987: 272) as 
follo\vs: 
"Everything is either inside a container or out of it - P or not P. If 
container A is in container B and X is in A, then X is in B - which is 
the basis for modus ponens: If all A's are B's and X is an A, then X is 
aB." 
10hnson (1987: 22) identifies a number of consequences of the structure of in-out 
schemata of the sort that will ground understanding of actions that bring about or 
change instances of containment, these consequences being: 
"(i) The experience of containment typically involves protection 
from, or resistance to, external forces ... 
(ii) Containment also limits and restricts forces within the 
container ... 
(iii) Because of this restraint of forces, the constrained object gets 
a relative fixity of location ... 
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(iv) This relative fixing of location within the container means that 
the contained object becomes either accessible or inaccessible 
to the view of some observer. It is either held so that it can be 
observed, or else the container itself blocks or hides the object 
from view. 
(v) Finally, we experience transitivity of containment. If B is in 
A, then whatever is in B is also in A.II 
We can reveal the user's work language and the metaphors that ground 
understanding of a domain by applying the methods suggested by the few metaphor-
based design approaches that exist. The method used by Lakoff and Johnson 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987) is to catalogue actual 
speech production in order to highlight metaphors and to link speech to the concepts 
underlying it. The method is similar to that of the textual analysis used in object-
oriented design, we identify metaphors by highlighting (by underlining) verbs and 
nouns that describe piles and interaction with them. It is possible, by examining the 
ways that Malone and his subjects talk about pile organisation and the gestures 
observed by Malone as his subjects describe their information resource organisation, 
to conclude that understanding of piles is based on the PILE IS CONTAINER 
metaphor. The first Medusa system, described in Chapter 6, examined the 
consequences of the FOLDER IS CONTAINER metaphor underlying document 
organisation in systems that implement the desktop user interface metaphor. Also in 
Chapter 9, the question raised by Mander, Salomon and Wong (1992) as to how 
their pile metaphor fitted in with the Apple implementation of the desktop metaphor 
as a whole was considered. As piles and folders are understood in terms of the same 
image schemata, one can question whether the pile is much of an advance over the 
traditional folder. One is able to understand users' confusion over the behaviour of 
piles and folders being used in the same desktop environment when files pass over, 
or are dropped onto, piles and folders. The image schemata that ground 
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understanding of both piles and folders are the same. We can suggest, therefore, that 
a user confronted by a folder on the top of a pile is likely to conclude that a file 
dropped ont~ the pile will be placed in the folder, the folder being the apparent target 
for the file when dropped. Means of overcoming this ambiguity within the second 
version of the Medusa system were discussed previously in Chapter 9. 
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